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SUMMARY
Haag, M.E. (1978) A. Study of the CDU/CSU Opposition to the Qst- 
politik in the 6th German Bundestag, 1969 - 72, Ph.D. Thesis, Uni­
versity of Surrey. The study aims to examine the behaviour and nature 
of the parliamentary opposition in the Federal Republic of Germany be­
tween 1969 and 1972, with special reference to the Ostpolitik of the 
first Brandt/Scheel government. An account of the conceptual back­
ground to the study of opposition in general, and of opposition in 
Germany and in the Federal Republic in particular, establishes the 
framework of the study, which seeks to give a detailed account of the 
plenary sessions of the 6th Bundestag relevant to the opposition.to 
the Ostpolitik. Special attention is paid to the Bundestag members* 
perception! of the roles of government and opposition, to their atti­
tudes to conflict in the area of foreign policy and to the style of 
this conflict. At the same time a chronological account is provided 
of the progress of the SPD/FDP Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik as 
it is revealed by the stenographic reports of the plenary sessions of 
the 6th, Bundestag. The approach of the CDU/CSU to loyal opposition^ is 
analysed and an attempt is then made to characterize a* specifically 
Vest German concept of opposition and to explain the ambivalent and 
confused attitudes shown towards it. The period chosen is particularly 
informative about these, due to the nature of the constitutional 
crises arising from the controversy over the Ostpolitik. The conse­
quences of this experience for future political conflict and political 
stability in the Federal Republic are assessed.
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INTRODUCTION
The period 1969 ” 72 was a particularly important one in the 
history of the Federal Republic of Germany. The first change of 
power resulted from the 1969 elections, putting the CDU/CSU into 
opposition for the first time and marking the beginning of what 
appears to be a stable system of government/opposition alternation 
in power. The behaviour of the opposition during the 1969 - 72 
period is especially interesting because of the nature of the major 
policy initiatives of the new government. The first SPD/FDP govern­
ment in the history of the Federal Republic undertook to cement 
the reorientation of the official foreign policy stance, which 
had begun under previous governments. The main result of the re- 
cognition of a second German state and of agreements with the Soviet 
Union, Poland and the DDR was to put an end to the myth that the 
Federal Republic was a provisional state, eventually to be reunited 
with other parts of 1937 Germany, once the Germans were again able 
to exercise self-determination. The internal political system of 
the Federal Republic was to be severely tested by the controversy 
over the Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik which had this result.
The 6th Bundestag was paralysed by dissenters from the government 
side, for the first time the opposition attempted to use the con­
structive vote of no confidence provided for in the constitution, 
and for the first time the Bundestag was prematurely dissolved by 
the Chancellor after he had failed to win a vote of confidence.
A detailed examination of the plenary sessions of the 6th Bundestag 
is used in this study to provide new insights into the processes 
leading up to these events and to investigate the character of the
Bundestag, the political style of its members and most especially
the approach of the new CDU/CSU opposition. Particular attention 
is paid to the political traditions which help to shape the West
German idea of opposition as expressed in the 6th Bundestag and it
is noted that the confusion and ambivalence surrounding this idea 
is also present in the German academic literature on parliamentary 
opposition. An assessment is made of the extent to which a specifi­
cally German concept and style of parliamentary opposition may be 
said to exist in the Federal Republic and of how these relate to 
the political culture and the institutional framework within which 
the opposition operates.
I BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY OF OPPOSITION
A The concept of opposition 
1 Opposition and democracy
The subject of this study is the parliamentary opposition in the
Federal Republic of Germany, that is, an institutionalised political 
opposition in a western-type liberal democracy. A liberal democracy 
may be broadly defined here as one which provides, above all, freedom 
of political choice, as well as a political system which allows that 
choice to operate. Institutionalised opposition is an integral part 
of such a system and is often regarded as one aspect of government.
It is considered so important in the functioning of a liberal demo­
cratic political system that its existence is often given as a 
necessary, or even sufficient condition of such a system, so that it
is frequently part of the definition of a liberal democracy.
Many authors take institutionalised political opposition as ’’the 
hallmark of those political societies which are variously called 
democratic, liberal, parliamentary, constitutional, pluralistic- 
constitutional, or even open or free”, and they agree that its 
presence and functioning can become a criterion for free democratic
1 Ghita Ionescu & Isabel de Madariaga, Opposition; Past and Present 
of a Political Institution (Pelican, 1972), p. 16.
order. Seymour Martin Lipset has written that without "a political 
system allowing the peaceful ’play’ of power, the adherence by the 
’outs’ to the decisions made by the ’ins’, and the recognition by
2
the 'ins' of the rights of the 'outs’ there can be no democracy". 
The same point is stated by Robert Dahl, who claims that one may 
regard "the existence of an opposition party as very nearly the 
most distinctive characteristic of democracy itself”. In consider­
ing the conditions favourable to democratising a given state, cre­
ating a ’polyarchy’, as Dahl^ calls a liberal democratic regime, he 
uses the following paraphrase: ”a regime in which the opponents of 
the government can openly and legally organize into political
parties in order to oppose the government in free and fair elec- 
5 .
tions.” These opinions of Dahl seem to be generally regarded as 
authoritative and form the basis for much of the subsequent writing 
on opposition. ~
In an early German article on institutionalised opposition, Eanns 
Seidel already affirmed that this kind of opposition had developed 
as "ein wesentliches Ordnungselement eines funktionierenden demo- 
kratischen Herrschaftssystems".^ Without this element a democratic 
system could not function. More recent German opinion restates the 
conclusion of a large number of sources that "zur Realitat der
2 Political Man (London, 1960), p. 21.
3 In Preface to Robert Dahl (ed.) Political Qpposi.tions in Western 
Democracies (Yale. 1966), p. xvi.
4 Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition (Yale, 1970*
5 Ibid., p. 1.
6 ’Die Funktion der Opposition im parlamentarischen System*, repr. 
in Politische Studien, 25, Heft 218 (1974), p. 583. (orig. 1955)
.7Demokratie gehort auch die Opposition, and speaks of "die Iden-
Q
tifizierung der Demokratie durch Opposition". An important con­
tribution to the work of both American and German political science
9
on opposition was made by Otto Kirchheimer. He came to regard 
opposition as necessary for democracy, in that he saw the alter­
nation of government and opposition in a political system as the
■ 1'0guarantee of human rights and freedoms. This belief is echoed
by Bertrand de Jouvenel:" ... the means of opposition are the in-
' . . 11 
frastructure of a. system of political liberty", and in a
different way by Ralf Dahrendorf who asserts: "liberal democracy
■ 12
is government by conflict" .These are only examples of versions 
of the sentiment shared by numerous others: a viable opposition 
is a necessity in a democratic system.
However, the use of the term opposition by the above and other 
sources differs from author to author. Some may refer to a very 
wide notion of any form of opposing government, others to the
7 Norbert Gehrig, Parlament - Regierung - Opposition* (Munich,
1969), p. 79.
8 Heinrich Oberreuter, Introduction to Parlamentarische Oppo­
sition, Ein internationaler Vergleich (Hamburg. 1975), P* 8.
9 He and other German and German-American political scientists 
are necessarily conditioned by German political experiences, 
as will be shown later.
10 J. Herz & E. Hula, Introduction to F.S. Burin & K. L. Shell (eds.) , 
Politics, Law and Social Change: selected essays of Otto Kirch- 
■heimer (New York, 1969), P* xxv.
11 ’The means of contestation', Government, and OiDnosition 1, no. 2 
(1966), p. 157.
12 Society and. Democracy in Germany (London, 1968), p. 174-
narrow idea of parliamentary opposition (= alternative government)
"based on the British model* A. comprehensive list of possible uses of
■ 13
the term opposition is given by Rodney Barker but is .too extensive 
for the purposes of this study. In what follows usage is generally 
clear from the context, and as regards the above sources, it is 
sufficient to note that the fundamental assertion in each case is 
the same: tha£ political opposition and democracy are inseparable.
2 Concepts of democracy
The way in which opposition is thought to be essential to democracy 
depends on the concept of democracy assumed. It may be useful here 
to outline possible ideas of democracy in order to clarify the 
part opposition is considered to play in it. The concept of- de­
mocracy always contains the basic ideas of sovereignty of the 
people, the rule of!the majority and political equality. In practice, 
most democratic systems have also been concerned with controlling 
the power of the majority, that is, with preserving as much freedom 
from coercion as possible.
The notion that a democracy is a political system which allows all 
its adult citizens to share widely in decision-making^ is an ex­
pression of the first three basic ideas, whereas the definition 
that a democracy is a regime under which the citizens can exert
13 In Introduction to Rodney Barker (ed.) Studies in Opposition. 
(London, 197”0> P* 4*
14 Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (New Haven, 1963) P« 8.
15
a relatively high decree of control over leaders assumes these
and concentrates on the preservation of freedom by the control of
16government power. A; further definition by the same author , which 
states that a democracy is a regime completely or almost completely 
responsive to all its citizens, reasserts political equality and 
the protection of the minority, in that it should be possible for 
government to take the preferences of all citizens into account in 
deci sion-making.
The concern in this study is with liberal democracy rather than
-J7 \
with egalitarian or totalitarian democracy , and this, suggests 
Dahrendorf, is dependent on an attitude which "searches for insti­
tutional means to control the powerful in order to keep the politi-
Q
cal system open for ever new solutions". The ideas of responsiveness 
of government and control of government power are again reflected 
here, and both may be achieved by institutionalised opposition. The 
presence and functioning of such an opposition may be held to depend 
on the social and political culture of the state in question, or on 
the provisions of the state's constitution, or, more plausibly, on 
a combination of socio-political and constitutional factors. The 
means of controlling the power of the majority rule which results 
from popular sovereignty is of course the basic problem: the 
question of how democracy can be made liberal.
15 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, 195&) P*3*
16 Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, p. 2.
17 Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, p. 25*
18 Ibid.
This problem is one which has affected Germany, but which does 
not arise if an already liberal society is made democratic, as in
the British case* This point is made by ,Dahl when he sets up two
dimensions necessary to 'polyarchy' (= liberal democracy): inclu­
siveness, i.e., the right of large numbers of citizens to participate 
(this is democratic in the narrow sense) and openess, i.e., allowing 
public opposition (=liberal). It has already been states that the 
main concern of authors on democracy is this second dimension. For
the sense of democracy to mean majority rule may be criticised for
on
not taking intensity of minority preference into account. If 
majority policy is carried out regardless of intensity, a situation 
may arise in which one side regards the victory of the other as a " 
threat to its existence. The principle of majority rule would then 
be rejected. Constitutional provisions may be made to meet such 
situations, but they may be prevented if the system is sufficiently 
responsive to all claims.
It has been suggested that a way to ensure that government is re­
sponsive is to reject the majority principle and conceive democracy 
as political equality or power-sharing. In this view political 
equality should not cease at the voting stage but should be reflected 
in decision-making bodies whose goal is unanimity. However, this 
appears to be majority rule after all, since dissenters would be 
persuaded or coerced into agreement. There is an important difference 
between agreeing to a decision and agreeing to abide by it. It is
19 Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, Ch. 3*
20 A/Preface to Democratic Theory, Ch. 4-
this second kind of agreement which is involved in the British type
government/opposition system. This system has equally been considered
•power sharing', in as much as opposition may be viewed as part of 
21
government, whose wishes will be taken into account by the govern­
ment to some extent. In this view, democracy is not, as Aristotle 
claimed, the rule of many in their own interests, but is seen very 
optimistically as ’the rule of many in the interests of all*.
3 The history of opposition
The history of parliamentary or institutionalised opposition is 
that of the development of the British parliamentary system. However,
the notion of some organized control of governmental power may be
' ' ■ 23 ■ ~ ' ■
traced back to earlier times. The Roman tribunes, who had the power
to check the action of the government through the magistrates, are
given as one example of early opposition. However, their position was
quite different to that of present-day institutionalised opposition
and more akin to the position of interest groups or trade unions,
since, as de Jouvenel writes: ’’the essential value of the Tribunate
was that the people were defended by those who did not aspire to 
24.
become masters". The main virtue of the ’potestas’ of the Roman 
Tribunate was, then, its identification with the governed and indepen­
dence of government. The modern institution of opposition is in a
21 Ionescu & Madariaga, p. 10.
22 Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p.27*
23 De Jouvenel, p. 159 ff•5 Ionescu & Madariaga, Ch. 2.
24 De Jouvenel, p. 161.
similar position in the latter respects, but ideally its personnel 
and those of the government are interchangeable. A second example 
of early opposition were the French lParlements, (de Jouvenel). These 
were courts which could intervene in public affairs and in the ad­
ministration of laws, and their position was in many ways comparable 
to that of the Tribunate.
The immediate forerunners of modern opposition, suggests de Jouvenel, 
were representatives, such as members of parliament, whose role in 
earlier times was to restrain the rulers by keeping them in touch 
with opinion from their special area, profession, etc. Nowadays, 
members of parliament are not so widely regarded as representatives 
in that sense and government is obliged to negotiate separately with 
those who are, such as trade unionists and leading industrialists.
The historical origins of political opposition of the modern, in­
stitutionalised type are, as already stated, to be found in the 
'classical' British parliamentary system. The 19th century saw the 
appearance of parliamentary regimes and of opposition as an institution
which had, in the British case, developed as an essential part of
25
the political system. Seidel suggests that the English parliament 
itself developed from the drive to oppose and to control the crown 
and the executive. In the 17th century the function of opposing was 
carried out by the parliament as a whole, but with the increase of 
parliamentary power and the selection of ministers from the strongest 
party, parliament and the executive became interconnected. Govern-
25 "Die Funktion der Opposition", p. 583*
ment responsibility came to rest with the parliamentary majority 
and impaired its ability to control or criticise government policy.
The function of opposition was therefore passed to the minority.
Seidel maintains that this process is characteristic for the concept 
of parliamentary opposition and it will be noted later in this study 
that this has only recently been recognised in the Federal Republic 
of Germany.
Since it was termed ’His Majesty's Opposition' in 1826, the British 
opposition has enjoyed an officially recognized status as an alter­
native government, and this fact is seen as a guarantee of responsible 
or, as Seidel terms it, 'constructive' opposition. The system is in 
most cases regarded as classical and many authors see West European 
systems as variants of this model. Its main feature is the 'game of 
alternation' , the smooth transfer of governme'htal power from one 
party to another, and a special characteristic is that the leader 
of the opposition is officially recognised and paid a state salary.
A two-party system is mostly considered essential for this 'game* 
and it is regarded by authors such as de Jouvenel and Ionescu and 
Madariaga as a special and rare case, a product of the unique de­
velopment of the British parliamentary system since 1688. It was 
this development which led to the two-party system and to the 
acceptance of the opposition as an alternative government as early 
as 1783. This opposition was loyal and constructive and evolved 
not as a sectional interest group but as opposition to the govern­
ment of the day.
26 otto Kirchheimer, 'The V/aning of Opposition in Parliamentary 
Regimes', (1957)> repr. in Burin & Shell, p. 293*
27 Kurt Kluxen, Introduction to 'Die parlamentarische Opposition* in 
Kurt Kluxen (ed.) Parlamentarismus (Cologne, 1967), p.394-
4 Prerequisites and conditions for the functioning of opposition
For 'classical1, British-type opposition to function it would 
seem that there must he two parties or stable groupings offering
alternatives, but these must be within the limits of broad agreement
■■ 28
on major objectives, or at least on the permissible rate of change. 
Since this classical model did not develop in continental Europe, 
Kirchheimer has attempted to investigate the conditions necessary 
for a British-type parliamentary system to operate. He maintains 
that there must be wide agreement on basic home policies and on the 
allowable rate of change or reform, and there must be reliance on 
the part of the opposition that the majority will keep it or its 
leader informed about foreign policy, and will take dissent into 
consideration. A' third important condition for Kirchheimer is that 
the bureaucracy and the military will accept the orders of their 
political masters in the parliamentary government, and a fourth, 
that there is general recognition of the basic rules of conduct, 
i.e., that the government will not use its control of the govern­
mental apparatus unfairly, so as to stay permanently in office, and 
that the opposition will not obstruct or sabotage government policies.
Another version of the prerequisites for the functioning of 
parliamentary opposition is as follows: parliament must be sovereign, 
it must be recognised as representative and there must be political
28 Otto Kirchheimer, 'Majorities and Minorities in Western Euro­
pean Governments ', 1959; repr. in Burin & Shell, p. 279*
29 This condition, particularly, is a very obvious example of the 
German conditioning mentioned on p. 3*
. . . ' 30 ' ■ ■ ‘
parties competing m  it. Parliamentary sovereignty is derived
from the sovereign will of the people, and this will is the source 
of the constitution, to which there should be no opposition. Oppo­
sition should only be on the day-to-day running of the principles 
laid down. It is essential that the people’s representatives can 
make majority decisions, but at the same time the right of the 
minority to dissent and to aspire to become the majority is re­
cognized.
Seymour Martin Lipset is also thinking of the ’classicalV oppo­
sition model when he sets up his conditions for alternative govern-
'31 ■
ment. These are that there must be a constitutional opportunity
to change government officials and that a large part of the popula­
tion must have the chance of influencing political decisions by 
choosing among the candidates for political office. However, these 
conditions depend on a further two: that there is consensus as to 
which political institutions are legitimate and that there is a set 
of leaders in office and one or more sets of recognised leaders 
attempting to gain office^ Lipset1s first two broad conditions are 
another version of Dahl’s two dimensions of polyarchy: competitive­
ness and inclusiveness. The second two conditions are also suggested 
by Giovanni Sartori, who maintains that the Western term opposition 
is associated with a particular party system and with alternation in 
power, and that this kind of opposition presupposes peaceful politics
30 Ionescu & Madariaga, p. 34 - 55*
31 Political Han, p. 45*
32based on fundamental agreement. Both authors are referring to the
need for dualism or polarisation based on consensus. Consensus is
also stressed by Kirchheimer when he states that a classical
government/opposition system needs moderate politicians and the basic
33
confidence of the opposition in the sincerity of the government.
Similar conditions and others which are anyway basic to democracy 
as a whole are mentioned by authors referring to a more general notion 
of political opposition. As systems with legal and peaceful oppo­
sition are comparatively few in number, they must be difficult to 
introduce or to maintain, it is suggested. Opposition is permitted 
in regimes where the government considers coercion would either fail 
or be too costly and it is unlikely to be suppressed if there is a 
pluralistic social order, a decentralised economy and no inter­
ference by the military in politics. A situation favourable to the 
functioning of political opposition is, of course, one favouring
democracy generally. Dahl uses evidence quoted by two studies on
35 . '
political culture to list the following favourable conditions: 
there must be a belief in the legitimacy of a democratic system.,
32 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Opposition and Control; Problems and Pros­
pects', Government and Opposition 1, no. 2 (1966)> p. 151*
33 ’The Waning of Opposition', p. 294-
34 Dahl, Oppositions in Western Democracies, p. xii.
35 Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political 
Development (Princeton, 1965); Gabriel Almond land Sidney Verba, 
The Civic Culture (Princeton, 1963)*
authority relationships should be democratic, there should be con­
fidence in the effectiveness of government, there should be trust
between those active politically and they should possess the ability
35
to cooperate as well as to compete. These conditions and those of 
■■ 37
Hans Daalder overlap to some extent. He suggests 1. a sense of 
shared political community, 2. a relatively stable pluralistic 
balance of social groups, 3« attitudes favouring relativism in 
demands, and 4* recognition of the need for accountability to the 
electorate. Daalder is hot thinking of Western democracies, but his 
list has some application especially to the newer West European 
democracies.
While terminology and emphasis vary a good deal, some generally 
recognized conditions for the functioning of opposition emerge from 
the various lists above. Basic agreement on the system and on its 
legitimacy are important and should be accompanied by confidence, 
above all among politicians, that each side will 'play fair1. Fur­
ther, there should be moderate polarisation around two, or not many 
more than two, political parties, and there should not be political 
interference by traditionally, or at least ideally 'neutral' groups 
such as the military.
36 Oppositions in Western Democracies. Ch. 12.
37 'Government and Opposition in the New States', Government’ and 
Opposition 1, no. 2 (1966), p. 205/6.
5 Party Systems and Opposition
As a two party or near-two party system is considered by the authors 
mentioned here to be most favourable, if not a necessary condition 
for the functioning of a classical government/opposition pattern, it 
may be useful here to consider various opinions concerning party 
systems and opposition*
In a two party system both parties aim at gaining a majority and 
seek support from groups mainly loyal to their opponents. There can­
not therefore be too heavy emphasis on the interests of their cus­
tomary supporters. In elections, the parties try to convince divergent 
groups of their common interests. A two party system thus encourages 
compromise and a basic consensus between the parties. It also means
that material goals rather than ideological ones are stressed. The
*. . . .
1 outs * can realistically aspire to office and are therefore less 
likely to follow exaggerated ideals, which might be embarrassing to 
office-holders. The 'rules of the game' are reinforced and the focus 
moves away from party differences towards party leaders. A two party 
system is claimed to maintain the entire electorate committed to the 
system rather than to a party, since the disappointed voter, it is 
argued, can blame the governing party and not the regime, and can 
try to replace that government by the opposition. Each party tries
to represent the whole nation and, as the government, is temporarily
■ 38 : . ■ .
identified with the state. Lipset also points out that in multi-
38 Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Party Systems and the Representation of 
Social Groups' in R. Dahl and D.E. Neubauer (eds.) Readings in 
Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, 1968), p* 109*
party states the differences between the parties tend to be magnified, 
since parties competing for the same vote endeavour to gain a distinct 
profile* Each party is consciously trying to represent a section of 
the electorate only and will maintain that only the state can repre­
sent the whole nation and that the state is above parties. Also, in 
a multi-party system, lesser parties can have a disproportionate in­
fluence on coalition formation so that election results are scarcely 
reflected in the composition of governments. The electorate cannot 
necessarily turn out leaders who disappoint it. Lipset feels that . 
a two party system is preferable to a multi-party system, except, 
he points out, in cases where polarisation is so intense that neither 
side can accept the other as an alternative government.
Since a very special constellation of factors is needed for a two 
party system to function, such a system is unlikely to work in most 
states in the opinion of Robert Dahl.'He has suggested the following 
conditions: 1. parliament is sovereign in law and in .fact, 2. there 
is majority rule in parliament, 3* there is consensus on 1. and 2., 
and on other parts of the system, 4• there are two basic groups of 
opinion which are stable but not fixed, and 5•there are two political 
parties, neither of which expects to be out of office indefinitely.^^ 
These conditions are remarkably similar to those generally given for 
the functioning of opposition and this reflects the interdependence 
of 1alternative-government’ opposition and the two party system.
39 Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, p. 595.
Both Sartori^ and MauriceDuverger^V agree that real 'alternative- 
government' or institutionalised opposition is only viable in a two 
party system. Opposition in vmulti-party systems tends to be 
shifting and its role cannot be to provide clear-cut alternatives.
If there are three, four or five parties, all may share power at 
some time, but if there are more the result is 'semi-turnover', 
claims Sartori, which means that some parties, usually extremist , 
ones, are permanently out of office and their opposition tends to 
become irresponsible. Sartori stresses that the distinction between 
two party and multi-party systems is misleading since it ignores the 
states with three, four or five parties. These are more sensibly 
classified separately as 'moderate multi-party'. The most important 
distinction is between these and the extreme multi-party systems, 
not between systems with two parties and those with more than two. 
Sartori prefers a different classification based on polarity.
Systems can be bipolar, and therefore centripetal, or multi-polar, 
and therefore centrifugal. He denies that dualism in politics is 
natural, an idea taken up by Duverger, and maintains that there 
is always a centre in politics, although there may not be a centre 
party. The two, three, four or five party systems may be suitable 
for responsible opposition, but extreme pluralism of parties means 
that each has limited access to government and therefore tends to­
wards irresponsible tactics such as overpromising and outbidding.^
40 'European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism* in
J. Lapalombara & M. Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Politi­
cal Development (Princeton, 1966), p. 137 “ 1?6.
41 Political Parties (Paris, 1954)> p. 414*
42 Sartori, 'European Political Parties', p. 137 - 140*
43 Ibid., p. 158.
This is not real competition. In this situation parties may also be­
come ideological and doctrinaire, and so increasingly unrealistic 
in attitude. All this contributes to the disintegration of consensus 
and to a lack of concern for resolving conflicts. The conclusion is 
that multi-party systems are very unlikely to be as.suitable as two 
party systems for the functioning of responsible opposition.
6 Classification of types of opposition
Most authors classify opposition according to whether or not it 
supports the political system it operates in, i.e., as 'constitutional 
or 1 anti-system1, as 'competitive1 or 'contesting*, as 'responsible* 
or 'irresponsible', as 'loyal opposition' or 'opposition of principle* 
Constitutional opposition is the,, term used by Sartori to describe the 
opposition in Western democracies, which not only works within the 
constitution but also intends to preserve it. This concept is related 
to the 'fair play' idea of politics, as Sartori calls it, which is 
seen as " a game played by correct players to whom cheating appears 
more disgraceful than losing".^ This kind of opposition is the out­
come of a long process of constitutional!sation of politics and it 
presupposes peaceful politics and basic consensus. Its antithesis is 
'anti-system' opposition, which, may work within a given constitution, 
but has the intention of destroying it, if successful. Oppositions 
can vary along a continuum between these two extremes and may be
44 'Opposition and Control' p. 151•
more, or less * responsible1, according to their expected possible 
future share in government. Sartori amalgamates the concepts of 
constitutional and responsible to arrive at a division into three 
basic patterns of opposition: responsible and constitutional, con­
stitutional but not responsible and neither responsible nor consti- 
45 "
tutional. This last is then termed ’contesting1 opposition.
The idea of a continuum along which patterns of opposition can 
vary is taken up by Dahl, who concludes that there is a great variety 
of patterns of opposition in democratic systems and no single pre­
vailing pattern. There are at least six ways in which oppositions 
can vary. The first is in organisational cohesion, and this obvious­
ly depends on the party system. The classical opposition of the two 
party system is rare and does not apply to the United States, where 
oppositions are formed across party lines, except at election time.
The European multi-party or moderate multi-party system is more the 
rule. A second difference can be in the competitiveness of the oppo­
sition, and this again depends on the number and nature of the 
parties involved. Parties may compete directly for key votes in elec­
tions, or they may aim their campaign at only one section of the 
electorate. A third point of difference is in the site or setting of 
the opposition, which may occur in parliament or elsewhere such as 
in the institutions of f e d e r a l i s m T h e  fourth point is distinctive­
ness. The classical model is very distinct, for example, whereas 
the fluctuating oppositions of the United States are indistinct. The
45 * Opposition and Control’, p. 153.
46 See also Carl Friedrich, ’Federalism and Opposition’, Government 
and Opposition 1, no. 3 (1966) p. 286, where it is shown that 
federalism can be a useful alternative method of institutionalising 
opposition.
fifth point deals with the goals of the opposition, which may be to 
change government personnel or policies, or to change the structure 
of the political or socio-economic system. Western oppositions are 
usually of the ’limited structural’ type, according to Dahl. A high 
degree of structural opposition would be what others term ’anti­
system’ or opposition of principle. The final way in which opposition 
patterns may differ is in the strategies adopted. These are necessarily 
linked with oppositional goals. Dahl differentiates between the 
following types of strategy: 1. strict election competition, 2. con­
centration on entering a government coalition, 3* concentration on 
entering a coalition and on bargaining with other groups,.4* con­
centration on local elections, pressure groups, etc., 5« forming 
a broad coalition during a crisis, 6. revolutionary opposition which 
attempts to discredit the regime and destroy the system. In an attempt 
to explain these various patterns, Dahl suggests some contributing 
factors. The constitutional arrangements of a given state can make 
a difference, although it cannot be defined. Attitudes are important; 
towards the political system these may be of allegiance, apathy or 
alienation, towards others generally of trust or distrust. The value 
put upon cooperation as against retention of individuality is also
' 47 -a factor , as is the approach to problem solving; pragmatic or 
rationalistic. The existence of regional, ethnic or religious sub­
cultures, or of serious economic, social or ideological cleavages 
can also affect the structure of the opposition. There is also some 
evidence that past experience of political successes or failures
47 of* Dahrendorf, p. 327> on public and private virtues.
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can act to condition the pattern of opposition. For the purposes
of an individual analysis, such as that of this study, the rough 
classification of parliamantary opposition according to its 
tendency towards cooperation or competition, which emerges from
49 .
Dahl's strategy analysis, is likely to be the most useful.
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Otto Kirchheimer has suggested three models of opposition ; 
the classical, or 19th century British type, opposition of 
principle, which is anti-system, revolutionary or irresponsible 
in other classifications, and a third model, in which he was 
particularly interested, a counter-concept to opposition in which 
the .'opposition1 "relates to government under various forms of
cartel arrangements among political organisations operating within
.'51 -
the framework of parliamentary institutions''^ , which he calls 
'the waning of opposition'. The first model, classical opposition, 
is characterized by the 'game of alternation' and the recognition 
that the opposition has a right to maintain its policy lines after 
the electorate has rejected them. The classical opposition pre­
sents itself as an alternative government and aims to focus public 
attention on the possibility and desirability of a change by means 
of an election. The government permits the opposition to carry 
out this function, but the monopoly of final decision-making is
48 Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, Ch. 11 & 12.
49 This classification is widely used in parliamentary studies,
notably recently by Oberreuter, Parlamentarische Opposition.
p.2; see also Hans-Joachim Veen, Opposition im Bundestag (Bonn, 
1976), p. 13 - 17-
50 'The Waning of Opposition', p. 292 - 5.
51 Ibid., p. 293*
with the government party* In other articles, Kirchheimer calls this
52model ‘loyal* opposition* The second model, opposition of principle, 
is exemplified by European socialism from 1880 - 1900 and by 20th 
century totalitarian parties. This kind of opposition intends to 
destroy the parliamentary system and can be successful in this, since 
its presence forces the parliamentary parties to abandon the ‘rules 
of the game’* This renders role reversal of government and oppo-
cz
sition impossible and means the end of the system. The third 
counter-concept to opposition is applied to a situation in which 
government through cartel is considered to effectively eliminate 
opposition. This third concept will be dealt with in more detail 
later.
7 The role and function of opposition
Criticism, control and alternative are the universally quoted 
functions of parliamentary opposition.^ There is general agreement 
among the authors mentioned here that criticism can help to keep 
ideas of dissent and freedom alive, and that the opposition's
52 e.g. in 'Germany; the vanishing opposition', Burin & Shell,p.319*
53 Here again, Kirchheimer's main, if not sole example must be 
Germany.
54 . The extent to which this may be termed an 'opposition ideology*,
an interesting suggestion by Hans-Peter Schneider in Die Parla- 
mentarische Opposition im Verfassungsrecht der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland (Frankfurt, 1974)t will be discussed later in this
existence alone can be a factor in controlling the actions of 
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government. The classical idea of opposition is that it should try
to force the government in power to modify domestic and foreign
policies and to replace it at the next election by offering clear-
56cut alternatives. The notion of control of government power is 
bound up with the Western-democratic conviction that there must be
respect for and protection of minorities. The opposition is also re-
. : ' 57  ■.
garded as an information channel and safety-valve for minorities.
It should be the means of the governed to contest the power of the 
government and to check its actions by discussion and criticism. It 
is stressed by de Jouvenel that an opposition does not have to be 
the British type to carry out these functions. However, alternative 
government is perceived to provide the citizen with a means of in­
timidating the government in power and is therefore often thought 
to be the most effective type of opposition.
The idea of control of government is disputed by some authors on 
the British parliament who consider that if there is any control of 
government in parliament it will, come most effectively from the
government’s own back benches and not from the opposition, whose
r 59 '■'■■■
minority position leaves it powerless. Parliamentary control is
55 Ionescu & Madariaga, p. 13•
56 . Michael Hereth, Die narlamentarische Opposition in der Bundes-
republik Deutschland (Munich. 1969), p. 10.
57 Sartori, ’Opposition and Control’, p. 150.
58 1 The Means of Contestation’, p. 157.
59 Richard Crossman, Introduction to W. Bagehot, The English Con­
stitution (London, 1963)> P* 43 - 44; Ronald Butt, The Power 
of Parliament (London, 1967)> p* 293*
now a fiction, writes Richard Crossman, and was only possible in 
the days when private members were free to vote as they wished. In 
those days, parliament acted collectively as a check on government. 
Party discipline has now made the control organ, the opposition, a 
permanent minority, but in any case, discussion, debate and voting 
are of little avail, since decisions are made at parliamentary 
party meetings and not on the floor of the house. The government 
and its support cannot normally be threatened by a confrontation 
with the Shadow Cabinat and its support. It is very rare that an 
opposition can remove a government or change any important major
policy or legislation.^ These opinions have gained wider acceptance
61 62by later, authors. They are repeated by Gehrig with reference to
other parliamentary systems. He too suggests that a government is
most effectively controlled by its own members and he terms this
'innere Opposition'. Most especially, when the government is a
63coalition there is an*extension of opposition into government'.
Richard Crossman concluded that the electorate is the real check 
on the government, by means of opinion polls, elections, etc.
This ties in with other important opinion on the British parliament
60 Butt, p. 293*
61 E.g. such German authors as Franz Nuscheler & Winfried Steffani in 
'Die Opposition als Alternatiyregierungj Das britische Bersplel',
Die Politische Meinung vol. 133> 1970> P* 59 and Werner Kaltefleiter 
in 'Oppositionsstrategie im parlamentarischen System'. Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte, Das Parlament, 4. 8. 73» P* 3 - 8*
62 Parlament - Regierung ~ Opposition, p. 129 - 130*
63 Ibid.; see also s. Landshut, 'Form und Itinktion der parlamenta­
rischen Opposition' in Kluxen (ed.) Parlamentarismus,,p. 401.
64 In Introduction to Bagehot, p. 44*
which sees the government/opposition conflict as a publicity
exercise to inform the electorate how it should vote in the next
6s 66
election. The idea of a 'continuous election campaign' as the
main function of opposition is one already hinted at by Bagehot,
when he wrote that parliamentary debates were "the means by which
statesmen advertise themselves for future and confirm themselves
£.•7
in present Government".
Ronald Butt, however, maintains that this constant electioneering
is not the main real function of opposition and that opposition
influence on government, while it may not be great, is not negli- 
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gible. Further, it is not always the case that opposition state­
ments and policies are directed towards vote-winning, since they are 
sometimes intended to influence an immediate situation or are simply 
expressing a reaction. It is also vitally important to the nation 
that there is always a credible alternative government ready and 
waiting to relieve the present one in office. The opposition cannot 
afford to act other than responsibly, and this may not always be 
favourable to vote winning. In reconciling criticism with responsi­
bility the opposition must take long term government policies into 
account (e.g., on foreign affairs or the economy) while still 
asserting that it is different from the government and persuading 
the electorate that a change is needed. In parliamentary and elec—
65 The fact that not parliament bat the mass media are the main
source of information will be touched upon later.
66 Bernard Crick, The Reform of Parliament (London, 1964), p. 26.
67 The English Constitution, p. 72.
68 The Power of Parliament, Ch. 11.
toral struggles "both parties tend towards the centre and try to 
achieve consensus. The party in power will direct some attention 
to floating voters and opposition clientele, the opposition will 
equally try to capture the floating vote and some dissatisfied 
government supporters. Whichever party gains power it will be steered
towards the centre by 'neutral* expert advice from the bureaucracy,
■' 69 ■ ■ ' ■ ■ .'■■■■
claims Butt. He also argues that the government/opposition con­
frontation in parliament is informative for the electorate about
immediate issues as well as about future voting. Each side in a de-
70 'bate will reveal some truth about the other.1
A.further general conclusion reached about the function of oppo­
sition ^by Butt, lonescu & Madariaga, Sartori and Bagehot, in different 
ways) is that it is actually part of government. Even in Bagehot*s 
day, we are told, back-benchers complained that parliament was run 
by a cartel of government and opposition front benches. Later 
versions have it that opposition is really a form of collaboration if 
it is constructive and has the general interest at heart. Opposition 
participates in government since it helps to fashion the contemporary 
climate of opinion and since the policies of the 'outs* can affect 
those of the ‘ins'. If good alternatives are seen to be offered, the
69 It has been pointed out, notably by Vilhelm Hennis (’Die Rolie 
des Parlaments und. die Parteiendemokratie!, in Richard Lowenthal
& Hans-Peter Schwarz (eds.), Die Zweite Republik (Stuttgart,1974)* 
p. 211) that there is no such 'neutral' body in West Germany. The 
system has, nevertheless, become centripetal, as will be discussed 
. -later.
70 See p. 24 above, note 65.
71 Bagehot, p. 290.
government.must improve its own offer. Much legislation is formu- v
lated with the reaction of the opposition in mind, or is modified
so that the opposition will not be able to make an overwhelming
case against it. The opposition can also get details of legislation
amended. Butt writes that this is due in Britain to a convention
that the majority should not steam-roll the minority$ the government
72
usually adheres to this convention.
The most profound impact of opposition, according to Butt, is when
it can become the focus of national debate (he gives the example of
7.5
Suez for Britain). A government may have less leverage abroad if 
the opposition is known to be against its policies. Further ’real* 
functions are to speed up government action on urgent matters and to 
force a public answer to its questions from the government. In an 
emergency the opposition leaders may be treated_as the government’s 
equals and consulted on all measures taken.
The same notion of opposition as part of government is adopted by 
Seidel. The opposition does control the government and the govern­
ment majority in parliament to some extent, he maintains, and its 
ultimate function is to make sure that party government does not 
turn into dictatorship. (Again this is obviously a view conditioned 
by German experience.) However, this function is "weniger eine 
Funktion des Gegensatzes als eine des inneren Ausgleichs zur Er-
72 The Power of Parliament, p. 302.
73 Ibid., p. 304
haltung des Gleichgewichts des Systems . . and is based on the
idea of the unity of parliament as the central organ of state} "Letzt-
75lich 1st die Opposition selbst ein Stuck Regierung”. Seidel empha­
sizes the integrative function of opposition in. a democratic system 
and maintains that the system would collapse without it. The value 
of the opposition, he concludes, is that it is ’’nicht nur etwas
■ •jC
Gegengesetztes, sondern auch etwas Dazugehoriges”.
8 The Decline of Opposition
The kind of opposition that tends to function as part of govern­
ment or as a shadow government has been criticized by some authors.
Rotably, Bernard Crick has claimed that there can be far too much 
emphasis on the 1 alternative government’ aspect~of opposition and 
not enough on the ’opposing’ aspect. His article was written at a 
time when it seemed that the British Conservative party was the 
permanent ruling party and the Labour party was the permanent 
opposition. He suggested that the opposition concentrate on opposing,
even at the risk of being called irresponsible, and waste less time 
77 - ■
on ’shadowing’ •
74 'Die Funktion der Opposition’, p. 584*
75 Ibid., p. 585.-
76 Ibid., p. 590.
77 Bernard Crick, ’Two Theories of Opposition’, Hew Statesman,
June 1960, p. 882 - 885*
A similar situation of ’permanent’ opposition in the Federal 
Republic of Germany led Otto Kirchheimer to write more seriously 
of the ’waning of opposition1 and the ’vanishing opposition1. There 
too, the parties seemed permanently in their respective roles. The 
opposition had to give up opposing in order to become a credible 
alternative government. However, Kirchheimer was more generally
•70
concerned with the ’’crisis of the concept of political opposition”
He saw this as due to the incongruity of party systems and social
reality. The heritage of the 19th century no longer applies, since
class differences are now weak, and parties are necessarily pursuing
the same interests in a 'unified middle-class society'. Kirchheimer
regarded the rise of the ’catch-all’ parties as the beginning of the
end of opposition* In this respect, he must be considered a German
79author, since this pessimistic approach has been; taken by..several 
other German authors, whose work will be discussed in the next 
section of this study.
Ron-German authors recognise more generally that increased con- ' 
sensus in welfare-oriented, centralized bureaucratic states with 
highly developed information media is likely to lead to the gradual
. QQ
demise of political opposition. In the British context, the ideas
78 ’The Waning of Opposition’, p. 310*
79 Ionescu & Madariaga refer to ’the German doctrinaires' (p. 84); 
Hans-Peter Schneider has coined the term 'Oppositionspessimismus 
(p. 140).
80 e.g., Ionescu & Madariaga, Dahl, Political Oppositions in 
Western Democracies .
of a 'publicity exercise1 and a 'continuous election campaign* ,
82
along with the view that party discipline has killed opposition 
reflect a similar, if less intense sentiment.
B: Opposition in Germany
1. Liberal democratic parliamentary system in Germany
To consider the progress of institutionalised parliamentary 
opposition in Germany is to consider just one aspect of German 
liberal democracy as a whole. This is a subject which has received 
much attention from authors both inside Germany and outside. Both 
the political and social institutions of Germany have been analysed 
with a view to explaining why a system of parliamentary government 
was not introduced in the 19th century, why the Weimar system failed, 
why, on the other hand, right-wing totalitarianism was even briefly
successful, and finally, why parliamentary liberal democracy is now
successful. To say that in each case certain conditions were or 
were not met is not sufficient, since to set up a scheme of con­
ditions is usually no more than to describe, with the benefit of 
hindsight, which conditions were or were not present.
81 Butt, p. 293; Crick, The Reform of Parliament, p. 26.
82 Crossman in Introduction to Bagehot, p. 44.
A number of traditions in German political culture may be regarded 
as having influenced or been influenced by its political develop­
ment. Some authors suggest a four-way division, although clear-cut 
separation is obviously impossible. The first tradition is that of the 
the 'unpolitical1 or romantic German, given to idealistic, irra­
tional or Utopian sentiments and with no taste for the everyday • 
practicalities of politics. This stereotype had no faith in poli­
tics as a means to freedom in any sense, since the German idea of 
freedom, it has been said, was bound up in the second and connected 
tradition: the Hegelian idea of the state as the 'Wirklichkeit der 
sittlichen Idee1, and therefore all-powerful and not to be opposed. 
This authoritarian state was considered to be above parties and 
politics and to signify unity and unanimity; parties therefore 
came to be regarded as negative, destructive and illegitimate, being
associated with disunity and conflict. The 'quiescent' German,
. 83according to Lewis Edinger, for example, was amenable to authority 
and looked not for individual freedom but for freedom of and within 
the state. Politics was, then, the business of the state, or more 
precisely, of the experts appointed by it, and not a matter for 
amateurs. A third tradition is stated as the legalistic-formalistic 
tradition, one tying in with the reverence for the expert and the 
faith in 'constitutional engineering' (Edinger) and in the Rechts- 
staat as the solution to all problems. The fourth tradition of 
avoidance of conflict is also bound up with the German idea of the 
state. Internal conflict was, if possible, to be abolished and
83 Politics in Germany: Attitudes and Processes, (Boston, 1968), 
p. 105.;
opposition regarded as treason. The unity of people and state was 
all important, not least as a sign of strength and a proof of 
superiority. The idea of harmony and unity here, of course, ties 
in with the Utopian and romantic tendencies of the first tradition. 
Connected with these various traditions, however they may be classi­
fied, is the German tradition of plebiscitary rather than represen­
tative democracy, and this and the other traditions listed above 
will be shown later to be still of importance today, especially 
with regard to the West German concept of opposition.
2 The history of opposition in Germany
A very brief account of the history of political parties and 
of parliament in Germany may be necessary here to describe the 
environment which shaped the political culture -described above.
In the first half of the 19th century, parliaments and embryo 
parties within them had the collective role of Opposition to the 
governments of the German states. This role was mainly of a reformist 
nature, and some modest reforms and a small share in decision- 
making were achieved. One important aim of these oppositions was 
to extract written constitutions from government, and in a few 
cases they succeeded. The aim of the 1848 revolution, when the 
'opposition* was temporarily in power, was to unify Germany under 
a liberal constitution. The eventual failure of the Frankfurt 
parliament tended to discredit liberal and reformist ideas and 
to turn opinion against parliamentarism.
Political parties proper began to be formed in the 1850s and 
1860 s. These were progressive and liberal groupings .formed in re­
sponse to a particular issue, in response to each other, or as 
an opposition to particular government proposals. These parties 
did hot aspire to take over government responsibility themselves.
They were intent on gaining concessions from the government con­
cerning such matters as parliamentary rights. They were fluctuating 
oppositional groups and could exert little influence on decision­
making. This type of opposition was loyal and constitutional but 
was far from being institutionalised as an alternative government. 
Theoretically it could aim to 'control' government by withholding 
its supporting vote, or to .'share' in government by giving its
vote. However, under Bismarck neither opposition groupings nor
those giving the government their support could be sure of making 
any lasting impact on government decisions. In 1869 a new oppo­
sitional force, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, was 
founded. The Social Democrats were an 'opposition of principle'•
They were anti-system but working within the system as a legal politi 
cal opposition until their activities were made illegal by Bismarck.
The Social Democrats supplanted the Liberals in the role of oppo­
sition so that this now became firmly associated with hostility 
to the existing state.
Due to the constitutional structure of Imperial Germany after 
.1871,' the Reichstag was reduced to a more negative role than ever.
It could criticize, complain, debate and amend and pass laws, but
there was no chance for a member of parliament to become a member
84
of the government. This, meant that the Reichstag was no more than
85
a 'demokratischer Susatz' of the Imperial System. ' The Reichstag 
did not develop as an active institution for political decision- 
making but as the legal opposition against the Imperial government. 
As such it could only hope to criticise or perhaps modify govern­
ment policies. In these circumstances there was no chance for the 
’game of alternation1 to develop and the Reichstag became an insti­
tution mainly representing various interests. The different parlia­
mentary groups were used by governments to form shifting majorities 
to approve government legislation. There was no clear front against 
the government nor any grouping strong enough to form a permanent 
majority. Able politicians could not expect ministerial posts and 
set their sights instead at the chairmanship of a parliamentary
—  q£  ••
committee - the most powerful position open to them. This sepa- 
ration of government and legislative personnel continued until just 
before the first World War, and full parliamentarisation came only 
in 1918 when the Chancellor's position was made dependent on parlia 
mentary support. During the Imperial period the middle classes had 
therefore not had access to political power since government and 
top military-bureaucratic posts went to aristocrats who were more
■ 0*7
readily identified with the monarchy and the state.
84 Hereth, p. 37*
85 Theodor Eschenburg, Die imnrovisierte Demokratie (Munich, 19&4) 
P* 12.
86 Peter Molt, Per Reichstag vor der improvisierten Revolution 
(Cologne, 1963), p. 309.
87 Kirchheimer, 'Germany - the Vanishing Opposition',pp«319 - 320.
After the military defeat of 1918 the onus of government fell 
for the first time on parliament, or rather on the largest parlia­
mentary party, the SPD. The former 19th.century 'opposition of 
principle' was now the major 'staatstragende Partei*. Previously 
the state and the parliamentary parties had been severely separated 
and the idea that a political party should produce a government to 
be temporarily identified with the state was still foreign to Ger­
many, as was liberal democracy itself. The Weimar system attempted 
to take account of this and created a strong president as head of
' gg .
state, whose position was not unlike that of the Kaiser had been.
To use Dahl's terms, the creation of the Weimar Republic was a case 
where 'polyarchy* was introduced after the collapse of the previous 
system, where an already fairly inclusive system was abruptly
liberalised, i.e., made competitive. These are the two situations
89 ■ "
given in Dahl's models as likely to be unfavourable for the
stability of liberal democracy. However, one weakness of his models 
is that his main example in these cases is Germany, thus the con­
ditions he sets up are merely a description of what happened in a 
particular case.
The Weimar multi-party system was not produced by the new electoral 
system of proportional representation, since a multiplicity of 
parties had already existed. However, proportional representation 
accelerated the splintering process. As stated above, many authors
88 Hereth, p. 39*
89 Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition. Ch. 3.
agree that a two party system or an approximation to it with perhaps 
three or four parties is much more conducive to the functioning of 
liberal democracy, as exemplified by the peaceful alternation of 
government and opposition. The Weimar multi-party parliamentary 
system did not produce stable party government. Smaller and more 
extreme parties, which were unlikely to be included in government, 
could afford to indulge in 'irresponsible* opposition. Even parties 
which shared in government coalitions felt free from responsibility 
and moved in and out of government to avoid responsibility on par­
ticular issues and thus gain electoral advantage. It has even been 
suggested that the SPD chose proportional representation, not only
because it had long been part of their programme, but also because
90
they feared to face undivided governmental responsiblity. ; They 
could not hope to fulfill the main part of their programme, which 
had tended to be somewhat Utopian as long as they had been denied 
access to government.
Under the mathematically 'democratic* electoral system of pro­
portional representation, parliamentary representation reflected 
voting very exactly. However, elections had very little influence 
on government formation, since coalitions of several parties were 
formed and then re-formed without elections necessarily being 
called. The system denied the electorate any chance of choosing a 
definite potential government, since only the President was directly 
elected. In a two party or near-two party system, on the other hand, 
elections are ostensibly to elect representatives, but they also
90. Kirchheimer, 'Germany - the Vanishing Opposition*,pp. 321 - 322.
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have the character of a direct plebiscite on the government. In
those circumstances it can be said that the ‘real1 control on the
92 • ■ . ; .government is the electorate . In the Weimar situation, this kind
of control was absent. As already mentioned, stable parliamentary 
groupings did not emerge and parties were not anxious to accept 
governmental responsibility, except as part of a fairly broad co­
alition. The absence of stable government, in particular, meant 
that no stable loyal opposition could form.
On the other hand, there was no lack of opposition in the Weimar 
Republic, but it was not loyal or constructive. The party constella 
tion did not allow for any system of clear government/opposition 
alternation. Instead, ‘opposition of principle * grew rapidly. This 
was legal opposition, since the Weimar system allowed for wide 
‘freedom of political action1. ^  This freedom was used by extreme 
dissenters who were avowedly anti-democratic and anti-republican.
As Dahl has pointed out, the result is likely to be disaffection 
to the regime, since large numbers of people are, as he puts it, 
"unfree in their political obligations"^ that is, they are obliged 
to live under a system they reject. The extreme right and left 
‘opposition of principle1 in Weimar was different in character from 
the 19th century socialist ‘opposition of principle1, which had 
been gradualist rather than militant.^ The extremist oppositional
91 Gehrig, p. 132.
92 Gf. p.. 23.
93. Dahl‘s phrase in Political Oppositions in Western Democracies,
pp.$88 - 389*
94 Ibid., p. 390.
95 Kirchheimer, ‘Germany - The Vanishing Opposition1, p. 321 •
activity meant that the ’Weimar parties’ (i.e., those prepared to
support the system) tended to cease what competition there had been
between them for each other’s fringe clientele, in favour of cartel.
96 .
This is a tendency in multi-party systems noted by Sartori.
A further circumstance which was unfavourable for the functioning
; . 97
of competitive politics was the prevailing lack of trust. Govern­
ment and opposition parties could not believe in each other’s sin­
cerity. From the beginning, the Weimar parliamentary parties regarded 
each other with mistrust and were not ready to let any party govern
'■ QQ .
alone. They preferred a power-sharing system in which several 
groups could exert some influence in government. Opposition was not 
perceived as having sufficient control over government activities.
Otto Kirchheimer was particularly concerned with the failure of
*
the classical government/opposition system to become established 
in continental Europe. In the case of Germany, he suggests, the 
reason for this failure was that the political parties never gained 
a monopoly of final political decision-making. Even in Weimar, 
branded as a 'Parteienstaat1 by opponents, the president was in a 
powerful position vis a vis parliament and an even greater counter- 
force to party government was the power of the military and bureau­
cratic elites. This narrowed the scope of political decision-making 
for the parties^^ The absence of military or bureaucratic inter-
96 'Opposition and Control’, p. 152.
97 Cf. Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition,-pp. 150 - 152.
98 Eschenburg, p. 29.
99 -'The Waning of Opposition',pp. 297/8.
100 Hereth, p. 58 f•
ference is a further condition frequently suggested as necessary
' 10,1
for the smooth functioning of competitive politics.'
The postulated ’favourable* or ’unfavourable1 conditions are 
only suggestions as to what is likely to influence political develop­
ments in a certain way and may often be only a description of 
circumstances. It has been argued that the Weimar system with its 
Strong executive, vigorous party system representing all shades of 
opinion, provision for parliamentary control of the executive, popu­
larly elected President as a stabilizing factor and strong centre
group in parliament was inconsistent with the British idea of al-
■ "  102
ternative government. Lehmbruch considers that the system failed
: ■. - " 103 because it was inappropriate' , and more importantly, because it
was regarded as inappropriate for a country where there were re- /
ligious, regional and class conflicts, and where there was a strong
tradition that party conflict is prejudicial to consensus.
The Weimar right-extremist ’opposition of principle’ gained 
momentum for many reasons. An important one is that the liberal 
democratic system was thought not only to be inappropriate but to 
be un-German. Party government became associated with a lost war, 
an oppressive peace treaty, economic difficulties, etc. and was 
thought to be inefficient.10^ The extreme right adopted the title 
of ’national opposition* and in their campaigning they were success-
101 Kirchheimer, ’Majorities and Minorities’, p.279.
102 Gerhard Lehmbruch, ’The Ambiguous Coalition in West Germany*, . 
Government and Opposition 3, no. 2 (1968), repr. in Barker, p.168.
103 Ibid., p. 169.
104 Abel, The Nazi Movement (New York, 1966), p. 21.
ful in associating parliamentary government with foreign influence 
and lack of patriotism. This national opposition was a special case 
of opposition to an entire system.10^Itdrew support from middle- 
class circles, especially from the insecure lower middle classes, 
and was characterized by a nationalism that was anti-democratic, 
anti-liberal and anti-Western.
This opposition of principle was working within the system and 
was able to use the institutions of federalism to advance its . -
1 06
cause* By gaining power in one state it was able to ’prove its 
governmental capabilities’ and incidentally to grant Hitler German 
citizenship - a prerequisite of its further progress.
The Hitler system put an end to further opposition. As Landshut
has pointed out, there were two ways in which opposition caused
107 ■ ' ’the fall of the Weimar Republic. The absolute or total opposition
to the system aimed to remove the conditions allowing opposition, 
and succeeded. One reason why it was able to succeed was that par­
liament was weak and consisted of ’nothing but opposition*. The 
parties outside the government coalition at any given time were, of 
course, in opposition. In addition,each party in the coalition was 
a source of ’latent opposition', likely to immobilise the govern­
ment from within or withdraw at a moment's notice.
105 Kurt Sontheimer, Grundziige des politischen Systems der Bundes- 
republik Deutschland (Munich, 1971), p.12/13.
106 Cf.Friedrich, 'Federalism and Opposition*.
107 ’Form und Funktion der parlamentarischen Opposition1, p.4-01*
This albeit simplified and fairly brief account of German nega­
tive experience with parliaments, political parties and political 
opposition is sufficient to show how the traditions suggested in 
the previous section were reinforced by events. However, the total 
collapse of the Hitler system and the temporary discredited state 
of the institutions politicised under it meant that the Germans 
(encouraged by the occupation powers) had to be prepared to turn 
to the 'democratic' political parties to provide the basis of the 
new political system.
3 Opposition in the Federal Republic
After 1945 a liberal democracy was again created in Germany, : 
more or less imposed by foreign occupation forces after military 
defeat and total collapse. Dahl describes the change from the 
Hitler system to the Federal Republic as from a 'closed hegemony*
- J Q Q
to a 'polyarchy*. It was hoped that the new liberal democratic 
parliamentary system would operate on the basis of competition be­
tween a fairly small number of parliamentary parties, which would 
be able to form stable governments and oppositions. An attempt was 
made to change factors thought to be connected with the previous 
political development. In the field of political culture the 
occupying powers attempted to 'reeducate' the Germans. With regard 
to a-new constitution, a Constitutional Assembly aimed at setting
108 Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, Ch» 3»
up a new ’water-tight1 system that avoided the supposed defects of 
Weimar. As mentioned above, the political parties, as the only in­
stitution not discredited by the Hitler period, were dominant in 
this assembly and it has been pointed out by Wilhelm Hennis that .
"nie zuvor in der deutschen Geschichte [Ist] eine Verfassung so
souveran von einer reinen Parteimannerversammlung aufgestellt
, „ 109worden".
The parties so successfully filled the power vacuum in post-war 
Western Germany at least partly because the constitution they de­
vised gave them an important status among the political institutions 
of the new state. The second article of the relevant section of the 
Basic Law (Article 21) states:"Die Parteienwirken beiderpolitischen 
Willensbildung des Volkes mit ". Subsequent legislation was to give 
parties state financing and further strengthen their position as
'political educators' of the people. Further, as Kenneth Dyson has 
110
pointed out, no counter-elites re-formed to challenge party
supremacy; rather, these elites were subject to party patronage
’■;112and were "absorbed into the new party state". As mentioned above, 
the influence of Hegel's doctrine of the state on German political 
thought had traditionally formed an intellectual barrier to the 
development of an appreciation of political parties. It. was thought
109 'Die Rolle des Parlaments', p.212.
110 Party, State and Bureaucracy in Western Germany, (London', 1977)> 
P* 6. ■
111 Ibid.
112 Gordon Smith, 'West Germany and the politics of centrality', 
Government and Opposition 11, no. 4, 1976, p. 400. .
impossible that parties could form a legitimate government or
counter-weight to government. The state was seen as above party
and as an expression of the general, and parties, at best as an
■ ■ 1 1 3expression of particular interests. It was the view of Otto 
Kirchheimer that the parties in Germany had never gained a 
monopoly of political decision-making and that this was the reason 
for their failure to produce stable governments and oppositions.
Now, with constitutional recognition for the first time, they were 
set on the road towards this monopoly and their position was per-
V -j-jc
haps over-estimated. It was typical of the German tradition of
legalism, of ’Rechtsstaatsdenken*, that parties had been regarded 
as illegitimate because they were not mentioned in the constitution, 
yet as having special legitimacy and as identifiable with the state 
once they were mentioned. For the reaction of one notable consti­
tutional expert was to criticise the Federal Republic as a fParteien
116 *'
staat* and to throw into doubt the compatibility of the party
state with representative parliamentary liberal democracy and most
especially with the idea of the free mandate. Interest in these
. # -117
ideas of Gerhard Leibholz has been reawakened to some extent
now that observers are referring to "the arrival of the party state"
113 Cf. Dieter Grosser, ’Die Opposition in Deutschland, historische 
und verfassungsstrukturelie VorbelastungenV in Gunther Doeker & 
Winfried Steffani (eds.), Klassen.justiz und Pluralismus, Fest­
schrift fur Ernst Fraenkel zum 75• Geburtstag, (Hamburg, 1973)
p- 517.
114 See p. 37 above.
115 Grosser, p. 5*17*
116 Gerhard Leibholz, ’Parteienstaat und representative Demokratie* 
Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1951. T>. 1 - 8; cf. p. 37 above.
117 Hennis, ’Die Rolle des Parlaments*, p. 212; Dyson, Party, State 
and Bureaucracy, p. 7 - 9 5 Schneider, p. 142-144•
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in West Germany. However, Leibholz *s basic theories would appear 
to predate the present position of the party state ’securely anchored
119
m  the parliamentary system* of the Federal Republic by almost 
■ .:; ’ 120
fifty years. It is symptomatic of'the embarrassment caused by the 
re-application to the Federal Republic of political theories from 
the Weimar era that Hennis expresses regret that Leibholz "vom Jahre 
1950 an nicht davon abgehalten werden konnte, langst erledigte kon- 
tinentaleuropaische Idiosynkrasien uber einen angeblich begriffs-
wesentlichen Gegensatz von Demokratie und Representation wieder auf-
' 121 ■ .
zutischen. ” Hennis goes on to claim that "in Wahrheit handelte es
sich nur urn die etwas seitenverkehrte Reprise von Lehren, die er
■ 122 '
schon in den zwanziger Jahren vorgetragen hatte". Nevertheless,
Leibholz has been an important influence, particularly on a number
123 'of left-wing political writers in West Germany, / a n d  the contro­
versy he caused illustrates the earlier sensitivity of constitutional 
124
issues and a continuing confusion concerning the concept of 'true*
'-125 ■ . ' ■ ■ ■ ■
liberal and parliamentary democracy in West Germany.
118 Smith, ’West Germany and the Politics of Centrality*, p. 398*
119 Ibid., p. 399.
120 Notably, Dyson/Party, State and Bureaucracy, p. 8 , gives the 
impression that the ’Parteienstaat’ theory is of only recent date.
121 Hennis, ’Die Rolle des Parlaments*, p. 208.
122 Ibid., p. 212.
123 e.g. Jurgen Habermas, Helga Grebing.
124 Cf. Hennis, ’Die Rolle des Parlaments’, p.212:”Die enorme Resonanz, 
die Leibholz* Thesen fanden... .waren \_sicQ das erste Beispiel
fiir die Leichtigkeit,mit der in Deutschland gegeniiber Fundamental- 
einsichten der modernen parlamentarischen Demokratie, ... Ver- 
bluffungseffekte erzielt werden konnen."
125 E.g. Oberreuter, p. 8: "Die Identifizierung der Demokratie durch 
Opposition . . bricht mit der liberalen Parlamentarismustheorie.."
As Hennis1 above derogatory use of the adjective 'kontinental- 
europaisch' betrays, the new system for the Federal Republic was 
perceived by him as being modelled on the British system* Indeed 
the first legislative period of the new republic was, at least 
superficially, characterized by a clear confrontation between 
government and opposition in parliament, with the opposition
126
'•performing in the classical parliamentary tradition". Politics 
became polarised to a large extent around the new catch-all CDU, 
which appealed to wide sections of the population, and the re­
founded SPD, which was still to some extent ideologically based 
and relying heavily on its anti-Nazi record to attract support.
This polarisation was particularly pronounced on some issues, such
as foreign policy and the economy. The system was bipolar, no longer
. ;v  . 1 p7 ■
multi-polar, and did tend in time, as Sartori has suggested, to
show centripetal tendencies.
The early trend towards a two party system has been noted by Lehm- 
128
bruch who suggests that public opinion was in favour of such a 
system, and that this led to all ideas of an all-party coalition 
for the first government of the new republic being abandoned. - The 
Basic Law did not make any specific mention of opposition, but 
Article 67 providing for a constructive vote of no confidence does 
imply a homogeneous opposition capable of producing an alternative
126 Kirchheimer, 'Germany - The Vanishing Opposition*, p. 325.
127 ‘European Political Parties1, p. 138.
128 'The Ambiguous Coalition in West Germany1, p. 169.
■129government. In contradiction of Hennis1 belief noted above, Kluxen 
comments that the drafters of the Basic Law were not thinking of the 
British model but more of avoiding a repetition of the Weimar situ­
ation. This is further exemplified by Article 20, which is seen as 
implying a division of powers. This shows that the British model of 
government/opposition counter-action as a substitute for the trar-. • 
ditional separation of powers was not found acceptable. As already 
mentioned in reference to the status of parties in Germany, the 
inclusion of an institution in constitutional law has a considerable 
impact on its perceived legitimacy, and this has led constitutional
lawyers and political scientists in West Germany to search for a
130"constitutional-legal warrant,! for opposition. The fact that the
term opposition is not mentioned in the Basic Law gains special
131
comment from some authors , just as great importance has.been 
attached to the fact that political parties are mentioned. Gehrig 
points out that the term opposition has been used only once in a 
German constitution, in the: 1947 Baden Constitution, only once in
132
a Federal German law and. only twice in a German state (Land) law.
Subsequently, the 1971 ’Hamburger Verfassungsreform' recognised
opposition as a "wesentlicher Bestandteil der parlamentarischen
■ 133
Demokratie1 for the first time in positive constitutional law.
129 Kluxen, Introduction to ’Lie parlamentarische Opposition’, p.396* 
150 Philip Blair’s phrase in Law and Politics in Germany,unpubl. 
paper for the Association for the Study of German Politics, 
Loughborough, Jan. 1976, p.19*
131 E.g., Kluxen, Hereth, Gehrig, Schneider.
132 Parlament - Regierung - Opposition, p. 260 - 261.
133 Schneider, p. 1.
However, in Gehrig’s view it is in any case evident that every loyal 
opposition must he constitutional, since this is implied in a demo­
cratic parliamentary system, and most especially in the fact that 
the Basic Law lays down that political parties should represent the 
popular will. In fact it might he a limitation on the freedom of 
the opposition to he defined as in the Hamburg constitution Article 
23a (2):”Sie hat die standige Aufgabe, die Kritik am Regierungs- 
programm im Grundsatz und im Einzelfall offentlich zu vertreten. Sie 
ist die politische Alternative zur Regierungsmehrheit ", since an 
opposition might be declared unconstitutional for not conforming 
exactly to this prescription. The principal of general freedom of 
opposition in the Basic Law, while not guaranteeing the actual exi­
stence of a parliamentary opposition or preventing all-party govern­
ment, is still sufficient.to make parliamentary opposition not only 
possible but necessary. There is an important ’normative difference* 
"Zwischen dem Mreehtsstaatlichen" Erfordernis negativer Begrenzung 
und dem Mdemokratischen" Anspruch positiver Gestaltung des politi- 
schen Prozesses.
It has already been pointed out that the German tradition of 
legalism and the concept of the Rechtsstaat can lead to consti­
tutional law being regarded as prescriptive. Indicative of the 
influence of constitutional law and lawyers on the German idea
of opposition is that parliamentary opposition may arguably be
■ 135
considered a ’Verfassungsaufgabe1.  ^Certainly, a verdict of the
134 Schneider, p. 21•
135 Ibid., p. 30. .
Federal Constitutional Court of 1953 stating:"Es ist nicht nur das 
Recht der Opposition, auSer ihren politischen auch ihre verf assungs-, 
rechtlichen Bedenken geltend zu machen, sondern im parlamentarisch-
136
demokratischen Staat geradezu ihre Pflicht* " may be regarded as
supporting this notion. It is seen as making constitutional objection
a legitimate tactic of parliamentary opposition, indeed as making it
the duty of opposition to take not only political but also constitu-
137
tional considerations into account.
The attention still paid to parliamentary opposition by academic 
lawyers contradicts the view of Waldemar Besson that " Las Problem 
Opposition ist schon lange kein Problem des Verfassungsrechts mehr.
Es ist eine Frage des politischen Stils und weit mehr noch eine 
Funktion der sozialen Entwicklung"? The question "Opposition als 
etwas Politisches oder auch als etwas Rechtliches und die Ver- 
fassungswirklichkeit rechtlich Gestaltendes?"^^ would appear to be 
still open. However, it may be argued that it is Inappropriate to 
regard law and politics as separate, as two cultures, in the context 
of the Federal Republic, since they are so obviously inseparably 
fused and since legalism,and particularly constitutional legalism 
is such an important part of German political culture.
136 Schneider, p. 31*
137 Ibid.
138 ’Regierung und Opposition in der deutschen Politik1, Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift vol. 3, no. 3, 1962, p. 234.
139 Posed by Adolf Arndt, 'Opposition1, Neue Sammlung, vol. 8, 1968, 
P- 1-
140 Cf. Schneider, p. 19*
During the first years of the Federal Republic there was obviously 
an awareness among politicians and lawyers alike that the new politi­
cal institutions had still to be shaped. Although, as already noted, 
there was noticeable polarisation around the two large parties, there 
were still a number of small parties in the Bundestag. The SPD had 
chosen to go into opposition in the Bizone administration and this 
arrangement was continued after the first Bundestag elections, although 
public opinion would probably have favoured a Grand Coalition. The 
SPD had been a serious contender for power but was also very aware 
of its new oppositional role and determined to make full use of it.
Its leader, Kurt Schumacher, made the following statement at the 
beginning of the first Bundestag:"The essence of opposition is a 
permanent attempt to force the government and its parties by concrete
proposals tuned to concrete situations to pursue the political line
141outlined by the opposition". This concept of the oppositional
role is very much in tune with the description of the actual function
of opposition given by those authors who consider it to be part of
government and therefore part of the state. Statements of other
prominent SPD members, such as the much-quoted reference by Carlo
' 142 "
Schmid to ’der andere Beweger der deutschen Politik1 , were in 
similar vein. Franz Neumann also reaffirmed the belief that "im de­
mokratischen Staat ist die Opposition der eine Tell, der kontrol- .
141 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 1. V/ahlperiode, 
Stenographische Berichte, p. 32.
142 In full:"Opposition ist der andere Beweger der deutschen Politik. 
Regierung und Opposition bilden nur zusammen die Ganze der 
deutschen Politik." Verhandlungen, 1. Wahlperiode, p. 185*
lierende, der mahnende, und die Regierung ist der andere Teil,
der erfiillende” in his opening speech to the Berlin SPD conference
14.3 .of 17th January, 1951* However, the SPD opposition at this time
could not be termed a ’continuous election campaign1 - some com­
mentators stress that all-out opposition was waged regardless of, 
almost in defiance of electoral considerations, and that it lost 
the SPD votes. On the other hand, this opposition was not Kirch.- - 
heimer1s ’opposition of principle1 as has been implied by Geoffrey 
Roberts**^, since that is clearly defined as anti-system, or as 
Kirchheimer put it, as an opposition pursuing goals which are "in-
' 145
compatible with the constitutional requirements” of the system.
This SPD opposition in the early days of the Federal Republic could 
better be termed ’limited structural’, ^  as although it sought to 
change the socio-economic structure it was loyal to the existing 
constitutional arrangements. A small amount of extremist opposition 
did exist for some years but never made much impact and was dying 
out even before the SRP and the KPD were found to be unconstitutional 
(and therefore ’opposition of principle’) by the Federal Constitu­
tional Court and banned.
The style of Schumacher’s opposition was very vigorous, even 
polemical at times, it included the famous occasion when he called
143 Quoted by A. Ashkenasi, Reformpartei und Aufienpolitik (Opladen,
1968) ,- p. 74. ’
144 'The West German Parties and the Ostpolitik’, Government and 
Opposition 7, no. 4 (1972), p.447.
145 ’Germany - The Vanishing Opposition1, p. 237.
146 Dahl’s term in Political Oppositions in Western Democracies,
■- P. 342.
Adenauer 'Kanzler der Alliierten' and many other stormy scenes in 
the Bundestag. On the other hand, the SPD opposition in the first 
Bundestag was an active participant in legislatory and committee 
work and the initiator of much legislation. It rejected only a small 
percentage of legislation and was successful in fields other than
: 147
foreign policy in bringing about modifications and compromises.
This was in line with the German stress on ’law-making’ as a primary 
function of parliament as a whole and also in accordance with 
Schumacher’s opening statement on the role of the opposition as he 
saw it. Several authors point out that an important difference be­
tween the classical British model of opposition and the continental 
European concept is that the former participates little in legisla­
tion, while the continental opposition is much more ’constructive1 
and 'positive’, often taking legislatory initiative and working
very hard in parliamentary committees to gain a * share’ in new
1A 8 *
legislation. This activity tends to blur the alternative-govern-
ment function of the opposition and is impossible where the oppo­
sition has alternative and counter proposals to government policies. 
In the area of foreign policy the SPD had no success in their 
attempts to ’force the government to adopt’ their counter proposals, 
and their structural opposition to the social market economy proved 
an embarrassment once the system was seen to be working.
147 W. Kralewski & K. Neunreither, Oppositionelles Verhalten im 
ersten deutschen Bundestag (Cologne, 1963), p. 99 f. •
148 Hereth, Ch. 2; Kluxen, p. 397*
After the SPD suffered losses in the 1953 elections it at first
149 .
continued in the same style, but as it became apparent that its
ideal-type opposition was not working, it gradually gave up trying
to oppose major government policies. Since the death of Schumacher
there had been no distinctive * leader of the opposition* capable of
competing with Adenauer. The CDTJ was taking on the character of a
permanent government party and becoming identified not only tempo-
150 '■ .
rarily, but in some eyes permanently with the state. In this 
situation an opposition might either become extreme and reject the 
government and therefore the state, or might draw closer to the 
government in an attempt to share in the state. The SPD chose the 
latter course. It seemed to accept its role of permanent opposition, 
conceived its position as the representation of the minority and 
sought_to participate as much as possible. The image of the party 
changed to suit new social realities and the Godesberg programme 
of 1959 is usually regarded as a turning point. Marxist/socialist 
terminology was dropped and a new ideal of an ’egalitarian consumer 
society* was adopted. Within a short time all attempts at an inde­
pendent foreign policy were also abandoned in favour of *Gemeinsam-
Anton Bohm, *Notizen zur Analyse der bundesrepublikanischen 
Opposition*, Wort und Wahrheit vol.15 (1958)» P* 161, apparently 
still had some grounds for his comment: ”Der Oppositionsstil von 
heute unterscheidet sich jedenfalls nicht mehr wesentlich von 
den Rede- und Schreibeexzessen in der Spatzeit der Y/eimarer Re- 
publik . . die Tendenz ist die gleiche: dem Volk soil beigebracht 
werden, daB es von Verratern regiert wird, Verratern an der na- 
tionalen Einheit und am Weltfrieden. " This could well have been 
written by a member of the government side during the 6th Bundes­
tag, as will be apparent later.
Cf. Gert Schafer & Carl Nedelmann (eds.) Der CDU-Staat: Studien 
zur Verfassungsv/irklichkeit der Bundesrepublik, (Munich, 19^7)*
149
150
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keif. As Kirchheimer put it:'’The SPD consciously strove to elimi­
nate parliamentary opposition as a desirable pattern for the conduct 
of political business.”  ^ By 1961 it had given up the idea that 
opposition should mean alternative policies and reduced it to 
'competitive' elements only. The new leader of the opposition,
Willy Brandt, expressed the view that it is quite normal in demo­
cracies for party goals to be identical and for only priorities and
152
methods to differ. The culmination of this new opposition strategy 
was the formation of the Grand Coalition in 1966, which with hind­
sight can be seen as part of the process of the SPD's transformation 
into an acceptable government party. At the time, however, this de­
velopment was viewed with dismay by some observers, who expected 
the coalition to continue indefinitely, on the then Austrian model, 
with all opposition being eliminated except for mutually agreed 
'Bereichsopposition*•
The situation of 'permanent' CDU government in the 50 s and early 
60 s followed by the absorption of the opposition into the Grand
' 153 ■Coalition was accompanied by an increasing 'Oppositionspessimismus1 
among German political observers. The fears of Otto Kirchheimer as 
expressed in his titles on the 'waning of opposition' and the ‘vani­
shing opposition' have already been mentioned* He wrote of the decline
151 'Germany - The Vanishing Opposition’, p. 243*
132 Ibid., p. 246 - ?.
153 Cf. p. 28.
and loss of function of opposition in the modern, industrialised,
1SA
welfare state. It was claimed that the phenomena of social 
equalisation and assimilation, and of political and economic 
technicalisation and specialisation in modern states changed the 
traditional character of political controversy so that problems 
could be rationalised and solved in the ’pre-political arena*. Con­
flicts of interest were now mainly about sharing out the gross
national product, it was alleged, and could be dealt with by state
‘ 155 ■
planning, direction and provision. In particular, the Federal
Republic, having become highly prosperous so that economic and
social differences were relatively slight and no longer the cause
of sharp clashes of interest, was considered a prime example of such
a ’modern, industrialised society’ in which the opposition could no
longer produce an alternative to government policy. Manfred Friedrich
has suggested that there are now no ’born opposers* in the welfare
state, so that government and opposition obtain their support from
•156
the same classes, and therefore represent identical interests.
While this is so, it does not necessarily rule out government/ 
opposition alternative but reveals a conception of ’real’ Opposition 
similar to the 19th century European one of governed versus governing 
classes - a permanent opposition of ’reformist’ classes, whose
154 See also Wilhelm Hennis, ’Parlamentarische Opposition und 
Industriegesellschaft’, Gesellschaft, Staat, Erziehung 5, (1957) 
p. 205 ~ 222 j and much later, Ernst Forsthoff, Per Staat der 
Industriegesellschaft. bargestellt am Beispiel der Bundes- 
republik Deutschland (Munich, 1-971).
155 Cf. Schneider, p. 37*
156 ’Opposition ohne Alternative?’ in Kluxen, Parlamentarismus, 
p. 435•
function is to oppose but never to govern. Yet the ’classical1 
British pattern of government/opposition was not based originally 
in class differences but on policy and personnel alternatives.
Nevertheless, the lack of class differences between the parties 
in the Federal Republic of Germany was claimed, as early as 1956, 
by Wilhelm Hennis to be a possible danger to the parliamentary 
system of government;"Das parlamentarisehe Regierungssystem konnte 
in solcher Situation seinen Sinn verlieren; mit den welianschaulichen
•J57
und sozialen Spannungen geht auch ihm der Atem aus". Ernst Forst-
A C Q
hoff was also of the opinion that the 'EntideologiSierung* of
modern catch-all-party systems left the opposition functioning as
no more than a "taktische Positionsvariante" within the system and
159not as an alternative. In Kirchheimer’s terms it was the decline
firstly of 'opposition of principle' that was referred to; this, 
in his view, was then followed by the decline in possibilities for 
loyal opposition. Manfred Friedrich also saw no more possibility 
of oppositional alternatives in the modern state since the end of 
class differences meant that "in weiten Bevolkerungsgruppen das Be- 
durfnis schwindet, einen Regierungswechsel uberhaupt noch zu voll- 
ziehen" .His conclusion here is particularly pessimistic:"Unter
157 'Parlamentarisehe Opposition und Industriegesellschaft*, p.222. 
Hennis later considered that there were still enough differences 
left for the system to function; see concluding section.
158 Cf. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe, 1960}.
159 'Verfassung und Verfassungswirklichkeit der Bundesrepublik1, 
Merkur vol.22 (1968), p. 406.
160 Opposition ohne Alternative? (Cologne, 1962), p. 104*
diesen Bedingungen ist die schwindende Differenzierung der Oppo­
sition von der Regierung ein unwiderrufliches Entwicklungsgesetz"
The phenomenon of 'Oppositionspessimismus1 can perhaps be regarded 
as part of the traditional German criticism of parties and parlia­
mentarism, of which Ekkehart Krippendorff*3 "Das Ende des Parteien- 
staates?" is a good example. Krippendorff saw in the seeming 
impossibility of the government in office being removed, i*e*, in 
its increasing ability to stay in office, an irreversible trend 
leading to the end of the European type of party state. He considered 
the party state was in fact "darauf angelegt, iiber das Instrument
der Volkspartei sich selbst aufheben zu miissen, indem er die Be-
-j 6  3  ■dingungen der Mbglichkeit von Oppositionsparteien aufhebt". How­
ever, others including Friedrich, did foresee that although the 
modern, catch-all-party state puts limitations on what alternatives 
can be offered and leads to a stagnation in voting due to the 
similarity of government and opposition, the position in which the 
standpoints of government and opposition become identical may be 
very good for a smooth change of power, especially in the German 
context, since neither side need fear any upheaval from the success 
of the other.
161 Opposition ohne Alternative?, p. 97.
162 'Das Ende des Parteienstaates?', Per Konat 160 (1962). p.64 - 70 
see also 'Ende des Parteienstaates?' , Die neue Gesellschaft 13,
U966), p. 5 - 10.
163 'i)as Ende des Farteienstaates?', p. .67. -/ '
This is exactly the way in which a change of power was finally 
brought about in the Federal Republic and it reflects the stress 
put on the provision of continuity. An opposition must seek to 
provide an alternative method of continuing, or appearing to continue 
with previously accepted policies. The German need for continuity 
is pointed out by Otto Kirchheimer, who links it with the concepts 
of the state and of the party. He claims that the party is seen as 
an instrument for processing claims of individuals or groups on the 
state, but the state is still seen as an "objective value structure 
above and beyond all interest organisations and all parties". He 
further maintains that the parties' conception of their own role is 
as 'administrative-bureaucratic' rather than * competitive?-electoral1 
organisations. This was of course exemplified by the SPD opposition 
leading up to the Grand Coalition, which concentrated almost exclu­
sively on universal bargaining to gain a share in administration, 
rather than on removing its rival from office.
The emphasis put on opposition participation in legislation, which,
as already mentioned, is a constant feature and not. specific to the
later SPD opposition, is at least partly a result, or a reflection of
the organisation of the Bundestag. Hereth has used the classification
of parliaments as either a 'Redeparlament* or an *Arbeitsparlament1,
terming the Bundestag one of the latter type, since there is so much
165 -
more stress on committee work than on debate. Opposition influence
164 'Germany - the Vanishing Opposition', p. 253*
165 Die Parlamentarisehe Opposition, Ch. 2.
is brought to bear above all in bargaining during committee sessions
166and , as Hereth states elsewhere , "Die Kontroversenfeindlichkeit 
des Deutschen Bundestages ist . . vielleicht sein vorherrschendes 
Merkmal geworden.” Such statements as this may invite an attempt
to classify Hereth1s work under ’Das deutsche Unbehagen am „Parla- 
mentarismus"1 but it is indisputable that the organisation of 
the Bundestag did not recognize the existence of the Opposition for 
a long time. There have been comparatively recent changes, but for 
the bulk of the life of the Bundestag the government benches were 
actually raised above the level of the rest of the house, thus em­
phasizing the fictitious separation of executive and legislature.
The seating arrangements are generally unitary and in a horseshoe 
formation so that government and opposition are not sitting clearly 
divided or facing each other. The rules of procedure of the Bundes­
tag were also made on the basis of government versus parliament as 
a whole. Until 19&9 the order of speakers made no reference to the 
opposition, since the largest Praktion spoke after the government.
A minor parliamentary reform then laid down that a governmental 
speech was to be followed by an ’abweichende Meinung’, but the new 
rule still did. not use the term opposition. During discussions of 
the reform a government side speaker stated that the principal of 
allowing an oppositional speaker to follow a government one was
166 ’Die Offentlichkeitsfunktion des Parlaments. ijberlegungen zur 
Reform des Deutschen Bundestages1, Politische Viertel.jahres- 
schrift 1970, no. 1, p. 29 - 45.
167 Ibid., p. 35.
168 Cf. Schneider, p. 41*
169"staatsrechtlich ganz unhaltbar" .and later declared:"Diese Um-
stellung der gewollten Verfassungsordnung, der Ordnung, daB das
Pendant zur Regierung das ganze Haus ist - Sie wollen, daB es die
. • 170 .
Opposition wird werden wir nicht mitmachen". After the forma­
tion of the Grand Coalition the SPD were less interested in the re­
form and the FDP, being perhaps particularly oriented towards the 
'classical liberal' idea of the division of powers ‘and the principal 
of the free mandate, did not press for the inclusion of the term 
’opposition'* Having agreed on the use of the phrase ‘abweichende 
Meinung’, the procedural committee reported: "Yon der Einfugung der 
Worte ,oppositionelle Meinung1 hat der AusschuB Ab stand genommen, 
ausgehend von der Tatsache, das durchaus auch Mitglieder der die
Regierung stellenden Fraktion eine von der Bundesregierung ab-
"■171weichende Meinung vortragen konnen”. 1 The fiction of the unity
of parliament was therefore preserved, although it is interesting
to note - and indicative of the ambivalence of attitudes towards
parliament and parties in Germany - that a survey taken at about
the same time showed a majority of members of the Bundestag in
favour of a number of measures to strengthen the institutional.
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position of the opposition. Nevertheless, the Fraktionen are 
still treated separately according to the Bundestag rules, which
16.9 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 5. Wahlperiode, 
Stenographische Berichte, p. 2320.
170 Ibid., p. 2321.
171 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 5. Wahlperiode, 
Drucksache V/4373» p. 7*
172 Hans Maier et al. (eds.) Zum Parlamentsverstandnis des 5» 
Deutschen Bundestages (Bonn, 1969). n. 4 2 - 46.
means that three out of four speakers can be from the government
side (e.g., the speaking order would be as follows: government
speech, opposition reply, larger government coalition party,
smaller government coalition party). A concession was made to
opposition during the Grand Coalition, however, when the tiny FDP
opposition was allowed to reply first to government speeches, and
■17.3'this set the precedent for the later reform.
Although a pattern of government/opposition alternation seems to 
have developed in the Federal Republic, the position of the oppo­
sition is not as clear-cut as in a real two-party system. The 
Federal Republic is not a true two-party system, since the third 
party is not outside the government/opposition pattern (as in , 
Britain or as it would be under a majority voting system). .The FDP 
is in a pivotal position and could still be a possible coalition 
partner for either of the potential government parties, although 
it at present declares its allegiance in advance of elections. Gehrig 
has termed the Federal Republic a ’Zweigruppensystem’ which approxi­
mates to a two-party system, except that the ’rule of the majority1 
principle can be ignored in certain circumstances. For example, the 
largest party can be forced into opposition by the other two parties 
outnumbering it together, although they may represent themselves to 
the electorate as two distinct parties. This opposition is not
173 Gehrig, Parlament - Regierung - Opposition, p. 256.
174 See also Seidel, p. 269; Buverger, p. 416; K.D. Grube, Die 
Stellung der Opposition im Strukturwandel des Parlamentarismus, 
(Jur. Diss.. Cologne, 19&5) > p. ?•
'illegitimate1 according to Gehrig, as the representative aspect of
the system allows for the parties to decide how a government is to be
formed, if the elections have failed to produce an absolute majority,
' ■' 175A similar point is made by Kluxen.
With reference to this kind of system, the view expressed by 
several British authors that government is controlled by its own 
parliamentary supporters, especially backbenchers, more than by 
the opposition is restated by Robert Leicht, Norbert Gehrig and 
others. They point out that this is even more applicable to a 'two 
group system1 with a coalition government, since coali tion increases 
the likelihood of 'latent opposition' within the government and its 
parties. Leicht uses the terminology of Karl Lowenstein's 
Verfassungslehre to describe the position of the government par­
ties as potentially fluctuating between the roles of 'intra-organ 
control' and 'inter-organ control', i.e., they may control the govern­
ment from within, or they may take the role of members of parliament
177 ■to control from outside. 1 Parliamentary opposition also has this 
dual role; it opposes the government parties within the framework 
of parliament and it opposes and tries to replace the government as 
a separate organ. In unusual circumstances the opposition can profit 
from dissidence within the government camp but normally it can only 
criticise, participate, present itself as an alternative government
175 Introduction to 'Die parlamentarisehe Opposition', p. 393 - 400.
176 Tubingen, 1959*
177 Robert jueicht, Grundgesetz und politische Praxis (Munich, 1974) t 
p.- -73.
and await the next election.
As indicated, there was a time when the SPD seemed to accept its 
role of permanent opposition. Because of the way in which opposition 
developed, in Germany especially, it is often considered quite 
natural that the more 'conservative1 elements should be in govern­
ment and the more 'progressiveelements should be in opposition.
For this reason it is particularly interesting to study the CDU/CSU 
opposition in the Federal Republic after 19&9- The party's concerted 
effort to master the new role of opposition soon became apparent, 
but this proved to be a difficult task and resulted in a heightened 
awareness of the problems of opposition. There were in addition 
particularly controversial issues at stake. Thus the period of 
broadly-based government and minute, negligible opposition gave 
way to a new era of lively opposition, comparable to the post-war 
period of SPD opposition and this promoted new interest and a more 
optimistic approach to opposition among both politicians and poli­
tical scientists. This change and the character of the revived 
opposition will be discussed in the following section.
C The 1969 - 1972 CDU/CSU Opposition in the Federal Republic
1 1969 - 1972: the new political situation in the Federal Republic
The period 19&9 — 1972 proved to be the beginning of two very- 
important processes for the Federal Republic of Germany: the develop­
ment of an alternating parliamentary system of government and the 
reorientation of foreign policy to allow the Federal Republic to 
recognise itself as permanent. The critical nature of these processes 
will be illustrated in the main section of this study by a detailed 
examination of the CDU/CSU oppositional behaviour in the sixth 
Bundestag, with special reference to Beutschlandpolitik and Gst- 
politik. In the present section it may be useful to set out some 
preliminary points of orientation regarding the situation of govern­
ment and opposition in the Bundestag and regarding the nature of 
the policy areas in which they confronted each other.
2 The situation after the 1969 election
The reaction of most observers of the German political situation
to the result of the 1969 election is to view it as the long-awaited
change of power, and as the beginning of a two party or two group
178 -
alternation system. The first period of CDU/CSU opposition is
178 e.g., Lewis Edinger, 'Political change in Germany: the Federal
Republic after the 19&9 election', Comparative Politics 2, 
no. 4.’(1970), p.549; Leicht, p. 7.
described as particularly lively, even as hostile, and frequently 
compared with the SPD opposition in the first Bundestag. The situ­
ation was in many ways roughly parallel. Each party was a newcomer 
to its role, for although the SPD had been in government just pre­
viously to 1969 - 72, it was its first experience of government 
leadership, while the CDU/CSU was totally new to opposition and had 
expected to be in government, just as the SPD had in 1949- The course 
of action of the opposition was similar in each case: a highly emo­
tional and hostile, often personnally very bitter confrontation in 
the areas of foreign policy and economic and financial affairs, 
desperate attempts to prevent government policy being carried out 
by calling upon the Federal Constitutional Court, and at the same 
time a great deal of legislative initiative and participation, not 
rewarded by the electorate, since legislation always tends to be 
attributed to the government. However, in the period 19&9 - 1972- 
the hostility and bitterness of the opposition were less intense 
and much less general than in the 1950 s, though similar in direction
again revealing old ideologically based differences, thought to
179have been overcome by the experience of the Grand Coalition.
Obviously, the first legislative period was viewed as a test of the 
new German parliamentary democracy, and this feeling returned in the 
sixth period when both government and opposition, but especially 
opposition, were perceived, and most importantly perceived them­
selves as on trial in their new roles.
179 See remark by F.-J.^ StrauS, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundes­
tages, Wahlperiode, Stenographische Berichte, p.2.
It has been suggested that the opposition in the first legislative
"180period might be termed ’limited structural1. This term could 
not be applied to the sixth period. On social policies the CDU/CSU 
opposition was generally both competitive and constructive, and 
finally cooperative, producing alternative and improved suggestions 
for legislation but often voting in favour of government drafts 
eventually. Some negative and obstructive tendencies were apparent 
in the opposition to economic and financial policies. This applies 
to some extent to the areas of Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik, 
but the main characteristic in these cases might best be described 
as conservative. There can be no suggestion of ’opposition of 
principle' in parliament, where the adherence of both sides to the 
constitution and to overall long-term goals is frequently reaffirmed.
Far from being anti-system, the GDU/CSIJopposition has been criti-
—  - 181'1 
cised for too much concentration on preserving the system. There
is, however, much confusion in the use of the phrase ’opposition of
principle’ or ’principled opposition’. Some authors do use it to
describe the type of opposition to foreign policy found in the
182first and sixth legislative periods but this is not in strict 
accordance with Kirchheimer\s definition mentioned above.
180 Cf. p. 49*
181 Christian Hacke, Die Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der CDU/CStJ: 
Wege und Irrwege der Opposition seit 1969 (Cologne, 1975), p • 18.
182 e.g. Waldemar Besson, ’Regierung und Opposition in der deutschen 
Politik' , Politische Viertel.jahresschrift 3, no. 3 (1962),
p.237? Geoffrey Pridham, 'The CDU/CSU Opposition in West 
Germany, 1969 - 72', Parliamentary Affairs, Spring 1975> p.216; 
Roberts, p. 447»
183 Cf. p. 49 «
Foreign policy opposition may be regarded in many ways as a
1 fl A
special case of opposition, and the classifications discussed
185earlier in this study -do not cover the case of a loyal, construc­
tive opposition which considers the fundamental orientation of 
government foreign policy to be wrong. In examining this kind of 
opposition during the first years of the Federal Republic, H. Kaack 
has suggested a classification of opposition according to the
'186'intensity of its activity in opposing matters of foreign policy.
The initial SPD opposition is classed as 'antagonistic1, since 
its basic concepts of foreign policy were not compatible with 
those of the government. Later, the SPD opposition became less 
antagonistic and is classed by Kaack as 1 .dialectic’ , since it re­
tains differences with the government but is basically ready to 
compromise. When the SDU/CSU took over opposition in 1969 it was 
expected that it would take up this’dialectic* position. However, 
it wavered between this and antagonism, due to the varying intensity 
of feeling in the different wings of the party. On balance the 
‘antagonistic’ style prevailed, making foreign policy opposition 
in the sixth Bundestag comparable to that in the first. The in­
tensity of this antagonism in each case can be related to the ex­
tent to which the policies concerned affected, or were perceived 
as affecting the question of German nationhood.
184 Gf. p. 66.
185 Cf. p. 17.
186 ’Opposition und AuBenpolitik’ , Politische Viertel.jahresschrif t 
1969> Sonderheft 1, p. 241•
3 Opposition in the area of foreign policy
The period 1969 “ 1972 was one dominated by foreign policy issues
and this is the area where the opposition is at its greatest dis-
187 ■
advantage to government ' and where party differences are most
188difficult to explain to the electorate. The development of a
credible alternative is not easy, since the world situation, the ;
intentions and wishes of other countries, especially of the major
powers, so condition foreign policy thinking that a course of
action undertaken by a government may often be perceived as the
189only possible one. - Further, the long-term nature of foreign 
policy decisions usually makes it impracticable for an opposition 
to offer to reverse a particular policy if elected to power at the 
next election. As it is accepted practice that foreign countries 
deal with governments and not with oppositions, no complete alter­
native foreign policy can be made effective. Important opposition 
figures are often invited to foreign countries for exchanges of 
views, but there is obviously no possibility of binding agreements. 
The reaction of a foreign power to an oppositionfs foreign policy
can only be a matter of conjecture. However, foreign policy is
190less the preserve of government than previously so that, while
187 Hereth, Die Parlamentarische Opposition, p. 101.
188 Gerhard Loewenberg, Parliament in the German Political System 
(Ithaca, 1966), p. 394*
189 Rudolf Hrbek, Die SPD, Deutschland und Europa (Diss. Tubingen, 
1968), p. 370.
190 Hrbek, 1AuBenpolitische Gemeinsamkeit von Regierung und Opposi 
tion' in K. v. Beyme et al. (eds.), Demokratisches System und 
poiitische Praxis der BRD. (Munich, 1971)» P* 444*
alternatives may be impossible to put into effect, oppositional 
influence may still be of great importance. The oppositional ten­
dency to propose an ’ideal’ foreign policy programme may in fact
191bring about modifications of government policy.
4 ’Gemeinsamkeit' in foreign policy in the Federal Republic
In the sixth Bundestag, one main line of government defence against 
opposition criticism was to demand to know the alternative and to 
suggest that the opposition was not fulfilling its function of pro­
viding one. As so much of the major criticism concerned foreign 
policy matters, the task of the opposition was a difficult one, and. 
not only for the reasons mentioned above. There had long been a 
prevailing conception in the Federal Republic that this is one area
in which a united government-opposition front should be presented 
'192
to the world, especially in view of fierce ’external' opposition 
from the DDR. According to Hrbek, the Anglo-Saxon conception of bi­
partisanship was felt to be appropriate to the situation in the
Federal Republic, especially since the latter was considered a
193
’penetrated system'.  ^External influences were perceived to be
so strong that only one course of action is left open - the one
191 Hrbek, Die SPD. Deutschland und Eurona. p. 370*
192 Hereth, Die parlamentarische Opposition, t>. 107; Hrbek, ’AuBen­
poli tische Gemeinsamkeit1, p. 456.
193 Cf. J. Rosenau, 'Pretheories and Theories in foreign policy' in 
R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and Inter­
national Politics (Evanston, 1966), p. 65.
matching the general climate in international relations* In this 
way there can be great pressure for ’Gemeinsamkeit’, a situation 
favouring the exertion of opposition influence but not the presen­
tation of opposition alternatives.
The concern for political stability in the Federal Republic
has meant'that ’Gemeinsamkeit' in foreign policy and other matters
has been found particularly attractive. The arguments in favour of.
government-opposition cooperation on foreign policy have been set
194
out by Hrbek as follows: 1. this is internationally approved
as a guarantee of foreign policy continuity and a sign of reliabili­
ty, 2. foreign policy is an area needing flexibility and cannot be 
covered by party programmes, 3* opposition against foreign policy 
could deter international partners, 4* government negotiators are 
in a better bargaining position with full parliamentary Support. 
Further, in the German context Joint foreign policy may be considered 
better for democracy, since there is wider participation and since 
the government demonstrates that it sees the opposition as an alter­
native government; the opposition can demonstrate its loyalty to the 
state, facilitating a change of power, and Joint responsibility 
avoids the repetition of a stab-in-the-back legend and of accusa­
tions that one side or the other is not acting in the national in­
terest. These last points illustrate the reaction against the
194 Hrbek, 'AUBenpolitische Gemeinsamkeitp. 447.
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German experience of 'nothing but opposition’ under the Weimar 
195
Republic.
It is pointed out in the same article by Hrbek that confrontation 
over foreign policy might equally well be considered positive for 
democracy, since more public discussion ensues and issues are more 
clearly drawn. Further, the responsibility lies on one side only, 
leaving the other to exercise some amount of control. Action may 
perhaps be more quickly possible in a confrontation situation 
where no time need be wasted in trying to find a common government- 
opposition stance. However, these points must be rejected if the 
conditions suggested by Hrbek as being favourable for 'Gemeinsam- 
keit’ are to be accepted.
These conditions are as follows: the government and the opposition 
should agree on the structure of the political system and on alter­
nation in office, each trusting that the other is sincere and 
capable; both sides should be prepared to put nation before party.
In the case of the Federal Republic there is certainly consensus 
on the political system and on the principle of alternation. In 
particular, each side in parliament is careful to affirm its belief 
in the basic sincerity of the other, although each, in trying to 
prove its superiority tends to use language reminiscent of ideolo­
gical differences of the past. While this might be unremarkable
195 Cf. p. 39.
elsewhere, it is of some significance in the West German context 
because, as statements in the Bundestag continue to show, it is 
found unacceptable by the other side as a weapon in democratic 
conflict. Many.examples of this tendency will be given later* The 
question of putting nation before party is also a vexed one in the 
German context, since the overriding problem has been the definition 
of the nation.
If the above conditions are accepted then it follows that the
achievement of'Gemeinsamkeit1 in foreign policy is very closely
linked with the successful functioning of liberal democracy and of
institutionalised opposition, since all are said to depend on very 
1
similar factors. All are associated with a particular political
culture and particular political attitudes, among them trust towards
others, a readiness to compromise and a pragmatic approach to 
197
problems. Further, a fairly homogeneous two or near-two party 
system is more likely to favour ’Gemeinsamkeit1 than a multi-party 
one. Lastly, much depends on the kind of foreign policy problem 
in question. Hrbek points out that if too many internal problems 
are involved it will be difficult for government and opposition 
to cooperate. In fact, one main difficulty regarding1 ’Gemeinsamkeit’ 
in the sixth Bundestag was the ambivalence of attitudes towards it; 
this will be discussed at a later point in this study.
196 Gf. p. 10 ff.
197 Hrbek, 'AuBenpolitische Gemeinsamkeit’, p. 455 J see also Dahl, 
Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, p. 352.
5 Characteristics of foreign policy opposition in the Federal
Republic.
In the case of the Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik of the 
Federal Republic of Germany from 1969 r 1972, it is particularly 
difficult to make any distinction between problems that are foreign 
and those that are internal, since the geographical area to which 
the political system itself applies was felt to be in question. This 
involves the recurring problem of the identity of state and nation 
in Germany and is one main reason why the opposition to these poli­
cies has been chosen for closer examination in this study. Until 
1969 the official point of orientation of the Deutschlandpolitik of 
the Federal Republic had remained the goal of a reunited German 
state. Gf course, it can be argued that the Westpolitik pursued by 
Adenauer was diametrically opposed to this, but the official stance 
remained ‘reunification through strength*.The 1969-1972 period 
saw a reorientation of the Deutschlandpolitik of the new government 
which had the immediate effect of facilitating progress in the Ost­
politik already begun by previous governments. More broadly speaking 
however, the Brandt government sought to resolve the tensions created 
by the disparity between the official, legal position of pursuing 
the goal of a reunited Germany and the ‘real * position of pursuing 
other goals, such as West European integration, which were opposed 
to this. The concept of reunification was retained only in a weaken­
ed form to mean the reunification of the nation, and it was made 
clear that a reunified German state was no longer possible. The 
central question for the opposition during this period was whether 
or not it was prepared to accept this reorientation. Its attitude
may be termed ’conservative' in as far as it sought to retain the
198previous official orientation.
However, the main reason for the high level of conflict between 
government and opposition in the area of Deutschlandpolitik and 
Ostpolitik between 1969 and 1972 was not so much the new abstract 
orientation as the more concrete matter of treaty politics* The con­
clusion of treaties can be particularly disruptive for internal 
politics, since treaties often deal with important changes in re­
lationships and may affect emotionally charged issues so that a
situation of 'dissonance between external and internal "realities" 1 
199
is created. As already mentioned this dissonance had existed 
since the early days of the Federal Republic and the treaties con­
cluded by the Brandt government served merely to sharpen public 
awareness of it. nevertheless, some parallels can be drawn to the 
German reactions to the Versailles Treaty and these will be discussed 
as they arise in the next section.
Similarly emotional and disruptive issues had been at stake in 
the 1st legislative period, but even then both sides spoke in favour 
of cooperation in foreign policy, although this proved impossible 
because basic concepts differed too greatly.20® As an example of 
the incompatibility of government and.opposition positions, Hrbek
198 Of. Klaus von Beyme, ’The Ostpolitik in the West German 1969 
Flections', Government and Opposition 5, p. 205.
199 Roberts, p. 438.
200) Hrbek, ’AuBenpolitische Gemeinsamkeit*, p. 456.
quotes various phrases used by the leader of the opposition and 
by another prominent opposition foreign policy speaker. Kurt 
Schumacher termed Adenauer's foreign policy ‘auBenpolitische 
Klassenpolitik1 and Gerhart Lutkens spoke of Veine von der Wurzel
aus falsche AuBenpolitik1. Yet in a speech in 1951 Lutkens appealed
201 .
for more cooperation in foreign policy. He emphasized that it
was the duty of the government to take responsibility for foreign 
policy, but also to consult the opposition and take its standpoint 
into account. In his view more cooperation might have been possible 
if the opposition had been able to force more foreign policy debates, 
had received more information and had been allowed more participation. 
On the other hand, he argued that it was the duty of the opposition 
to take up a counter position to that of the government and that 
this should not permit the government to describe the opposition as 
purely negative. ~~
Lutkens1 arguments are somewhat confused but it is interesting to
note that they are similar to those of the later CDU/CSU opposition.
It also appealed constantly for more information and blamed the
government for the lack of cooperation on foreign policy; above
all, members of the 1969 - 72 opposition felt that an unduly negative
202 :role was being imposed upon them by the government* They had 
chosen to confront the government on Deutschlandpolitik and Ost-
201 'Die parlamentarische Opposition in der AuBenpolitik1, AuBen­
politik II (1951)> P* 598.
202 See H. Blum, Reaktion oder Reform; Wohin geht di e GPU? (Reinbek 
bei Hamburg, 1972), p. 8.
politik and found that the government was using this to gain in­
creased sympathy. V/hat justification there was for this will be dis­
cussed later.
A further characteristic of the foreign policy opposition common 
to both the 1st and 6th legislative periods was the use of hostile 
and divisive language. Adenauer was accused of following anti- 
German, anti-European and pro-French policies and of encouraging 
private capitalist manipulation. His ideas on. West European inte­
gration were called 'conservative, clerical, capitalist and cartelli- 
stic'. Similar rigid dogmatism is evident in the opposition's terms 
for Brandt's policies: anti-German, anti-European and pro-Soviet
policies which would bring the Federal Republic 'to the entrance of
203 ■
the Soviet system'. In each case the government replied in simi­
lar vein with accusations of communism or. Nazism, so that foreign 
policy debates often took on an ideological fixation. Some authors 
claim that this style of abuse was initiated and deliberately main­
tained by the CDU/CSTJ government during the early years of the Pede-
204. ■ " ; V ■ v . ' '
ral Republic. Certainly it was in Adenauer*s interest to exagger­
ate ideological differences between government and opposition as
tnis kind of polarisation increased solidarity within the governing 
/ . . 205
coalitions. The use of abusive remarks on both sides poisoned the
203 Cf. p. 89.
204 Hereth, p. 129; see also H. Hannover, Folitische Diffamierung 
der Opposition (Dortmund, 1962).
205 Hereth, pp. 92 - 94; Pridham, 'The CDTJ/CSU Opposition’, p. 202.
political atmosphere so that every difference of opinion led to 
hostility and threatened to destroy the basis of democratic dis­
cussion. Hereth points out that one reason for the use of this 
political style was the special nature of the main object of con­
tention: foreign policy. As already mentioned, this is a particular­
ly disruptive area in the German context since it touches upon the 
questions of German nationhood and statehood. In the discussion of 
such questions the latent but traditional ideological differences 
in German politics reappear and become rigid. This situation has 
been referred to by Dahrendorf as follows: "Uneinigkeit in nationalen 
Fragen ist . . . ein Kampf absoluter Anspruehe, es gibt keine Kom- 
promisse . . . Hier verlangt jede Position im Grunde die bedingungs- 
lose conversion des Gegners. Differenzen in nationalen F r a g e n • 
schaffen ein nahezu atemberaubendes, namlich todliches IQima der 
inneren Poli tik1.2®^
A further main reason for this abusive political style is said 
to be the lack of basic agreement on the limits of parliamentary 
controversy. If rational debate is to be possible, neither side 
must feel at a disadvantage institutionally and each must regard 
the other as an opponent but not an enemy. German authors suggest 
that the Bundestag is particularly given to the kind of sharp 
attacks and noisy scenes which make considered discussion imposs-
. " 207 ■ ■ ..V.
ible. In fact the British parliamentary debates are often much
206 Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland (Munich, 1965), 
p.•29. /■ .
207 .E. g., Hereth, p. 128.
sharper and much more noisy, and this does not necessarily prevent
discussion, since the insults and accusations are perhaps more good-
humoured, or at least not taken so seriously, and are not loaded
with connotations from the past. The German feeling that this kind
of political controversy is unacceptable reflects a lower level of
conflict tolerance, due to the relatively recent existence of pro-
■ 208found ideological cleavages in German society.
Due to strong anti-communist feelings in the Federal Republic, 
especially in the early years, the CDU/C3TJ government was able to
denounce the SPD opposition as ’klassenkampferisch1 and therefore
209 :'dangerous to democracy. ■ If the opposition went against majority
opinion it might be accused of being against the democratic order.
The government suggested that the opposition could endanger the
state by opposing government policies at a time when the foreign
policy situation was critical, especially as the East German regime
would be delighted to see the coalition in danger. Hannover has
pointed out that defamation of the opposition was the standard
’ F  2 1 0
government tactic in the foreign policy area* Opposition to
foreign policy was denounced as treason and, until about 1960, the
SPD was accused of communism and of supporting Soviet policies or
acting in the Soviet interest. Franz-Josef StrauB is singled out
-  211 ' by Hereth as a brilliant exponent of the art of defamation.
208 Cf. Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, p.367.
209 Pridham, p. 202.
Pin Politische Diffamierung der Opposition, -p. 55.
211 Die parlamentarische Op-position, p. 131.
An example of this is StrauB’ assertion that if the SPD rejected 
atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr they would be ’handing over the 
Federal Republic to the Communists without a struggle’.
This hostile and bitter atmosphere was also present at the personal
level during the period when the SPD was in opposition. Herbert
Wehner was subjected to personal attacks because of his Communist
past. The government made Wehner’s career a “Symbol sozial-
212demokratischer Ostverdachtigkeit'1* Later the opposition 
chancellor candidate, Willy Brandt, was also subjected to govern­
ment abuse because he had gone into emigration during the Third 
Reich.215
As already mentioned there was to some extent a revival of this 
political style in the 6th legislative period, although much of 
the more extreme abuse occurred originally outside the Bundestag 
and was then brought up for discussion there at a later date. In 
the following section of this study the part played by each side 
in parliament in this ’defamation’ campaign will be discussed, and 
an attempt will be made to show how this style was adapted to the 
change in roles which had taken place.
212 Hereth, p. 132.
213 Verhandlungen, 8th March, 1961. p. 8319.
6 The-change of roles in the 6 th Bundestag-
As stated above, the 6th Bundestag marked a turning point in the
history of the Federal Republic both in internal politics and inter-
214 ' ' 
nationally. By some commentators a real change of power is con-
215 216
sidered to have taken place, while others claim that the
new government had to be regarded as just another variation of the 
changing government coalitions, until the decisive change of power 
was reached in 1972, when the SPD at last received the largest 
number of votes. In some quarters doubt was cast on the legitimacy 
of the 1969 change, since the largest party was no longer in govern­
ment. However, a clear change did take place as far as the role of 
opposition is concerned, since this was taken over for the first 
time by the CDU/CSU, a party never before out of government and 
firmly identified with government and with the state.
The change of government coalition was made possible by a number 
of factors: the recent SPD government experience, the precedents 
set at Land level of SPD/FDP coalitions, the changes in FDP orien­
tations, especially in the areas of Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpoli- 
tik. Studies have shown that in the 1969 election the FDP lost 
mainly right wing votes to the CDU/cStJ, due, above all, to the 
change in foreign policy attitudes; the CDIl/CSU lost some votes to
214 Sdinger, ’Political change in Germany’,pp.549 - 578; Hrbek,
’AuBenpolitische Gemeinsamkeit1, p.467; W. Kaltefleiter, ’The 
Impact of the Flection of 1969 and the Formation of the New 
Government on the German Party System’, Comparative Politics, 
July 1970, p.593; Leicht, p. 143.
215 e.g., Sdinger, Hrbek.
216 e.g., Kaltefleiter, Leicht.
the SPD through a decline in the. traditional voting adherence of 
urban Catholics and rural Protestants.*^? The whole climate of 
opinion in 1969 was favourable to the SPD taking over government 
leadership. The CDU/CSTJ electoral emphasis on security and re­
assurance- was no longer as attractive as previously, while the
SPD projected a modem and forward-looking image which appealed to
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the electorate. According to Edinger 7 the 1969 election was
the first time that the two major parties could really, not only 
theoretically, compete for office. The change which took place was 
not critical and there was no sharp party realignment, no polari­
sation, and no substantial shift in voting. The transition was a 
gradual one from the government point of view, but a sudden one for 
the opposition. The new role situation of the two major parties was 
favourable to a more election oriented confrontation in the Bundes­
tag than ever before and spelt the end of the l3ismarckian tradition 
of separation between parliament and government. The notion of 
parliament as a body controlling the executive finally ended in the 
6th Bundestag and the role of opposition became clearly identified 
with the Fraktion of the C D U / C S U . H o w e v e r ,  the Concept of le­
gitimate. parliamentary opposition was not well established in the
217 H. Klingemann .& F. Pappi, ’The 196-9 Bundestag Election- in the 
Federal Republic of Germany - An Analysis of Voting Behaviour1, 
Comparative Politics 2, no.4 (July 1970), pp. 523 - 548.
218 J. Herz, Introduction to Comparative Politics 2, no. 4 (July 
.1970)> Kaltefleiter, 'The Impact of the Election1, p.597*
219 ’Political Change in Germany1, p. 552.
220 Ibid., p. 572; see also Pridham, ’The CDU/CSU Opposition* p.208.
political culture. One survey taken prior to the 19&9 election
found that 6970 of voters felt that opposition should support rather
221than criticise government. In view of this Edinger suggests 
that it was questionable whether the new opposition could perform 
the functions of criticism of government, representing some interests 
of disaffected social groups and demonstrating its potential ca­
pacity for better government. This last function was likely to be 
particularly difficult for the CDU/CSTT since it lacked cohesion and
contained some centrifugal elements which could endanger its
■ 222 : ' ■solidarity now that government responsibility was lost. In fact 
’’The move to the role of Opposi tion proved to be the decisive 
turning point for renewal in the political and organisational 
development of the CDU/CSIF”^ ^ , as Geoffrey Pridham has demonstrated, 
but this renewal was not yet apparent during the life of the 
opposition in the sixth Bundestag, where the “immediate reaction 
was one of almost total disorientation”. Initial suggestions on 
solving the problems of the new role of the CDU/CSU were soon publi­
shed by a number of authors, notably by. members and ex—members of 
the party. These introspective works revolve mainly around the un—
221 Max Kaase, Determinants of Voting Behaviour in the West German 
General Election of 19&9* unpub1., Institut fur Sozialwissen- 
schaften Mannheim, p. 6 (quoted by Edinger, ‘Political Change 
in Germany1, p. 577)*
222 Cf. Geoffrey Pridham, Christian Democracy in Western Germany 
(London, 1977), P- 190.
223 Ibid., p. 188.
224 Ibid., pi 189. '
suitability of the CDU/CSU party structure and self-perception to
the role of opposition, with suggestions for reform, or are
225attempts to clarify an opposition programme. However, little
concrete progress was made and issues became, if anything, more
confused. A basic ambivalence of approach was a notable feature
of these works:” . .das Auseinanderklaffen zwiscHen arbeits- und
leistungsorientierten Vorstellungen hier und offentlichkeits-
orientierten, auf der Bildung schwerpunktmaBiger Alternativen
• 227 'beruhenden Konzepten dort . .1 There was also a shortage of 
time for considered renewal and reform, due to the premature dis­
solution of the sixth Bundestag and more particularly to the 
preoccupation of the opposition with the political crisis preceding 
it: ”SchlieBlich waren im 6. Bundestag in dem Moment alle guten
Vorsatze vergessen, als das Ende der Oppositionsrolle fur die
228 — -CDU/CSU nahe herbeigekommen schien.” As will be shown in the 
following section of this study, the behaviour of the CDU/CSU 
opposition to the Ostpolitik in the sixth Bundestag was not only 
determined by the nature of the issues involved and by the tra­
ditional character of the party and of the Bundestag itself, but 
to a large extent also by its reluctance, if not refusal, to accept 
its new role.
225 E.g., Blum, Reaktion oder Reform; D.-E. Becker & E. Wiesendahl,
Ohne Programm nach Bonn - Die Union als Kanzlerwahl-Verein, (Rein-
bek bei Hamburg, 1972); D. Rollman (ed.), Die CPU in der Oppo­
sition - Eine Selbstdarstellung (Hamburg, 1970)» 0. Goiter &
E. Pieroth (eds.), Die Union in der Opposition: Analyse, Stra­
tegic, Programm (Diisseldorf, 1970).
226 Cf. Pridham, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, p. 191*
227 R* Schneider, Die CDU/CSU-Opposition im 6. Deutschen Bundestag
unpubl. 'Eagister! thesis, Univ. of Freiburg, 1973» P* 44-
228 Ibid."
II OPPOSITIONAL BEHAVIOUR IN THE PLENARY SESSIONS OF THE SIXTH. 
BUNDESTAG : THE CDU/CSU OPPOSITION TO THE OSTPOLITIK '
A The period preceding the Moscow Treaty of August 1970
1 Introductory sitting
The consciousness of a test situation for German parliamentary 
democracy was present from the beginning of the 6th Bundestag. In 
his introduction to the first sitting, Altersprasident Borm(FDP) 
referred to the duty of politicians to better their image and to 
encourage a more realistic attitude to politics and to history. He 
expressed regret that the job of a politician was still, not very 
highly regarded in the Federal Republic of Germany, and particu­
larly that government was always more highly regarded than oppo­
sition. Borm emphasized the relationship between opposition and 
democracy by saying: ”Auch totalitare Staaten haben ihre Regierungen.
Die Opposition und ihre gewahrleisteten Moglichkeiten sind das
1Kriterium wahrer Demokratie*1. With the political style of earlier
years in mind he called for an end to the use of such defamatory
expressions as ‘Verzicht’, ’Vaterlandsverrat1 and ’Herbeifiihrung 
2
des Untergangs’, which had been heard during the election campaign.
1 Verhandlungen, 6. Wahlperiode, p. 2.
2 Ibid., p.
On the state and authority, Borm advised the young to remain criti­
cal of authority, and then pointed out that nothing is more contrary 
to the intention of the Basic Law on parties than to equate one's 
own party with the state. He warned his audience to remember the
period 1933 - 1945 and to consider the situation in the ‘other part 
3of our nation*.
This speech is characteristic of the new situation in the 6th 
Bundestag and is directed mainly at the new CDU/CSU opposition. The 
central points of later criticism are already touched upon: reluc­
tance of the CDU/CSTJ to accept its new role, its tendency to use 
hostile language with ideological and historical overtones, its 
identification of itself with the state. While these points all 
have validity, it is interesting to note here that the opposition 
has already been cast in a role which is potentially advantageous 
for the government, before it has even spoken in the new Bundestag. 
Borm's remarks also illustrate a continuing awareness of the sen­
sitive context of politics in the Federal Republic: doubts are ex­
pressed about the political culture and German totalitarian regimes 
past and present are held up as a warning.
Such remarks are, of course, not unusual in the Bundestag, but 
it should be remembered that the most important statements and 
debates discussed here were televised, so that remarks addressed 
ostensibly only to the house in fact reached a much wider audience. 
Also, appeals to 'preserve democracy' had not been aimed so credibly 
at the opposition since the 1st Bundestag. It might be assumed that
3 Verhandlungen, p . 3 *
the presence of cameras would increase the likelihood of a 'con­
tinuous election campaign1 in parliament, and the extent to which 
this applies to the opposition and to the separate parties will be 
discussed later. One tendency is already apparent here: the FDR 
practice of prescribing desirable oppositional behaviour and politi­
cal style while reminding the house (and the public) of Germany's 
political traditions and recent political history.
2 The government declaration and the debate following
The first activity of the CDU/CSU opposition in the Bundestag 
came during the government declaration. Chancellor Brandt was 
constantly interrupted by Barzel, who as leader of the opposition 
Fraktion was soon to emerge as the natural counterpart to the 
Chancellor and eventually to become opposition Chancellor candidate. 
This interruption, which was not usual during such prepared state­
ments, gave the impression that the new opposition intended above 
all to oppose. The crucial points of the declaration were that 
while the DDR would not be recognized in international law, there 
were two German states which were not foreign countries for each 
other. Renewed interruption from Barzel followed this and brought 
a characteristic government comment from Brandt: "Ach wissen Sie,
Sie miissen sich noch angewohnen, auch einmal einer Regierungs- 
erklarung zuzuhoren . . This kind’of remark was, of course, 
made on both sides but was particularly effectively used by the
government side to cast the opposition as reluctant and lacking
4
4 Verhandlungen, n. 24.
in appreciation of its proper function. However, it seems unlikely
that any defamation was intended in Brandt’s counter to opposition
campaign statements about the ’end. of democracy"Wir stehen nicht
5am finde unserer Demokratie, wir fangen erst richtig an". Here
Brandt was presumably referring to the change of power and likely
development of a system of alternation, but the CDU/CSU took him
6
to mean that their years in government had not been democratic.
7
The opposition reply was more in the nature of an opposition 
8declaration. Barzel emphasized the ’German’ goals of self-deter­
mination and the recognition of human rights. He declared that the 
opposition was ready to cooperate in all matters of national im­
portance. It should therefore by kept fully informed and its opin­
ions should be considered by government decision-makers. These 
claims, maintained Barzel, were particularly valid since the CDU/ 
CSU was numerically the strongest Fraktion, and since Kiesinger 
had been the preferred chancellor of 46.T/3 of voters according to 
polls. - This is the first of many such statements illustrating 
the opposition’s perception-of the situation as illegitimate. As 
mentioned above, it did not acknowledge having lost the election 
and interpreted the results as a mandate to continue the previous 
cooperation in foreign policy. For its part, the government claimed 
that it was continuing the foreign policy of the Grand Coalition.
5 Verhandlungen, p. 34*
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., pp. 37 - 46.
8 Cf. Loewenberg, p.402.
With reference to the CDU/CSU conception of the role of opposition, 
Barzel stressed that the opposition also has responsibility for the 
state, should be critical but not purely negative, should be ready 
to suggest alternatives or improvement to government policy and
9should be included in important questions such as German policy*
The intention to introduce its own legislative programme and not to
10be ‘merely opposition1 was made clear. The CDU/CSU intended to 
compete with the government in the field of concrete legislation.
The competitive element is illustrated by Barzel: . .wir werden
sehen . . , wer schneller ein besseres mehrheitsfahiges Stadte-
11baufdrderungsgesetz vorlegt, die Koalition oder die Opposition’1.
This is one aspect of the approach which has been termed 'quasi 
12governmental'.
The opposition tactic of questioning the constitutionality of 
government foreign policy, which later culminated in the use of the 
Federal Constitutional Court, was already hinted at in this first 
opposition statement. Barzel referred to the omission of the word 
reunification from the government statement and to the two-state 
theory as being incompatible with the imperative contained in the 
preamble of the Basic Law. He saw the change in the ministry name 
from ’Gesamtdeutsche Fragen* to 'Innerdeutsche Beziehungen' as a
9 Verhandlungen, p. JQ.
10 Ibid., p. 40.
11 Ibid., p. 39*
12 Cf. p. 185 ff.
4
further indication that the government had abandoned the goal of 
1Vreunification* This was the first of many occasions on which the 
government was accused by the opposition of breaking with contin­
uity and with ’Gemeinsamkeit1 by no longer proceeding on'the basis 
of. the joint declaration of September 1968. Here again>there were 
opposition demands for clarity and for increased information*
The reply by Mischnick for the FDP Fraktion was along the lines 
already indicated as characteristic for the FDP. Mischnick welcomed 
the change of power as a great step forward for Germany, but ex­
pressed regret that not everyone took the government/ opposition 
change of roles for granted. Wehner’s reply for the SPD. then took 
up the opposition objections to Brandt’s statement that democracy 
had only just begun: ”Es 1st doch eine Anerkennung auch der Rolle 
der parlamentarischen Opposition, wenn vom Bundeskanzler gesagt 
wird:tUnsere parlamentarische Demokratie hat 20 Jahre nach ihrer 
Griindung ihre Fahigkeit zum Wandel bewiesen und damit ihre Probe 
bestanden. Dies ist auch auSerhalb unserer Grenzen vermerkt worden
1A
und hat unserem Staat zu neuem Vertrauen in der Welt verholfen* ”.
This reflects the importance of international approval for the 
15
Federal Republic .both in internal and foreign affairs. Later the 
government was to use the widespread approval of its foreign policy 
as a defence against opposition objections, and the opposition, by 
quoting for its part examples of international disapproval, accepted 
the argument as valid. International considerations are also used
^3 Verhandlungen, p. 43*
14 Ibid., p. 57.
15 Gf. p. 66.
by Vehner in this speech to justify the change in adjectives from 
’gesamtdeutsch’ to ’innerdeutsch’: English and French speakers, he 
explained, confuse ’gesamtdeutsch* with ’groBdeutsch’, which is
embarrassing.16
These contributions from the government side contain elements 
of the special political style of the Federal Republic conditioned 
by German history: preoccupation with democracy at home and inter­
national opinion abroad- As mentioned above, the first of these
elements, particularly, had been successfully used by CIKj/CSU
17
governments to discredit the opposition and was now turned to 
SPD/FDP advantage in the 6th legislative period* The first example 
of this is Brandt’s reply to Barzel in this debate- The Chancellor 
said that he would welcomethe cooperation of the opposition, but 
warned that behaviour such as that of CSU chairman StrauB was not 
acceptable, since his statements outside the Bundestag, and especial­
ly abroad, were in a different style to those inside. Brandt re­
ferred to what he termed ’nationalistically motivated’ remarks by 
StrauB made in North Carolina, accusing the Brandt government of 
’Ausverkauf nationaler Interessen’ and to StrauB1 use of the
Bayernkurier, which in Brandt's words n . .. Hugenberg in den Schatten 
*18
stellt”. - This is the first really provocative remark in the 
6th Bundestag, and it came from the Chancellor himself, bringing a 
cry of ’Verdammte Dreckschleuder* from the opposition.1^ This was
16 Verhandlungen- p. 60.
17 Cf. p. 76.
18 Verhandlungen-pp. 63/64.
19 Ibid.
the pattern followed by many later, similar incidents, when the 
opposition was asked to explain or retract accusations made outside 
parliament. As already stated, this style of controversy reveals the 
underlying ideological divisions of German political history and
is felt to be damaging to democratic politics in the Federal Re-
, . 20 public.
On this occasion the opposition called for an adjournment to 
allow tempers to cool, but contrary to usual practice the govern­
ment opposed the request and a vote was taken. Mi sunders tandings 
during the voting left the whole house in uproar, giving a very 
stormy and disorderly impression of parliamentary procedure. However 
apologies eventually followed so that the debate could continue, 
albeit in very hostile mood, with ideological accusations unabated. 
StrauB objected to the word 'nationalistic1 being used about him
21and pointed out that he would not describe the SPD as communists.
He then hinted at Brandt's emigrant past by reminding his audience
22that he, StrauB, had had to stay and fight during the war. In re­
ply, Brandt quoted the latest headline from the Ba?rernkurier as a 
further example of StrauB* defamation tactics: 'Brandt als Kanzler 
des Ausverkauf s '. He then read from the article claims that the SPD 
was too weak to “take a stand against the second Versailles, the pro 
grammed destruction of German economic power" and was "moving the 
Federal Republic towards the entrance to the Soviet system".^
20 Cf. Hereth, Die parlamentarische Opposition, p* 132.
21 Verhandlungen, p. JO.
2;B Ibid., p. 71.
23 Ibid., p. 72.
Although no concrete issues have yet been discussed, these first 
speeches of the 6th Bundestag already reveal the antagonistic at­
mosphere which often prevailed. Over-sensitiveness on both sides is 
evident, but government use of opposition 'defamation attempts' 
is probably to be regarded as mainly tactical. At this early stage 
the CBtJ/CSU perception of the role change as illegitimate put great 
pressure on the government to justify itself and to prove its superi­
ority. Its method is not direct ’defamation of the opposition1, as 
described by Hannover, but is a more indirect approach, using the 
language of the more extreme sections of the opposition to establish 
a connection with previous anti-democratic German opposition, 
especially where explicit comparisons with the Weimar period are 
made, as above. It seems that this method was still felt to be 
effective after 20 years of the Federal Republic, since the whole 
political system was a conscious attempt to avoid a repetition of 
the Weimar situation.
l’he debate itself in the 6th sitting referred to above reflects 
the opposition interest in foreign policy. The opposition requested 
that this area be discussed first and was represented by ex-Chancellor 
Kiesinger. In his speech he returned first to the recent election, 
claiming that the result was the same as always; the CDU/CSU had 
been returned as the strongest party, and the impression of a huge 
swing in voting given by some foreign media was totally inaccurate.
In fact the decision on government and opposition roles had been 
made by the FDP, a party with only about 5fo of the votes cast.^4
24 Verhandlungen. p. 74.
This again reaffirms the opposition conviction that it had not lost
the election. - On the CDU/CSU conception of the role of opposition
Kiesinger quoted the words ox the first leader of the opposition
in the Federal Republic, Kurt Schumacher, in the 1st Bundestag:"Das
We sen der Opposition ist der permanente Versuch, in konkreten Tat-
bestanden mit konkreten Vorschlagen der Regierung und ihren Parteien
25
den positiven Gestaltungswillen der Opposition aufzuzwingen".
This exactly describes the CDU/CSU behaviour in matters of concrete
26legislation. As has been shown by Veen, the CDTJ/CSU approach- to 
legislation was first of all competitive, in that the initiative 
was taken, sometimes forcing the government to produce its own draft 
on the same matter; then the opposition often dropped its own ini­
tiative and became constructive, attempting to carry amendments and 
additions; even where this failed the opposition was often still 
cooperative, voting in favour of the government draft. However, as 
mentioned above, this is only one aspect of the attitude of the 
opposition. The other aspect was referred to by Kiesinger later in
the same speech when he said that the opposition would fbe fair in 
27
waging war1, a remark to which the FDP objected. Dorn (FDP) re­
torted that if Kiesinger spoke of ’war1 in the context of parlia­
mentary politics, his conception of democracy must be very different
28
to that pf the FDP. This remark again reflects a low tolerance 
for any suggestions of political conflict reminiscent of the Weimar 
'nothing but opposition1, as did the speech the next day by Genscher, 
who stressed the dangers of hostile relationships in politics. On
25 Verhandlungen, o. 79; Cf. p. 48 above.
‘36 Die CDU/CSU Opposition.
27 Verhandlungen» p. 74*
28 Ibid., p. 81/82.
foreign policy, Kiesinger repeated accusations that the government 
had broken with continuity and abandoned the goals of reunification 
and self-determination. He also questioned the compatibility of the 
two-state theory with the refusal to recognise the DDR in inter­
national law and warned that hopes of goodwill from the Soviet Union 
were illusory. Other opposition speakers continued in a similar 
fashion; a typical example of the sincere, outright opposition to 
government Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik by some members of the 
CDU/CSU was von Guttenberg's statement that he was 'very much dis­
mayed' at the two-state theory and had grave doubts about the
29government's juggling with formulae and ambiguous concepts. How­
ever, the opposition approach to Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik
30at this stage could not yet be described in Kaack's terms as 
'antagonistic1, but rather as 1 dialectic', since the possibility of 
compromise was present, and each side professed to favour it.
The 'antagonistic' approach of each side to the other was much 
more marked in the earlier exchanges concerning political style 
and oppositional methods, but these did continue into the foreign 
policy discussion proper. Also, most opposition 'defamation' was 
concerned at least indirectly with Ostpolitik or Deutschlandpolitik 
(e.g., StrauB had used the expression 'Ausverkauf* to refer to 
monetary policy, but the connotations are clear.). The terminology 
itself makes the parallel with the Weimar period inescapable, but 
this parallel is unacceptable. As Fraenkel has pointed out, the
29 Verhandlungen, n. 91.
30 Cf. p. 65. ,
“Trauma der Auflosung der Weimarer Republik . . . das klassische
Beispiel fur den miBlungenen Versuch . . . das englische parla-
31mentarische R'egierungssystem auf fremde Lander zu iibertragen" 
still affects the German conception of government - opposition 
conflict. The memory of deep divisions of an ideological nature,
32
claims Fraenkel, may have contributed to an ’aversion to conflict’
and to the fact that the Germans cannot ” . . safely afford to
bicker . .“ because they are not “ . . so sure of their own mode-
ration that they are not dangerously disturbed by the never ending
33din of political conflicts!,”.
3 Opposition use of question time and the right of initiative
- - \ 34
The first question period dealing with foreign policy was to be
dominated by a small number of opposition questioners asking a
number of related questions and supplementary questions in order to
35probe into the details of a particular topic. .This tactic was used 
in most foreign policy question periods by the opposition and was 
very effective in demonstrating the CDU/CSU concern in particular 
areas, notably in showing its representation of expellee and refugee 
interests, which it could claim had been abandonned by the government, 
since there was no longer a separate ministry to deal with these 
matters. The CDU/CSU specialists in this area, such as Czaja, Becher,
31 ’Historische Yorbelastungen des deutschen Parlamentarismus1, 
Viertel.jahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, 19^0, no. 4 1 P*323*
3% Cf. Bahrendorf, Ch. 10.
33 Balfour quoted by E. Fraenkel, p. 358-
34 Verhandlungen♦ p. 234*
35 Cf. Loewenberg, p. 412.
von Guttenberg, von Fircks and von Vrangel submitted a very large
•z£
proportion of all questions relating to it. Their questions in
this first period related to the refugees* and expellees1 'iRecht
\]
auf Iieimat’, to the necessity for consultation with these' groups 
prior to any territorial changes that might result from the govern­
ment’s intended talks with Poland.
Following this questioning, another opposition foreign policy 
specialist, von Weizsacker, proposed a motion that the Bundestag 
committee on German affairs should retain the concept of ‘all Germany’
37and be called the ’AusschuB fur gesamtdeutsche und Berliner Fragen* 
and not be changed to ‘innerdeutsche Beziehungen1 corresponding to 
the new ministry name, as the government intended. Yon V/eizsacker 
argued that ’gesamtdeutsch’ reflected the undeniable fact that 
Germans on both sides of the border are conscious of belonging to­
gether. The term was not intended to keep illusions alive but to 
serve these goals: ’’ Grenzen durchlassig zu machen, den uberlebten 
Hationalstaat uneingeschrankter Souveranitat zu uberwinden”. ^  Von 
V/eizsacker then reaffirmed the opposition’s wish for cooperation 
as under the Grand Coalition and its dislike of turning national 
questions into a 'polemisches Schlachtfeld’, a remark which received 
applause from all sides. He claimed that although there was general 
impatience for the German question to be settled, no responsible. 
politician would consider accepting the division of the nation.
36 Cf. Loewenberg, p. 414»
37 Verhandlungen» p. 261.
38 Ibid., p. 262.
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The opposition motion was defeated, but the CDU/CSU intention to 
oppose any break with the policies of the Grand Coalition had been 
made clear. This use of an opposition initiative rather than simply 
of an opposition vote against the government proposal is an early 
indication of the approach which Kaltefleiter has termed govern­
mental ^  and is an expression of the CDU/CSb intention not to be 
‘merely opposition*, but to seek to obtain a majority for its views. 
The attitude of the opposition is already conservative here in seek­
ing to retain previous terminology, and a main catch phrase of 
later opposition.to the Brandt/Scheel Ostpolitik, 'Grenzen dureh- 
lassig machen', is already current here.
The following question time^ was used in a similar fashion by 
the opposition to the previous one. A number of questions designed 
. to express the opposition's mistrust of Soviet intentions regarding 
European security were asked, with Becher and von Guttenberg again 
prominent in pointing out that any agreement with the Soviet Union 
was bound to involve accepting Soviet German policy. Further matters 
of security were discussed in the next sitting, when the first major 
initiative of the 6th Bundestag, the opposition's 'GroBe Anfrage1 
on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was dealt with.^VThe oppo­
sition accused the government of intending to sign without con- 
suiting them and therefore not showing the professed 'Willen zur 
Gemeinsamkeit in lebenswichtigen Fragen1. This is the first example
39 Cf. p. 185 ff.
40 Verhandlungen, p. 277*
#1 Ibid., p. 307.
of the opposition's reaction to the government's 1 treaty politicsf. 
Although a multilateral treaty cannot he regarded as similar to 
the bilateral 'Ostvertrage‘, the CDU/CSW opposed the signing with 
some vehemence. Their interpretation was that Soviet hegemony, in 
Europe would be cemented.^
The familiar pattern is repeated by the SPD speaker Flaming
in that he refers immediately to opposition statements outside the
Bundestag, which illustrate the Weimar-type style of opposition. He
quotes a newspaper 'very close to the GSTJ* on the results of the
Federal Republic's signing the treaty:"Die Gefahrdung der Arbeits-
platze, die Kontrolle der deutschen Industrie, die ungeklarten
Kostenfragen wiirden die deutsche Position auf dem Weltmarkt ent-
43
scheidend treffen". A further quote from the same source draws an 
explicit parallel to the German reactions to the Versailles treaty 
and shows the continued legacy of the SPD*s part in the early days
of the Weimar Republic: "Wieder wird es ein Sozialdemokrat sein, der
einen verhangnisvollen Vertrag unterschreibt. Beim. Versailler Ver- 
trag spielte der SPD Kanzler Bauer diese tragische Rolle. Jetzt ist 
Willy Brandt in seinen FuBsfcapfen getreten,r. ^  The government side is 
again using the more extreme statements of the opposition to its 
own advantage. Flaming points out that if the Federal Republic does 
not sign, the impression will be created that she wishes to make 
her own nuclear weapons, although Barzel^ and Birrenbach^ make
42 Cf. Roberts, p. 438*
43 -Verhandlungen, pp.311/312.
44 Ibid., p. 312.
45 Ibid., p. 316.
46 Ibid., p. 327.
the concrete objection to the signing that a new relationship be­
tween the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union would be created, 
which would not be compatible with the Soviet Union's continued 
right of intervention according to the United Rations statutes.
There is little chance for this to be discussed since the next
government side speaker (Schultz, FDP) again quotes opposition
opinions published outside parliament and claims that the CDU/CSU
does not admit to these opinions in the Bundestag. An article by
Strau'B in the Bayernkurier is cited, which illustrates a mistrust
of government dealings, felt to be unhealthy in the German context:
“Brandt, der groBe Keister der unverbindlichen Ausdrucksweise,
4.7
pflegt die Tugend der Zweideutigkeit“.
As on every occasion on which aspects of government foreign poli­
cy are discussed, the opposition asks for more information. In this 
instance, regret is expressed that a press conference had been told 
of the'imminence of talks with the Soviet Union on a non-agression 
agreement before the Bundestag had been informed. - It was the usual 
practice throughout the 6th legislative period for information.on 
actual steps in government Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik to be 
given through press conferences and interviews. Sometimes the house 
was informed later, sometimes it was not formally informed at all. 
This is probably a reflection of the concept of parliament as a 
legislative body primarily, rather than as a representative body,
A7 Verhandlungen♦ p. 337*
*v
and of the Bismarckian tradition that ministers are not part of the 
house and therefore do not inform it. The Brandt/Scheed government 
continued in the tradition described by Loewenberg for ministers to 
turn to the media and bypass the information/communications function
A O
of parliament.
It can be seen that the opposition made full use of question 
time and of its right of initiative in forcing debates as far as 
foreign policy is concerned. As already mentioned, it possessed a 
large number of experts in this area who tended to dominate oppo­
sition efforts in plenary sessions.
4 The 'Bericht zur Lage der Nation1, 1970* and the debate following
The government’s 'Bericht zur Lage der Ration im gespaltenen 
Deutschland’ is traditionally the occasion for a lengthy and com­
prehensive debate on a variety of major topics. The Chancellor gave 
the report in the 22nd Sitting of the 6th Bundestag^in which he 
stressed the government's belief in the continuing idea of the Ger­
man nation, but also the necessity of facing up to the reality that 
the Federal Republic and the DDR are no longer provisional but per­
manent. The main aim of the government's German policy, he said, 
must be to preserve the freedom of the part of Germany that is free, 
or, in the words of Golo Mann: "Die BRD muB sich selbst anerkennen".^
48 Parliament in the German Political System, p. 391; See also 
Bagehot on the 'informing function' of parliament, pp. 152/153.
49 Verhandlungen, p. 839•
50 Ibid., p. 843.
5 1 .In the debate which followed the next day Kiesinger, still the
main opposition foreign policy expert, replied with a summary of
the history of the German question as he saw it. Again this was an
52opposition statement rather than a direct reply. The sceptical 
words of Goethe and Schiller:"Zur Nation euch zu bilden, ihr hofft 
es, Deutsche, vergebens; Bildet, ihr konnt es, ,dafiir freier zu 
Menschen euch aus", said Kiesinger were proved wrong in 1871» when 
Bismarck successfully united the German nation, and this Bismarckian 
state is the basis of our present day national consciousness. For 
this reason, a report on the German nation should consider German 
history, especially the history of the last 20 years of effort by 
•the Federal Republic to solve the German question; the whole history 
of the renunciation of force which had begun with the Deutschland- 
vertrag. Further, the main present obstacle to any efforts should 
be mentioned: the Brezhnev doctrine. Kiesinger’s main objection to 
the report, however, was that it said nothing of the aim of unity 
of nation and state in Germany. This, he claimed, is no longer con­
sistent with the 1^68 joint resolution, which declared that the re­
alisation of German self-determination through the reunification 
of Germany under a liberal democratic constitution must be the 
centre of German policy. - The theme of continuity was thus repeated 
here by Kiesinger, as he demanded to know what had changed since 
September 1968 to make the government now give up the aim of a uni­
fied German state. After issuing warnings about using confusing 
and misleading formulations concerning the recognition of the DDR 
as a state but not as a foreign country, and about the intentions
4
51 Yerhandlungen, p. 851.
52 "Cf. Loewenberg, p. 402.
of the Soviet Union, who must demand concessions in return for the 
renunciation of force, while probably still retaining their rights 
of intervention according to the U.N. Charta, Articles 53 and 107? 
Kiesinger dismissed the possibility of the DDR having an independent 
policy, since she had recognised, and indeed acted upon the Brezh­
nev doctrine. He reaffirmed the opposition’s wish to join in a H 
common foreign policy with the government, but his condition was:
. dann miissen Sie als Ihr Ziel nicht nur die Bewahrung der natio­
nal en, sondem die Erreichung der .staatlichen Sinheit der deutschen 
53Nation setzenl”
As already mentioned, this point of contention arose throughout 
the 6th Bundestag, especially as concrete actions in the form of 
treaties clearly showed the government standpoint. This particular 
debate was extremely long, giving speakers of each side a chance to 
repeat their respective positions. Each accused the other of de­
stroying the unity of parliament on German policy, although there 
were no sharp exchanges until a disagreement about the length of 
time allowed for StrauB to speak caused opposition anger. The pre­
siding member was accused of being 1,unfair to the largest Fraktion” 
and of preventing StrauB from speaking.The reason for the dis­
satisfaction is that the rules of procedure of the Bundestag still, 
recognise the Fraktionen and the government separately,^ leaving 
the opposition only one long speech in reply to the report (.that
53 Yerhandlungen, p. 857-
54 Ibid., p. 874*
55 Cf. Loewenberg, p. 397*
of Kiesinger), while the government side had spoken previously in 
the guise of the Chancellor, and then again when Wehner and Mischnick 
spoke for the SPD and FDP Fraktionen. The CDU/CSU now chose to see 
the speech by Kiesinger as a reply to the Chancellor and demanded 
the rights of the opposition as a body rather than rights for their 
Fraktion. .
When the debate resumed, StrauB spoke at some length, covering
the same ground as the previous speakers, but in a more 'ideological'
fashion. He warned of confronting 'weltrevolutionarer Kommunismus
56und russischer Imperialismus', saying he would not use the term
Rapal’lo, since the situation is different; but the rest of the world 
would use it. After warning the government of Moscow’s intentions 
in Europe, and pointing out that in view of European history since 
the end of the war the Russians are not to be trusted, he stressed 
that their mentality is so different to that of the West that it is 
foolish to act in the same way as with a Western power, giving ad­
vance concessions as Adenauer's Westpolitik had done. As an example 
of the use of the same words in different conceptual systems StrauB 
points out that one of Molotov's demands at Potsdam was for a 
'peace-loving, democratic and unified' Germany.^
StrauB further accuses the government of leaving the basis of the 
joint resolution of September 1968 and of breaking its word on the 
non-recognition of the DDR as a second German state. In reply to 
similar government tactics, he quotes Brandt 'defaming the oppo-
5° Verhandlun,°:en« p. 899» 
51 Ibid., p. 901.
58 Ibid., p. 903*
sition1 by saying that while the Federal Republic is stable and
democratic it had avoided radical breaks with the past and is thus
’’gegen Riickfalle in ein schwarz-weiB-rot-braun-Denken nicht vollig
gefeitf.^ Such a remark, maintained StrauB, reflected "die Ge-
schichtslosigkeit des Kanzlers". This expression is immediately
6 '0 "
reminiscent of the earlier campaign against Brandt and is one of
6
many which, seem to confirm Hereth’s comment on the style of StrauB. 
Insults at a personal level are used as a counter-weapon to the con­
stant government insinuations of continuing CDU/CSIT nationalism re­
lated to National Socialism.
On the subject of Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik StrauB points
out the confusion caused by the government formula 1staatsrechtliche
62Anerkennung: ja, volkerrechtliche Anerkennung: nein’-, and warns 
that the Soviet Union will not understand that the Federal Republic 
has made a full offer of concessions prior to negotiations and will 
expect to gain further concessions from negotiation. Again StrauB 
stresses the dissimilarity of Ostpolitik and Westpolitik, and seems 
to regard the governments approach as naive and illusionary, since, 
according to him, the only realistic stance is a deep mistrust of 
the Soviet bloc.
A brief reply by Brandt rejects the term ‘Geschichtslosigkeitr 
and emphasizes that he does identify with the history of Germany
59 Verhandlungen. p. 904.
60 Cf. p. 77*
61 Die parlamentarische Opposition* p. 131.
62 Verhandlungen* p. 904*
by quoting a speech of his from I960: “Wir konnen aus unserer Ge-
• 63 ^
schichte ohnehin nicht austreten". A further, and. very lengthy
contribution to the accounts of German history is then given by 
Carlo Schmid (SPD), who traces the question of the unity of the Ger­
man nation during the previous centuries. He expresses regret that 
due to German historical experience the words ‘Nation* and ’Vater- 
land’ are now the cause of embarrassed smiles.^ Schmid stresses 
that “Nation ist ein Produkt des Viliens” and that this is the only
65
way in which the unity of the German nation can be preserved.
The fact that each side contributed lengthy historical accounts 
of the German question underlines the importance of the yearly de­
bate on the ‘Lage der Nation* in clarifying the positions from 
which government and opposition derive their attitudes towards 
German policy and therefore towards foreign policy as a whole. Most 
of the debate is felt to be about Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik, 
and this reflects the inseparability of these policy areas from the 
question of German nationhood.
It has already been noted that the opposition to foreign policy,
both in major debates and in question periods tends to be monopolised
66by a few experts. The fact that Bach (CDU/CStr) made a maiden speech 
during the debate on the *Bericht zur Lage der Nation* is unusual. 
Very few maiden speeches were made during the 6th Bundestag, in
63 Yerhandlungen, p. SO'J,
64 Ibid., p. 909.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid. p. 923.
spite of the relatively large membership turnover (as compared, for 
example, with the British parliament). The speech by Bach on Deutsch­
landpolitik ‘and Ostpolitik echoed familiar opposition views: that it 
would be best for the whole German nation if an all-party agreement 
on these policies could be worked out, that the opposition did not 
like to hear the previous 1Gemeinsamkeit1 in these areas questioned. 
He again accused the government of leaving the joint standpoint on 
foreign policy and of abandoning the goal of reunification, and 
then quoted a Brandt interview in which the Chancellor had said:"I
must admit I ’ve stopped speaking about reunification." This, said
67
Bach, was tantamount to rejecting the Basic Law.
Bach’s comments on the roles of government and opposition also
coincide with the views of other CDU/CSU-politicians mentioned 
63
above. He sees the separation of powers as ideally between govern­
ment and parliament, not as between government and opposition, and 
considers that the government partj^ should be the main control over
the government and not "ein Kampfverb and zur Preikampfung der
69
RegierungsstraBe". As.will be discussed later, events showed that
the ’back-benchers’, especially of the smaller coalition party, did
70prove to be the ultimate control over the government. However, 
this control was exercised by defection to the other side, rather
71than by influence from within, as has been suggested by Crossman.
67 Verhandlungen, p. 924*
68 E.g., Barsel.
69 . Verhandlunff-en, p. 924.
70 Cf. p. .22.
71 In Introduction to Bagehot, pp. 4 3 - 4 4 *
The debate on the "Bericht zur Lage der Hation, 1970' continued
in the next sitting^ with an attack on the opposition by Apel (SPD).
73He accused them of 'cold war-mongering1 and of clinging to illu­
sory, ideas of Ostpolitik and JDeutschlandpolitik. A reply by von 
Weizsacker criticized the government for lack of clear ideas in 
these fields which made cooperation difficult. He stressed that the 
two sides must work together in national questions even now the 
Grhnd Coalition has ended, and also assured the government that any 
opposition criticism was intended for the good of the nation and not 
as an attempt to damage the government.^ In general, von V/eiz­
sacker ' s speech was conciliatory and a critique of government 
methods rather than a rejection of government policies. This was
pointed out by iloersch (FDP), who found no basic disapproval in this
75opposition speech.
It is notable that all the opposition speakers appeal for a re­
turn to government-opposition cooperation on Deutschlandpolitik and 
Ostpolitik, but on the basis of the Grand Coalition policies. Both 
sides assume, it seems, that 'Gemeinsamkeit1 is desirable and the 
opposition agrees on the basic aims of government policy. However, 
it charges the government with the responsibility of showing why any 
change from the September 1968 resolution has been made.. It does not 
accept that the election result is sufficient reason, since it does 
not accept that it lost the election. Further, as Barzel points
72 16th January, 1970* Verhandlungen» p. 931*
73 Verhandlungen, p.932. 
f4 Ibid., p. 958.
75 Ibid.', p. 939.
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out, the electorate was led to "believe that the SPD still adhered 
to the policies of the Grand Coalition.
The CDU/CSU opposition could claim to represent some expellee 
interests in that constant pressure was applied in questions on'the 
subject to the government. These questions were asked mainly by ex­
perts, but opposition leaders also took care to mention expellees in 
important debates. In this case, Barzel states that decisions in 
Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik should be discussed with expellee- 
group representatives in advance. To emphasize that the SPD is no 
longer so concerned with these groups as in previous years, he quotes 
a statement from Koexistenz - Zwang zum Wagnis (1965) by Brandt that 
the Oder-Ueisse line could only be dealt with in a final peace treaty. 
In this way, the opposition can attempt to show a lack of continuity 
in government policies and claim to represent a disaffected minority, 
in this case the expellees. Barzel made it clear that the opposition 
was interested in the people ’actually affected’ by the government’s 
Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik, when he ended by setting a new
condition for opposition approval: ” Wenn Sie etwas fur die Menschen
7 7
herausholen, dann wird diese Opposition dem zustimiaen. ” - This con­
dition was to be repeated at every stage of government policy. - 
Barzel added a summary of what the opposition disapproved of: the 
two-state theory, the change from ’gesamtdeutsch’ to ’innerdeutsch’, 
the change in political presence in Berlin, the signing of the non­
proliferation treaty. He then offered opposition support on the basis 
of the SPD ,Grundsatzprogramm,^r® in an attempt to show the extent of
76 Yerhandlungen, p. 955*
77 Ibid., p. 955.
78 Ibid., p. 958.
government ’deviation1.
The less tactical and more sincere opposition of von Guttenberg 
was again displayed here. He expresses some disappointment that the 
policies of the Grand Coalition were not being continued, and goes 
on to say that the great change is that for the, first time a German 
government is talking of recognising a second German state. This, 
he says, is a very basic difference between government and opposition 
since ”bei der Frage nach der Anerkennung eines zweiten deutschen 
Staates stehen nicht Methoden, sondern . . . eine Grundsatzposition
79
freiheitlich, rechtstaatlich demokratischen Denkens auf dem Spiel.” 
This kind of opposition thinking on basic orientations of Deutsch­
landpolitik and Ostpolitik has tempted some authors to call the CDU/
80CSU opposition ’opposition of principle’. Guttenberg further
argues that a unified German state is the logical consequence of the
right of self-determination, as long as Germans in the DDR have not
chosen to become a second state. He appeals for a ’national* social-
democratic movement and ends with an expression of regret that the
first SPD government for 4° years ”in einer entscheidenden Frage
unserer gemeinsamen deutschen Politik eine bisher unbezweifelte
fi 1
Gemeinsamkeit ohne Hot verlassen hat*”
In the debate on the ’Bericht zur Lage der Nation, 1970* the 
opposition showed clearly that its approach was a conservative one. 
The doubts and fears it expressed were concerned with changes in 
the official basic standpoint of the Federal Republic’s Deutsch-
T9 Verhandlungen, p. 962.
80 Cf. p. 64.
81 Verhandlungen, p. 9&4*
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landpolitik and Ostpolitik, with the consequent lack of government- 
opposition ’Gemeinsamkeit' and with the dangers to West German de­
mocracy which could result from these changes.
5 The 1970 budget and finance debates
The next foreign policy discussion was due to take place during 
the 33^& Sitting but was preceded by controversies during the first 
two days of the 197^ budget debate (31st Sitting, 19th February, and 
32nd'Sitting, 20th February, 1970)• As already mentioned, the area 
of finance was the other sphere in which the CDU/CSU opposition 
took up an antagonistic stance in plenary sessions. On this occasion 
the policies of the Finance Minister, Holler, are criticized sharply 
by the opposition and Defence Minister Schmidt launches a counter­
attack in which he quotes statements made by StrauB in a speech at 
82Vilshofen. StrauB had allegedly said of the Minister of Agricul­
ture: f,Ich sage nicht, daB er ein Terra ter istj denn fur den Verrat 
fehlt ihm die Erkenntnis fur die Rolle die er gespielt hat. On
Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik he had accused the government of 
selling out one German position after the other *zu Schleuderr- -
82 StrauB had been particularly outspoken against the government on 
this occasion and throughout the 6th Bundestag the word 'Vils­
hofen1 was used by the government side to stand for ’Weimar- 
type’ opposition. In return, the CDU/CSU adopted'Bielefeld' to 
stand for government 'defamation* of the opposition, since Brandt 
had been sharply critical of extreme right-wing opposition on
•A'* that occasion.
83 Verhandlungen, p. 1405.
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preisen'. Schmidt’s most serious accusation against StrauB was
that he had criticized, a government negotiator while talks with the
Soviet Union were in progress by.saying that it made his hair stand
on end to. see "wie der dilettantische Amateurdiplomat iiber Fragen
85verhandelt, von denen die Zukunft Suropas abhangt."
On this occasion then, the government side turned the debate to­
wards Ostpolitik and again used examples of unacceptable opposition 
style in their own defence. They maintain that the opposition should 
be answerable for statements made outside, as well as inside, parlia­
ment. In the course of the debate they faced further general criti­
cism about lack of continuity, credibility, transparency and were 
said by Worner (CDU/CSU) to be using a * fog of-formulations1 either 
to hide their true purpose, or for lack of clearer ideas. Worner
alleges "Auch in der AuBenpolitik ist doch jener Verbalismus 
86
Trumpf”, and further claims that lack of clarity and of prompt
information have caused the end of 'Gemeinsamkeit1 in this field.
Again the government answer by Brandt refers to StrauB' remarks
about Bahr; Brandt points out that Bahr recently defended StrauB
in Moscow against accusations of fascism, and this causes uproar
RT
among the opposition. Nevertheless, at the end of his speech,
Brandt stresses the duty of the government and the opposition to try
88to reach as much agreement on foreign policy as possible.
84 -Verhandlung-en, p. 1405.
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The FDP made a similar contribution to that of previous debates 
by referring, to the situation of the CDU/CSU in opposition. Address­
ing the opposition, Moersch expresses the hope that German democracy
can function "wenn. Sie nicht in die Attitude der Staatspartei und
69
des ewigen Hachtausubens zuriickf alien wollen. *' The SPD also re­
ferred to the attitude and style of the opposition, especially re­
garding Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik,^ but the CDU/CSU main­
tained that these areas should not be discussed until the agreed 
date.
The planned discussion on foreign policy took place during the
next Sitting as^part of the continuation of the finance and budget
debate. Foreign Minister Scheel gave an account of the government's
aims, and in a reply for the opposition, Barzel made it clear that
the CDU/CStT supported these aims, but not the methods of the govern- 
91ment. He formally declared opposition support for talks with
East Berlin, but warned against recognising the DDR in international 
92
law. In general the opposition complaint was of a lack of timely 
information to parliament, while the press was always first to be 
informed. This showed the lack of government desire for cooperation, 
claimed Barzel, and warned that without a broad basis German Ost­
politik and Deutschlandpolitik might not be taken seriously by the 
rest of the world. However, he declared the opposition in favour of 
the talks with the Soviet Union and said: "wir wiirden es begriiBen,
89 Yerhandlungen, p. 1497*
90 E.g., Wehner, Verhandlungen, p. 1512.
1^ Verhandlungen, p. 1556.
92 Ibid., p. 1561.
93wenn ein Gewaltverzichtsvertrag zustande kame,f. The main oppo­
sition concern, he stressed, was that the right of self-determina-
94tion for all Germans should he upheld, and he repeated the offer
95made by the opposition on 29th October, 19&9* Shortly after this
the FDP took up a now familiar stance and appealed to the opposition
to give up its approach of confrontation in favour of cooperation:
"hie AuBenpolitik eignet sich nicht fur polemische Auseinandersetzung-
en . . Verzichten Sie auf Polemik, unterstiitzen Sie die Regierung,
96und arbeiten wir gemeinsam fiir den Frieden dieses Volkes.1
So far, these budget discussions show the continuation of several 
trends already observed. The government use of the more extreme oppo­
sition statements to discredit the Chll/CSTI style continues. The re­
peated opposition call for information to be given to parliament be­
fore it is given to the press and other media illustrates an im­
portant aspect of the Bundestag: the tendency for the information/ 
communications function of parliament to be by-passed in favour of
an approach more in line with the plebiscitary elements of German
97constitutional tradition. The feeling that ’Gemeinsamkeit1 is 
appropriate for West German foreign policy is reflected in the state­
ments from all parties in favour of cooperation of government and 
opposition and against confrontation, which is seen as undesirable 
and not in the national interest. The opposition’s statements on
93 Verhandlungen, p. 1560.
94 Ibid., p. 1561.
95 This was: "Wir bieten auch in aller Form die Koglichkeit an, in den 
Lebensfragen der Nation zur Kooperation aller zu kommen."
96 Achenbach (FDP); Yerhandlungen, p. 1569.
97 Cf. Loewenberg, p.391; also E. Fraenkel,’hie representative und 
die plebiszitare Komponente.im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat1, 
Recht und Staat in Geschichte und Gegenwagt (Tubingen 1958), p.48.
cooperation and on general approval of the aims of the Ostpolitik 
and Deutschlandpolitik seem to suggest Kaack’s ’dialectic* approach 
at this stage, at least from the tactical CDTJ opposition led by 
Barzel.
Differences of opinion within the opposition' are apparent when 
StrauB speaks of government policy in much more negative terms than 
Barzel. He raises the question of the constitutionality of the Ost­
politik and Deutschlandpolitik and defends the use of this opposition
weapon, given the SPD precedent. He is able to quote both earlier
98
statements by Brandt and authoritative legal opinion in support
of the view that recognition of the DDR in international law would
be contrary to the ’reunification imperative’ contained in the Pre-
99amble to the Basic Law. StrauB repeats the opposition objections ' 
to government policy that it was playing into the hands of the 
Soviet Union and conceding too much too soon. He further pointed 
out - quite correctly, of course - that whatever formulations were 
used, the world would interpret government moves as recognition of 
the DDR. It is symptomatic of the situation of the GDTJ/CSTJ, faced 
as it was with the new position as opposition and the new direction 
of the Ostpolitik, that StrauB should also mention his concept of 
the role of the opposition as regards this policy. He concludes that 
the only feasible role is to control and to criticize. The CDU/CSU 
alternative, he says, is the step-by-step approach in Ostpolitik 
used previously. - It can be seen here that StrauB is in line with
98 Weinkauff, former president of the Bundesgerichtshof.
99 Verhandlungen, p. 1572.
the conservative approach in Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik on 
this occasion and is not using the ’style of Vilshofen1. His asser­
tion that the opposition intend to control and criticize is echoed 
later by von Vrangel, who declares that die CDU/CSU in diesem 
Hause keine Zustimmungsopposition sein wird. Von Vrangel ex­
presses opposition fears about the course the government is taking
and warns that it may lead to - "weniger Prieden, weniger Sicherheit
101und weniger Preiheit in Deutschland.” Later, Kiesinger issues a
warning along the same lines and stresses the possibility of a per-
102manent forfeiture of the German right of self-determination.
After the appeal earlier in the debate by Achenbach for an end to 
confrontation in foreign policy, the PDP again show low conflict 
tolerance when Mischnick criticizes the opposition for choosing to 
debate Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik again so soon, when nego­
tiations are going on and when no new developments have taken 
103
place. He expresses doubt about the opposition’s desire for co­
operation in view of StrauB’ attitude^^ and in view of the oppo-
105
sition’s political style, and he makes a further appeal to the 
opposition: "3s sollte endlich aufhoren . . daB Sie die Deutsch­
landpolitik als innenpolitisch.es Hauptkampfinstrument benutzen;
100 Verhandlungen. -p. 1584.
101 Ibid., p. 1585.
102 Ibid., p. 1610.
103 Ibid., p. 1612.
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denn das ist das schleehteste, was der Deutschlandpolitik, was der 
Ostpolitik uberhau.pt passieren kann.1 Ihis expression of dis­
taste at the increasing polarisation over the Ostpolitik enhanced 
by the efforts of each side to brand the other as extreme and there­
fore unacceptable to the voters of the centre has been attributed by 
Leicht^^ to the aversion to conflict in German politics. As already 
mentioned, conflict on issues of such national importance as the
Ostpolitik is felt to be especially harmful, according to Dahren- 
108dorf. It is interesting to note here that Dahrendorf appears to
have retained this opinion; In this debate and as a Junior Minister
in the Foreign Ministry he makes a speech applauded largely by the 
109opposition only, which gives some indication that he cannot re­
main in office long.
Some sections of the SPD Fraktion, as represented by Wehner and
Apel, were less concerned with avoiding conflict. Wehner's remark:
110uIch- brauche keine Opposition" had immediately been taken up by 
the opposition as proof that the government had no intention of 
seeking cooperation and was cited frequently in debates in the 6th 
Bundestag. In this 1970 budget debate, Apel, an SPD member who was 
prominent in foreign policy debates and who generally displayed a 
hostile attitude towards the opposition, also seems to reject the
106. Verhandlungen, p. 1615.
107 Grundgesetz und politische Praxis, -p. 80.
108 Cf. p. 75*
109 Verhandlungen, pp.1579 - 80.
110 In an interview with 'Der Spiegel*, 26th January, 1970.
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opposition expectation, of "being included in foreign policy decision
making. The GDU/CSU, says Apel, must accept what Kiesinger had said
in 1958: “Das ist einfach die Ubung, und zwar deswegen, weil iiber-
all in der V/elt die Regierungen das Recht haben, AuBenpolitik zu
machen, und das Parlament sich darauf beschrankt, die Regierung da-
11 1bei zu kontrollieren." This is the point already discussed m
112the previous section and one which the opposition found hard to
115accept, as their 1 governmental1 approach: illustrated.
Towards the end of this debate it is made clear by such oppo­
sition speakers as von Guttenberg, Czaja and Becher that the CBU/
CSIT claim to represent expellee interests and to be concerned above 
all with the human element is to be maintained. An emotional speech
by Becher illustrates the strength of feeling on the subject of the
114 ~former German territories and the deep mistrust of Soviet in-
115tentions in Europe felt in some quarters. Czaja declares that
the opposition emphasis is on the people directly affected by the 
116
Ostpolitik and finally Barzel sums up for the opposition as 
follows: “Uns geht es urn die Anerkennung der Menschenrechte. ¥enn 
es das zu besiegeln gilt, fragen wir nicht nach der Farbe der Tinte 
und der Form des Unterschriftsformulars.1,1^
111 Verhandlungen, p. 1616. '
112- Gf. p. 66.
115 According to Hacke, one exception was Schroder, who did accept 
this viewpoint: Hacke, p. 61.
114 Verhandlungen, p. 1619*
115 Ibid., p.1621.
116 Ibid., p. I64O.
117 - Ibid., p. 1638.
In the opinion of the opposition the debate showed that no co- 
operation was possible but, in spite of this, the government 
concludes by suggesting that as the opposition admit they agree 
with government aims, and as they apparently have no alternative to
government methods, they should.give the government their support
119 .while negotiations are in progress. The opposition position is
still that a more conservative approach would be preferable, but
there is now great stress on progress in human terms. The CBU/CSU
120show some tendency now towards 'ideal1 foreign policy in hoping 
that such an approach could achieve an 'Anerkennung der Menschen- 
rechte'. In spite of all the criticisms and objections they make, 
there is still no definite rejection of the SPD/FDP Ostpolitik
and Deutschlandpolitik at this stage. Efforts continue to make oppo-
. . . ' 121
sition influence felt and to improve the ability of the oppo-
122  —sition to do this.
6 The Erfurt and Kassel meetings
On 20th March, 1970> Brandt made a statement to the Bundestag 
about his meeting with Stoph in Erfurt the previous day. This was
118 Yerhandlungen, p. 1636.
119 Ibid., p. 1646.
120 Of. p. 67.
121 E.g., questions by von Fircks, Czaja, Yerhandlungen, p.2076, 
and by Schulze-Yorberg, Yerhandlungen. p. 2077.
122 On the possibility of funds for opposition publicity, the CDTT/
* CSU press the claim that "die Opposition in einem demokratischen 
Rechtsstaat der Regierungskoalition gleichwertig ist"$ Ver- . 
handlungen. p. 1774.
the first official mention of the meeting in parliament and is a
further indication that the informing function of the Bundestag is un- 
123important. The Erfurt meeting had been very significant for the
relationship between the Federal Republic and the DDR, and Brandt 
claimed that his reception had proved that the German nation was 
still, a reality. The exchange of opinions, he Said, had been worth­
while, and this gave cause for some optimism about the second meeting
124.planned in Kassel. The opposition reply was in the form of a 
statement by Barzel declaring that the CDTJ/CSH had supported the 
Erfurt meeting and had done nothing that might spoil or prevent it.
The emphasis on retaining the goal of self-determination and on in­
creased freedom for the people of the DDR was repeated. The oppo~. .
sition considered the Erfurt meeting important, said Barzel, udenn 
dieser historische Yorgang wirft doch die Frage auf, wie wir unsere 
Staatlichkeit und unsere geschichtliche Kontinuitat begreifen. Sine 
Ration, die aufhort, ihre Einheit zu wollen, gibt sich selbst auf.
. . . Sin Rechtsstaat, der geltendesl Rebht als politisch hinder11che 
Zwirnsfaden abtut, hort auf Rechtsstaat zu sein,,."^ Barzel warns 
further that membership in the United Rations of the two Germanies 
“ ware ein VerstoS gegen das Grundrecht auf Selbstbestimmung1' which 
the opposition could not support.
Barzel also made a statement in reply to Brandt’s report of a 
visit to Washington. On this occasion the opposition objection to
123 Cf. p. 111.
124 Verhandlungen, pp. 2089 - 2091.
125 Ibid., p. 2091.
126. Ibid., p. 2094.
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further moves in the Ostpolitik was that Berlin should first be 
127settled. Other points of emphasis were that RATO and US troops
were important for security, that mistrust of the EG in the United
States must be dispelled and, again, that more information on the
talks with the Soviet Union should be forthcoming. It was stated
that the opposition intended to submit a-JGrofle' Anxrage1 on foreign
policy, Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik but were willing to wait
until after the Kassel meeting. The opposition was concerned, said
Barzel, that since the Erfurt meeting a German-Russian communique
of 22nd March, 1970? had stated that the talks should be based on
’der in Europa bestehenden wirklichen Lage’, while the English ver-
128sion had spoken of the ’status quo’. The opposition considered
that the open German question was part of the status quo> and wanted
clear answers on the recognition of borders, the recognition of the
DDR in international law, the ratification of the non-proliferation
treaty, Berlin and the Munich agreement. If realities are to be faced
on these questions, stated Barzel, then the reality of one German
nation, a people not prepared to give up its right of self-deter-
129
mination, must also be faced. On Poland, the opposition pledged 
support for a real settlement but not for a mere formula; as far as 
the Kassel meeting was concerned, they were not optimistic, but were 
prepared not to obstruct it in any way.
For the PDP, a statement was made by von Kuhlmann-Stumm, who re-
127 15th April, 1970; Verhandlungen♦ p. 2130.
128 Yerhandlungen, p. 2131.
1*29 Ibid., p. 2192.
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minded the house of US objections to the Ostpolitik and of the
section of the US Congress favouring withdrawal from Europe. These
and other reservations about the Ostpolitik received opposition
applause and shouts of approval from Barzel and Kiesinger, again
130indicating the breadth, of opinion within the PUP. The 3PD
Fraktion was represented by Wehner, who attacked the opposition
with such names as fMadigmacher-Union1 and *Schrei-Union* and made
131v.ery scathing remarks to one individual member. The reason for
this attack was the oppositional style as displayed at the recent
CSU; conference in Munich, where Brandt had been compared with
Beville Chamberlain and with Kerenski. Wehner accuses the opposition
of slander and says: "was Sie versuchen, ist das Aufpeitschen .
132eines Ptestes von Ilationalismus”. This antagonism from the govern­
ment side was continued'later by Apel, who. said of StrauB that-out­
side parliament he used arguments "die in der Tat die Substanz
133dieser Republik gefahrden". StrauB had replied to Wehner by re­
marking that Wehner *s speech should have been seen and heard by the 
whole nation} this would be politically very informative. He
also accused Wehner of intolerance of the opinions of others and
130 Verhandlungen, p. 2134*
131 Verhandlungen , p. 2138} To a remark by Jaeger (CDU/CSU)
Wehner replied: "Ich habe Ihren Zwischenruf nicht gehort} ich.
nehme an, er war so, wie Sie sind, und deswegen regt es mich 
nicht auf”.
132 Verhandlungen, p. 2139.
133 Ibid., p. 2146.
134 Ibid., p. 2143.
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135of not taking parliamentary procedures seriously. On Ostpolitik
his main point'had "been that the opposition would only support a 
•do ut des ’ policy.
Hostility at a personal level occurs again later in the debate
when Barzel mentions the word ’Pappkamerade1 and Wehner retorts:
"Sie sind ja selber einer", adding shortly afterwards: "Sehleimer
ware richtiger!", in spite of intervention from the chair. Barzel1 s
reaction is merely to say that Wehner will not succeed in silencing
the opposition by insults, bujb his colleagues in the CDbT/CSU add:
137"Das kann man in Hoskau lernen". This and the previous ex­
changes illustrate the hostile nature of the relationship between 
government and opposition sides in the Bundestag and the extent 
to which the initiative lies with the government side. In each in­
stance, the insults soon become ideological, creating an atmosphere
in which concrete discussion is impossible, since each side seems to
138regard the other not as an opponent, but as an enemy.
The CDU/CSU offer to hold back their ’GroBe Anfrage’ until after
the Kassel meeting did not, therefore, mean that conflict between 
government and opposition was avoided during this period. There 
was also continued skillful use of question periods by the opposition,
155 Verhandlungen, p. 2144; Wehner had referred to the CDU/CSU 
’GroBe Anfrage’ and ’der SpaB’.
136 Verhandlungen♦ p. 2145.
137 Ibid., p. 2152.
138 Cf. p. 75; also Hereth, p. 128.
4
139 There was a further clash on 24th April (Verhandlungen. p.2380) 
during questioning on the economy, when Wehner accused the 
opposition of wanting inflation.
especially to probe the area of German-Polish relations. Brandt
and Scheel were closely questioned by CBU/CSU foreign policy experts
140
Marx, von Guttenberg, von Vrangel, Czaja, Becher and von Fircks. 
However, one occasion for harmony in the Bundestag was the 8th May, 
1970> the-25th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe and the 
end of Hazism. For the first time in the history of the Federal Re­
public, the Chancellor made a statement on this date, perhaps sympto­
matic of the new emphasis on coming to terms with the results of 
the Second World War. Brandt:1 s main points were that a lesson should 
be learned from history and that the younger generation was not yet 
free from the past. He maintained that Germany was still struggling 
with the results of Hitler1 s war and must seek more international 
understanding and cooperation to remove the mistrust of the Germans. 
How, he said, with West German democracy stable and a firm partner 
for the West, it was time to face facts, especially the existing
borders, in order to be able to proceed towards European cooperation,
141security and peace.. For the opposition, von Weizsacker made a 
statement similar in content. He reminded his audience of the danger 
of new tyranny from Russia and of the need to find a European se­
curity arrangement, in order to avoid a return to nationalism.
The SPD and FDP Fraktion speakers also stressed the German responsi­
bility to pursue peace and to be seen doing so by the rest of the 
143
world. The whole occasion reflected the continuing influence of
14° Verhandlungen, p.. 2416 - 2427.
141 Ibid., p. 2564 - 2567.
142 Ibid., p. 2567 - 2568.
143 Ibid.
the recent past on the politics of the Federal Republic and the 
conviction that West German foreign policy must be directed towards 
overcoming that past.
In spite of opposition statements, the CDU/CSU ’GroBe Anfrage’ 
on Deutschlandpolitik, Ostpolitik and Europapolitik was submitted 
before the Kassel meeting"*^ and was answered in writing. However, 
no debate was held until after Kassel, which was on the 21st May, 
1970* The separate debate on this meeting which had been envisaged 
did not take place, since the matter could be combined with the 
discussion on the 'GroBe Anfrage'. It is again noted here that no 
official statement on Kassel, either before or after the event, 
was made to a plenary session of the Bundestag.
7 The debate on the opposition ’GroBe Anfrage’, 27th May, 1970
This debate was introduced by Barzel for the opposition, who was
quick to remark on the fact that the government did not see fit
to speak first or to make any statement to parliament on the Kassel 
145meeting. ^  Barzel then questioned the Chancellor on the recognition 
of the DDR in international law and on the omission of the word 
’Selbstbestimmung’ from the 20 points raised at the Kassel meeting, 
although the Basic Law states that ”Das gesamte deutsche Yolk bleibt 
aufgefordert, in freier Selbstbestimmung die Einheit und Freiheit
144 15th May, 1970$ See Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksachen YI/&91, 
vi/V57.
145 Yerhandlungen. p. 2665*
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Deutschlands zu vollenden". He later also expressed doubts
about.the intended Moscow treaty and wished to know if it would
state that the Federal Republic would retain its goal of the unity
147of Germany on the basis of self-determination. On Poland, he
put the opposition position as follows; ”Ja zu Ausgleich. und
Losung, nein zu der in sich widerspruchsvollen“Formel dieser .
Regierung”. Barzel further declared that the Berlin issue should
be settled before any agreements were made with the Soviet Union 
149or the BUR and said that if Scheel were sent to Moscow to nego­
tiate on the present basis, this would be to have decided upon a 
"Wendung..der deutschen Politik . . ohne zuvor das Parlament unter- 
richtet, das freie Berlin gefestigt, den einseitigen Gewaltvorbe- 
halt der Sowjetunion wirklich beseitigt, die Zustimmung der Deutschen 
zur Grenze an Oder und ReiBe, zur Zweiteilung Deutschlands und
■ 5Q~ ■
zur Isolierung Berlins eingeholt zu haben".
Thus the opposition contention is that the government is by­
passing parliament on foreign policy, that its actions may not be 
compatible with the constitutional imperative and that its Ost­
politik and Deutschlandpolitik represent a possibly dangerous 
break with the continuity of previous years which lacks the legiti- 
macy of parliamentary and popular approval. The CDU/CSU is there-
146 Verhandlungen, p. 2666.
147 Ibid., p. 2668.
148 Ibid., p. 2669.
149 Ibid., p. 2670. '
150 Ibid., p. 2672.
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fore opposed to the present government course.
This position causes antagonism from the government side when
horn (FD?) criticizes the opposition’s style, especially certain
remarks made at the CSU conference and in the Bayerkurier: "Dies
sind die gefahrliehen Kethoden der Bildung einer neuen DolchstoS-
legende. Wir alle in diesem Hause wissen, was aus einer Verteufe-
lung der Absichten einer demokratischen Hegierung schon einmal
151in Deutschlands Vergangenheit entstanden istM. Dorn rejects the
CSU criticism of the FDP with the words: ,fV/ir lassen uns auch nicht
durch solche Angriffe aus dem Konzept bringen, schon gar nicht von
Politikern, die einer Partei angehoren, die ihre Zustimmung zum
152Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland verweigert hat". Of
the opposition in general he claims that their only alternative is
"die Fortsetzung einer Politik der geistigen Unbeweglichkeit und
155des politischen Biickschritts". Apel (SPD) is equally critical of
the opposition and of their ‘GroBe Anfrage’: "diese GroBe Anfrage 
offenbart sehr deutlich, wes Geistes Kind die Opposition ist, indem 
sie eine Ansammlung von Gertichten und Unterstellungen zu einer 
GroBen Anfrage zusammenbraut, die in der Tat weder bei Ihnen noch 
bei uns politische Erkenntnis bringen konnte".
151 Verhandlungen, p. 2674.
152 Ibid., p. 2679.
153 Ibid., p. 2680 j Cf. Hacke, p. 86, who implies that the opposi­
tion approach is retrogressive.
154 Verhandlungen, p. 2681.
4
The FDP is in an especially difficult position as regards the 
•continuous election campaign' in parliament and this is illustra­
ted by the attempts described above to show that the opposition is 
comparable to the national opposition of Weimar, is possibly domi­
nated by a party with anti-democratic tendencies, or at least whose 
allegiance to the Basic Law is in doubt, and is therefore unaccept­
able to voters of the centre. Apel’s suggestion that the ’GroBe 
Anfrage* is a purely tactical manoeuvre and not designed to pro­
duce clarity on concrete issues is taken up by von Guttenberg for
the GDU/CSU with an assurance that it is a result of a genuine, deep
155concern about the outcome of government policy. It has. already 
been noted that von Guttenberg represented sincere, outright oppo­
sition to the Ostpolitik and was an ’absolute opponent in prin- 
156
ciple'. This is clearly reflected in his major speech on this 
occasion.
Von Guttenberg maintains that injustice should not be legiti­
mized, and therefore the DDR cannot be recognized. He emphasizes. 
that he is not merely criticizing, but is truly convinced that even 
those with the best motives can be wrong, and that the government 
is heading towards recognition of the DDR, which will lead to the 
end of IIATO and to Soviet hegemony in Europe. Von Guttenberg does
155 Verhandlungen, p. 2693.
156 This is the classification given by Geoffrey Pridham, ’The
Ostpolitik and the Opposition in West Germany1, in Roger 
Tilford (ed.), The Ostpolitik and Political Change in West 
Germany (Pamborough, 1975) > p* 49.
157 Verhandlungen, p. 2694*
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not: accuse Brandt of intending this, but claims it is the logical
outcome: “Sie, Herr Bundeskanzler, sind dabei, das Deutschland-
konzept des v/estens aufzugeben und in jenes der Sowjetunion einzu- 
158treten". Recognition of the status quo, he says, leads only to 
1 Scheinfrieden1, and to claim that the government is retaining the 
goal of self-determination is ’I’ormelkram1. ^ 9  He also accuses 
Brandt's government of blurring the difference between the two 
parts of Germany and warns:u Die deutsche Demokratie ist schon ein- 
mal zugrunde gegangen . . weil daaals unter Deutschen eine geistig- 
moralische Yerwirrung angestiftet und die Grenze zwischen demokra- 
tischer Rechtsstaatlichkeit und totalitarem Yerbrecherregime ver-
-j^ O
wischt wurden". This emotional speech receives a standing ovation 
from the CDU/CSIJ.
A similar view of dealing with the Communists is expressed by 
StrauB, who claims that many people were shocked when the govern­
ment suddenly took over the communist doctrine of two states in
161
October, 1969* without previous discussions. He then warns 
of the difference between communist and Western concepts, saying 
that it is a fallacy to believe that " durch die Benutzung eines 
gemeinsamen Yokabulars auch gemeinsame politische Begriffe und ge~ 
meinsame politische Srgebnisse” can be brought a b o u t . S t r a u B
158 Yerhandlungen. ~p. 2695.
159 Ibid., .
16.0 Ibid., p. 2697*
161 Ibid., p. 2708.
162 Ibid., p. 2709.
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claims that while past CDU/CSU policies had. meant that the Federal
Republic was regarded as reliable, the present course meant a re-.
165turn to the 'Ruf der deutschen Unbestimmbarkeit': further, the
government use of ambiguous formulations, especially in treaties,
*fco achieve ‘verbale Annaherung' ,was dangerous.
In this debate the exchanges between government and opposition 
sides consist largely in insinuations from each that the other is 
endangering German democracy. The basic anti-communism of the CSU 
becomes clear and its rejection of ’verbal rapprochement1 shows its 
distaste for treaty politics. This and the. statement by Barzel on 
Poland illustrate the opposition's tendency to seek an ’ideal’ 
foreign policy providing 'solutions' and not merely accomodation. 
The apparent support for the CSU views from the rest of the oppo­
sition suggests that at this stage there is some fluctuation of 
opposition opinion; previously the opposition had expressed itself 
in favour of negotiations with the DDR and with Moscow. Also, when 
the debate on the ’GroSe Anfrage' has been postponed, reports by 
Bichgans and Petersen for the opposition come out in favour of 
cautious movement towards a treaty with Poland.
® The budget debate of 4th June, 1970? the Chancellery budget
Windelen, the opposition spokesman, included much criticism of 
government Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik in his speech. He
165 Verhandlungen, p.. 2709.
164 Ibid., p. 2710.
165 Ibid., p. 2730.
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makes the point that the government has changed its views after
once having said 'Verzicht ist Verrat', just as the opposition now
does. The government were now trying to brand the opposition as
nationalists for this: "In der Deutschlandpolitik und Ostpolitik
versuchen Sie . . die Opposition nun in die nationalistische Ecke 
166zu drangen". The discussion rapidly disintegrates into uproar 
but is presently turned back to concrete matters by Barzel. He re­
states the CDU/CSU position as regards an agreement with the Soviet 
Union, saying that the Federal Republic seems to be taking on a 
series of obligations towards the Soviet Union which are not to be 
reciprocated. The general opposition standpoint, he says, is the 
same as it was on May 26th, namely: support for talks provided they 
produce improvements for the people and a decrease in tension 
(unlike at Kassel), no support for the recognition of the DDR in 
international law or for policies obviously leading to this, since 
it would be contrary to the right of self-determination, support 
for non-aggression agreements with Moscow, Warsaw and Bast Berlin 
(these and the Soviet right of intervention must be mutually exclu­
sive, ana borders can only be finally settled in a peace treaty), 
support for a Berlin settlement which means that the ties between
the city and the Federal Republic are retained; progress on Berlin
16 A
should be a prerequisite of the rest.
This opposition statement is phrased to appear positive but con­
tains provisos which allow for the rejection of all aspects of
166 Verhandlungen, p. 2979- 
Ibid. , p. 3007.
168- Ibid., p. 3011.
government policy. The government side accuse the opposition of
169being destructive rather than providing an alternative, and
continue to attack in such strong terms that nearly all the oppo-
170
si tion members walk out. The same antagonistic atmosphere pre­
vails later during discussions of the budget of the Hinistry for 
Inner German Relations and again the opposition threaten to walk 
out. It is left to the PIP to express regret-at the prevailing
style and to remind the members that everyone in the Bundestag is
172in favour of the aim of reunification. However, the opposition’s
final statement on this section of the budget was to denounce the
government's Deutschlandpolitik as "gefahrlich und . . verderblich
173fur die deutsche Ration”. This and the incidents during the
debate show that the relationship between the government and the 
opposition has deteriorated to a point where concrete discussion is 
impossible. The final opposition statement also underlines the CDU/ 
CSU claim to be safeguarding national interests and illustrates the 
high level of polarisation which has been reached.
9 The debate of 17th June. 1970; (continuation of the 'Grofle 
Anfrage' debate.
As before on 8th May, this debate began with a statement by ' 
Brandt on the historical importance of the occasion. He repeated 
government assurances that the goal of the Ostpolitik and Deutsch-
16.9 Verhandlungen, p. 3013j Wehner.
170 Verhandlungen, p. 3016.
171. Ibid., p. 3078.
172 Ibid., p. 3079.
173 Ibid., p. 3092.
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landpolitik would remain the unity of Germany on the hasis of self-
determination, and that there would he no recognition of the DDR
17 A
in international law. The opposition (Marx) also speak on the 
importance of the 17th June, 1955? hut then turn to the results of
-j yc ,
the recent local elections. --The CDU/CSU interpretation of these
is that the majority of voters share their doubts about government
Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik, They reject suggestions that
they are appealing to nationalistic instincts, claim to represent
the course of the Grand Coalition and to stand for patriotism,
176
not nationalism. There was also repetition of demands for in-
177formation in view of press leaks of ‘treaty texts1 from Moscow. 
Barzel declares:"Diese Aufienpolitik ohne Gegenleistungen hat hier
17ft
und im deutschen Volk keine ilehrheitu.
179The government side reply to this with cri.ticism of Barzel
180
and of the opposition’s polemical style, which they claim is 
had for parliament. It is pointed out that the CDU/CSU conduct 
opposition hy continually asking the same questions and not listen­
ing to the answers. Von Wrangel defends the opposition’s action and
reveals the conception that parliament as a whole should be the
181counterpart to government when he states for his party: ” . . daB 
wir als- Opposition in diesem Hause eine Kontrollfunktion wahrzu-
174 Verhandlungen, p. 3217.
175 Baden-Wurttemberg, June • 14th, 1970.
1J6 Verhandlungen, up. 5220 - 3221.
177 The Bahr paper* Verhandlungen, p. 3224.
1J8 Verhandlungen, pp.3246 - 7.
179 Ibid., p. 3250j Ehrnke.
180 Verhandlungen, p. 3252; Rutschke.
181 Cf. p. 104:.
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nehmen haben, um so mehr, als sich groBe Teile der Koalition offen-
182
bar nur noch als Hilfstruppe der Regierung betrachten”. As was
shortly to become clear, the real control over the government
was to be exerted not by the opposition but by the ’back-benchers1
183of the smaller coalition party.
The opposition is further represented in this debate by StrauB,
who repeats accusations that the government is no longer adhering
1 ft/
to the joint resolution of 1968, made no progress in Kassel
185and is misreading communist intentions. On the ‘Bahr paper*
leaked to the press from Moscow he claims that the Federal Republic
has given everything that the Soviet Union wanted, so that there
186was no point in negotiating. The government, he says, paint a 
false picture of the opposition:"her CDU/CSU wird das Plakat 
„Kalte Krieger - nicht bereit zu Verhandlungen” angeheftet”; how­
ever, he points out, the government is not a peace-maker just be­
cause it stresses the word’peace* - that word was stressed in
Munich in 1938* It is necessary for both sides to agree on an in- 
187
terpretation. StrauB* opinion of the proposed treaty is that it 
settles nothing.
182 Verhandlungen, p. 3255*
183 Gf. p. 22.
184 Verhandlungen, p. 3262.
185 Ibid., p. 3264.
186 Ibid., p. 3266.
187 Ibid., pp. 3266 - 7.
In the sittings following 17th June the continued discussions of
the ’GroBe Anfrage* were mostly of a concrete nature and concerned
with European policy. However, there were notable signs of latent
opposition from within the government coalition. Two FDP members,
Zoglmann and von Kuhlmann-Stumm, do not vote with the government
188on an opposition amendment to the Chancellery budget. Von 
Kuhlmann-Stumm closely questions the government on how Bild 
could have obtained a copy of the proposed Moscow treaty before 
parliament.
B The period after the signing of the treaty with the Soviet Union
1 The Moscow treaty
The treaty between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union
was signed on the 12th August, 1970, during the Bundestag’s summer 
break. Thus none of the immediate controversy surrounding it took 
place in parliament. The *Bahr paper*, the ’Gromyko paper* and 
finally the treaty text itself had been leaked to the press before 
the signing and had been greeted with a wide range of objections 
from opposition politicians, especially from the CSU. The opposition 
had been invited to be represented in Moscow, but had declined. The . 
first wave of reaction had died down by the time the treaty was
188 Verhandlungen, p. 3322.
189 Ibid., p. 3375.
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first announced to the Bundestag by Brandt on 18th September, 1970*
His statement was followed by those of each Fraktion. For the CDU/
CSU Barzel was consistent with the opposition action in declining
to go to Moscow. He declared that Berlin should have first been
settled and that the government;, signature had been given against
the advice of the opposition. The opposition therefore dissociated
itself from the signing:"Das verantwortet - die Folgen eingeschlos-
190
sen - die Bundesregierung allein” . However, Barzel did not 
commit the opposition to rejection but stated that they wished to 
consider the Ostpolitik as a whole and would for now limit them­
selves to six points for government consideration: 1. the future of 
European union, 2. the future of American troop presence, 3* the 
future of Berlin, 4* improvements in the situation of the whole of 
Germany, 5* the future of German-Polish talks since a) the Federal 
Republic should not.have settled first with the Russians on a Polish 
question, and b) settlement of borders should be left for a final 
peace treaty, 6. the opposition wish to see all the papers con­
cerning the negotiations on the Moscow treaty and to test the 
treaty’s conformity with the constitution.
Barzel also listed various ways in which the opposition would 
judge the treaty: a) no reduction in tension yet visible, b). no 
improvements for the people yet obvious, c) the right of self-deter­
mination seemed to be in danger, d) the Soviet Union seetaed to have 
retained its right of intervention. In view of these points, said 
Barzel, the opposition must reaffirm its earlier attitude: ”Der
190 Verhandlungen, p. 3633.
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deutsch-sowjetische Vertragsentwurf er-fiillt zwar einige Erwartungen
der CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, laBt aber entscheidende Bedenken 
191fortbestehen". However, the details must be studied and the re­
sults of talks on Berlin, Poland^the CSSR and the DDR must first be 
taken into account before a final decision can be made. - This 
stance illustrates the tactical aspect of the behaviour of the 
opposition and the effort by Barzel to leave all the options open.
2 The budget discussions of 25rd and 24th September, 1970.
Although the statements on the Moscow treaty were not followed by 
a bitter debate, as-Imight have been expected, the budget discussions 
of a few days later saw a renewal of previous outright antagonism 
between government and opposition. On this occasion the issue was 
another very emotive one in the German context - inflation. Finance 
Minister Moller spoke on accusations about the causes of the pre­
sent and previous inflations in Germany. He told the opposition:
"Die, die diese Weltkriege und die darauffolgende Inflationen zu
192verantworten haben, stehen Ihnen geistig naher als der SPD1*.
The CDTJ/CSH walks out in protest at this but Moller refuses to with­
draw his statement. The following day he claims that he did not 
mean to imply any connection between the opposition and the Rational 
Socialists. The CDU/CSU hold up parliamentary proceedings for an 
hour to consider their position and return to say that Moller1 s
191 Verhandlungen, p. 3636.
192 Ibid., p. 3684.
abatement is insufficient, since he had said on television that 
he would use the same formulation again. nSie, Herr Bundesminister 
der Pinanzen,” says Barzel, "haben sich als Demokrat disgualifi- 
ziert1'. In reply the government side remind the opposition of
some of the accusations they have made: StrauB likened the treaty 
with the Soviet Union to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and has often 
referred to the government as ’Volksverrater1, ‘Verzichtspoliti- 
ker1.194 ;
The situation worsens when Kirst (PUP) begins to speak, causing
195many opposition members tc walk out. He turns his attention to
the behaviour of the CDU/CSU in opposition during the year since
the change of roles: "Unter dem Schmerz uber den Verlust der Macht
hat die Opposition in diesen zwolf Konaten hier und drauBen un-
kontrolliert um sich geschlagen - . Das von uns vertretene Volk
196hat einen besseren politischen Stil verdi ent". The government
side is again successful at a later date .in pointing out the 
CBU/GSU’s difficulties in accepting the new role of opposition. 
After von Wrangel for the opposition has brought a motion of cen­
sure against Moller*^9  ^ the CDU/CSU plead for a change in the style 
of the government towards the opposition. However, Schafer (SPD) . 
replies that the CDU/CSU have become over-sensitive as opposition, 
since as government in 19&5 they had simply rejected and forgotten
193 Verhandlungen, p. 3722.
194 Ibid., p. 3737.
193 Ibid., p. 3743.
196 Ibid., p. 3749.
197 Ibid., p. 3869.
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a .similar suggestion made by Holler. Their present indignation
199is purely obstructive. - This whole incident does not. only
illustrate the sensitiveness of the opposition, but also shows that 
‘ideologically hostile’ language can obviously become a habit with 
members of the Bundestag, and that behind its tactical use there 
may still lie a conviction that an opposing political party is po­
tentially extremist and a danger, to democracy.
The nature of exchanges on Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik at 
this time is in contrast to the atmosphere prevailing in the finan­
cial discussions described above. The opposition specialists con­
tinue to put related questions to the government, especially on the 
situation of the former German territories.*^ However, conciliatory 
attitudes are adopted when Scheel announces that the treaty with 
the Soviet Union has been greeted with enthusiasm in the world as
part of the Ostpolitik, which is an important contribution to de- 
201
tente. His statement that Berlin must be settled before the 
ratification of the Moscow treaty, because of the close connection
202between the two, brings applause from both sides of the Bundestag.
Xn answer to opposition demands Scheel replies that the government 
will, make every effort to inform the opposition and hope that co­
operation will be the r e s u l t . I t  does seem likely during October 
1970 that more efforts will be made to achieve some form of ‘Gemein—
198 Verhandlungen, o. 3871*
199 Ibid., p. 3872.
200 Ibid.,pp. 3931 - 3935.
2^ 01 Ibid., p. 3945.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid., p. 3959-
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samkeit' on Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik, especially since the 
government majority is narrowing. On October 4"fch it.is announced by 
the CDU/CSU that former FDP members Mende and Starke have now joined
A
the opposition Praktion, while Zoglmann is a ’guest' member.
This is the beginning of the process of evening out the numerical 
difference between the two sides in the Bundestag, and, as already 
mentioned, an example of how 'back-benchers’ can exercise control 
over the government.
3 The treaty with Poland
On October 1970, the opposition Praktion adopted a reso­
lution on relations between the Federal Republic and Poland which 
came out in favour of reconciliation, but stressed that final settle- 
'ment could only be on the basis of self-determination in a wider 
European c o n t e x t . T h e r e  were no debates on the subject of Poland 
in the period leading up to the signing of the treaty? instead, an­
tagonism continued at the basic level of ’enemies of democracy’.
The opposition becomes preoccupied with a government statement which
had mentioned "die rechten Erafte, die einen Anschiag auf die
207
Bundesregierung planen". They object to the term ‘Anschlag* , and
pAQ
after much questioning request an 'Aktuelle Stunde’ on the subject. 
Benda claims that such language shows that Brandt is ’nervos’ and
204 72nd Sitting,* Yerhandlungen, p. 3973*
205 Cf. p. 22.
206 Repr. in Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik (Bonn, 1971)* 6>, p.164.
207 Yerhandlungen , p. 3977? Breidbach.
208 Yerhandlungen, p. 3987*
’unfahig1, and adds: "wer das neue Deutschland schaffen will, muB 
ja deswegen noch nicht in die Tonart des t,Neuen Deutschland" ver- 
f a l i e n " . T h e  SPD object strongly to this comparison and reply 
with similar insinuations. Exchanges on the subject continue in the 
two following sittings.
In contrast, exchanges on the subject of the Polish treaty are
avoided. On 13th November, 1970, there is no formal discussion on
Poland and it becomes clear that the opposition questions have
210been withdrawn to await the return of Scheel. The text of the
treaty is published and Brandt appears on television to make a 
211
statement, but does not address the Bundestag. The CDU/CSU de­
clines an invitation to be represented in Warsaw and proposes a
motion on relations between the Federal Republic and Poland on 4th
212 - December, 1970, which is not debated. Although there is much .
hostility to the treaty from expellee groups and from the CSU, there 
is only sporadic questioning in the Bundestag, and no official 
opposition statement is made to the house. The treaty is signed on 
December 7th, 1970, and once again this is announced on television, 
by Brandt. The official position of the opposition is still open, 
and Barzel undertakes a personal visit to Poland to judge the situ­
ation for himself and to seek assurances from the Polish government.
209 Verhandlungen. p. 3988*
210 Ibid., p. _4476 j Scheel initialled the treaty on 14th November.
211 Repr. in Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik 6.pp. 214-215.
212 Deutscher Bundestag, Anlagen 144, 1970; Drucksache Vl/l525,
4th December, 1970.
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The opposition task here is a difficult one. Throughout the 6th 
Bundestag it had clearly espoused the expellee cause, yet tactical 
considerations prevented outright rejection of the Warsaw treaty.
The expellee and CSU objections were likely to be unacceptable to 
moderate CDU voters, with whom the gesture of reconciliation with 
Poland could be expected to be popular. As leader of the opposition, 
Barzel could not hope to have any meaningful dealings with the 
Polish government that could alter the treaty or its interpretation, 
but by his visit he presumably sought to show that the opposition 
decision would be a reasoned, rather than an emotional or irrational 
one.
4 The debate on the 'Bericht zur Lage der Nation, 1971*. in con­
junction with, an SPD/FDP 1 GroBe Anfrage1 oh~foreign-policy*^ ^
This debate is the occasion of very lengthy and thorough dis­
cussion of the government's Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik.
After the government position has been stated by Brandt, Barzel 
replies for the opposition stressing that all. foreign policy should 
be on the basis of *Gemeinsamkeit', that it should achieve concrete 
results and should be based on the idea of European peace. The oppo­
sition will judge the treaties by their contents rather than their 
form, he says, and consider the right of self-determination and the
213 93*d Sitting, 28th January, 1971.
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status of Berlin most important. He states again that the CDU/CSU 
will judge the whole Ostpolitik and Deuts.chlandpolitik together, hut 
warns that so far the treaties do not come up to opposition expec­
tations.^^
As before, the government side replies with sharp criticism of
the opposition. Apel maintains that they are simply trying to find
excuses for refusing to ratify the treaties when the time comes. In
his opinion, “Die Opposition hier im Hause und drauBen mufi wissen,
daB sie die Grenzen der vertretbaren Opposition langst uberschritten 
'215hat". Since the opposition so often mention the right of self-
determination he warns them:"Es wird Ihnen schwerfalien, zu beweisen,
daB die Ostvertrage diesem Recht auf Selbstbestimmung zuwiderlaufen
216Oder es gar unmoglich machen**. - Apel seems here to be voicing
the opinion that the CDU/CSH is no longer acting as a ‘loyal* oppo­
sition. As already mentioned, opposition in ’national* questions 
may be thought to be too divisive in the German context.
The opposition side continue to question the compatibility of
the right of self-determination with the recognition of the DDR and
2 "18
the Oder-HeiBe line. Grave doubts are also expressed about the 
intentions of the Federal Republic’s Eastern partners. Yon Weiz- 
sacker warns that the SED do not want self-determination, but only
214' Verhandlungen, pp. 5057 - 8.
215 Ibid., p. 5060.
216 Ibid., p. 5065.
§17 Of. p. 75 ..
218 Verhandlungen, p. 5100; von Weizsacker.
o i q
socialist unity.*" Beciier makes a similar point, but in much more
emotional terms when he claims that the other side do not want de-
220tente, but world revolution. In his opinion the Ostpolitik plays
into the hands of the Soviet Union: "Ich bin der dberzeugung, daB
die Sowjets recht haben, daB Breschnew-recht hat, wenn er von seiner
Seite den Koskauer Vertrag als einen Teil der Offensivstrategie der
221
Sowjetunion auf der politischen Sbene ausdeutet und zitiert . . ”
Becher refers to the Ostpolitik as nein Kartenhaus auf tonernen 
222FuBen" and stresses the opposition’s concern at the loss of tne
Eastern territories and the plight of the expellees, which, he says,
should not be recognized and therefore legalized. He claims that
many people think the Ostvertrage are unconstitutional, and he is
223convinced they are. In his opinion German, detente is only possible 
on the basis of a broad parliamentary majority: "Wenn wir die Poli- 
tik, die Sie vorhaben, hier unter der ^Confrontation durchziehen, . . 
dann. sehe ich schwarz. um die Lage der Nation. So gefestigt ist 
diese Nation nicht, daB sie die dann ausgeloste Spannung ertragen. 
konnte. ITielleicht ist das wiederum sogar ein leil des Konzepts 
der sowjetischen Seite, daB sie durch. die Infiltrierung. der neuen 
Ostpolitik, die in Wahrheit ja von Moskaui aus motorisiert wur&e 
und wird und nicht von Bonn aus, gerade die Aufspaltung hervorrufen 
will, um die es hier geht."^^*
219 Verhandlungen. p. 5102.
220, Ibid.,pp. 5113 - 4.
221 Ibid., p. 5114.
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This rejection of government policy as 'pro-Soviet1 and danger­
ously divisive for the nation may he seen as similar to the atti­
tude of the opposition in the 1st Bundestag, with which a parallel
225 .
has been drawn above. A further example of this style occurs rn
226the continuation of this debate when Marx declares that the
opposition regard the Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik of the
227government as ’falsch und gefahrlich angelegt'. He refers to 
Vehner's remark that it would be a disaster if the treaties were 
not ratified, and claims: "In Wirklichkeit hat diese Politik bereits 
zum Besaster gefuhrt".22^
The more moderate members of the opposition attempt to put for­
ward reasons for their hostility towards the treaties. Birrenbach 
contends that the much-quoted favourable foreign opinion is not
really relevant since:"Die Opfer im Rahmen der Ostvertrage bringen
229nicht die Auslander-, sondern die Beutschen". He also points
to alleged discrepancies in the wording of the German and Russian
versions of the Moscow treaty and to possible dangers to European
230
stability which may arise from it. , Kiesinger returns to the argu­
ment that the whole Ostpolitik is over-hasty and bound to fail with-
231
out a broad majority; also, it has not brought any noticeable 
improvements in the attitude of the DDR, rather the reverse.2^2
225 Cf. pp. 72 - 73. •
226 94th Sitting, 29th January, 1971.
227 Cf. the point made by Liitkens, p. .73 above.
228 Verhandlungen. p. 5135*
229 Ibid., p. 5152.
^30 Ibid., pp.5154 - 7.
231 Ibid., p. 5163*
232 Ibid., pp.5164 - 5.
Ihe reply to this from the government side is to use the usual
tactic of discrediting the opposition, this time by remarks about
past political affiliations.Apel claimed that ICiesinger had said
that the Fiihrer had once been elected ’Man of the Year1, just as
Brandt had; but Kiesi'nger should not say such things with his
past.2^  AL similar reference is made by Arndt (SPD) to Becher’s
past. He says that Becher is not qualified to speak of constitu-
234
tionality in view of his previous political affiliations.
In spite of the antagonism and the fundamental differences dis­
played in this debate, both the Chancellor and the leader of the
opposition return in their summing up to the subject of *Gezneinsam-
235keit1. Brandt still hopes for cooperation from the opposition
and points out that there is nothing to prevent them agreeing to
. 236 ~
the treaty with Poland,  ^ since his government has not made con­
cessions or given up legal positions, but simply acted on the real 
situation. Barzel confirms that there are some points on which the 
government and the opposition agree, but questions whether these 
are sufficient for fGemeinsamkeit1, especially since the government 
does not pay any attention-to the opposition. MEs ist schon ziemlich 
merkwiirdig., wenn ein Bundeskanzler mit dieser schwachen Mehrheit 
ubersieht, daB eine Opposition offentlich davon spricht, daB auch 
Kitverantwortung fur Vertrage denkbar sei".2^7 Barzel repeats his
233 Verhandlungen. n. 5166.
234 Ibid., p. 5178.
235 Ibid., p. 5183.
236 Ibid., p. 5185.
237 Ibid., p. 5187; the recent defections of Mende, Zoglmann and 
Starke prompt the mention of the government majority.
conditions for this, the most important of which is that the Ger­
man question should remain open, and attempts to make clear that 
the opposition attitude is not a purely negative one.
5 The debate on the 1971 Chancellery budget :
238This dehate is again the scene of confrontation when Worner
p?q
(CDU/CSTJ) makes a strong attack on the government and refers to 
Brandt as follows: " . . wer sich nicht mehr traut . Unmensehlichkeit 
Unmensehlichkeit und Unfreiheit Unfreiheit und Diktatur Diktatur 
zu nennen . .'*^ 40 Brandt's oversensitive reaction is to walk out 
and return only at the end of the speech; the government side
(Schafer) reacts by accusing the opposition of appealing to the ex-
2A1 - ■ -..
treme right. This causes von Guttenberg to make insinuations
about SPD connections with the extreme left.^^ It is again ijhe
task of the FDP (Kirst) to deplore these 'ghosts of Weimar* and to
express regret at this confrontation and polarisation. The oppo^‘
sition is seen as at fault: “Es liegt . . daran, daB die CDU/CSU
immer. noch nicht in der Lage ist, ihre Rolle in diesem Staat so zu
begreifen, wie sie ist, namlich als die Rolle einer Partei und
243 .
nicht einer Staatspartei.' At this point voices from the oppo-
2J8 96th Sitting, 3rd February, 1971.
239 Verhandlungen. p-p. 5296 - 5304.
2A0 Ibid., p. 5302.
241 Ibid., p. 5308.
242 Ibid., p. 5310.
§43 Ibid., p. 5313.
sition side insist that the polarisation is the fault of the govern­
ment and remind the house that it was Wehner xvho once said "ich 
brauche keine Opposition" and referred to the CDU/CSU as 'Volks- 
verhetzer'. Kirst replies that the opposition was talking of 'Aus-
. 244
verkauf' and 'Inflation1 before Brandt had even been sworn m .
He expresses the concern that would appear to be shared by all that
confrontation and polarisation are bad for democracy, especially for
a democracy which is just being tested by the first change of power.
Kirst makes a plea for more concrete debates and points out: "daB
noch nie eine Hegierung dieses Staates so konzentrischen Angriffen
ausgesetzt gewesen ist seitens der Opposition innerhalb und auBer-
245halb dieses Hauses".
This remark from the government side reveals a sentiment simi­
lar to that of the government in the 1st Bundestag, and the CDU/
CSXT. are now quick to refer to the opposition under Schumacher. Kiep 
(CDU/CSU) tells Brandt that while Adenauer remained in the chamber 
after being called ’Kanzler der Alliierten* by the opposition, his 
(Brandt's) behaviour was a "schlechtes Zeugnis iiber Ihr Demokratie- 
verstandnis" and such behaviour was unknown in the history of the
OAf.
Bundestag. On Ostpolitik, Kiep maintains that Brandt's concept 
is illusory and only wishful thinking, that he is a do-gooder who 
speaks a great deal of peace, but does not therefore have the mono-
244 Verhandlungen. p. 5313.
245 Ibid., p. 5315.
246 Ibid., p. 5331.
poly of it.2^  The government, says Kiep, regard the opposition as
a nuisance and even as non-democratic, unless it agrees with the
government. He ends by stressing the importance of ‘Gemeinsamkeit’
in Ostpolitik and Heutschlandpolitik and says that the opposition
2A8must now try to stop the treaties, doing any damage. ‘
There is further controversy later in the debate when Reddemann
(CDU/CSU.) insinuates that Brandt must have been indebted in some
way to the journalist Henri Uannen, since Hannen was invited to go
to Poland. There are some roars of protest from the SPD at this
personal attack, but Barzel demonstrates opposition Fraktion soli-
249darity by shaking, hands with Reddemann at the end of his speech.
250The antagonism is continued the next day when, after von Fircks
has accused the government of 'giving away one quarter of Germany*
and ignoring human rights, a government side questioner (Wiirtz)
asks if von Fircks had been concerned with human rights as a former
251
3S 'Umsiedlungskommissar*. This causes the usual accusations on 
both sides. '
Much more serious criticism of the government is made in a further 
252budget debate when StrauB speaks on the polarisation of politi-
255cal forces and the ‘Barrieren des Hasses im Beutschen Bundestag*.
247 Verhandlungen, p. 5333.
248 Ibid., p. 5335.
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He points out 1. that the government is unable to take criticism,
2. that it blames 20, years of CDU/CSU rule for everything, 3« that
’reforms* have not materialized, and as a 4th point he says: " nenne
ich. den geradezu glaubenskampferischen Fanatismus des Eintretens
fur eine in den Denkansatzen leider falsche, unter mehrdeutigen
Auslegungen leidende, aber fast in den Rang eirier Heilslehre der
Welt erhohene neue Ostpolitik, die mit trugerischen Formulierungen
wie „den Frieden sicherer machen" aufgeputzt wird, als ob die
Frage nKrieg oder Frieden" von der Durchsetzung dieser Ostpolitik,
254
yon ihrem Erfolg oder MiBerfolg abhangen wurde". This,, is a. clear,
fundamental rejection of government policy, comparable with that in
255
the 1 st Bundestag.
StrauB continues his speech on this occasion by defending the 
opposition, against accusations of extreme, right-wing views: "GBTJ 
und CSIT; sind und bleiben Parteien der Mitte, mit scharfer Abgren- 
zung zu. jenem irrationalen und verhangnisvollen Rechtsradikalismus, 
der mit dem Lihksradikalismus mehr gemeinsam hat als mit uns. CDTT 
und GSU bieten auch denen eine politische Heimat, .die ein durch 
Geschichte gereiftes und durch personliche Erfahrung gelautertes. 
HationalbewuBtsein haben und ein von obrigkeitsstaatlichem Denken 
freies, aber die Staatsautoritat bejahendes Yerhaltnis der staatr* 
lichen Ordnung demagogi . . • demokratischer Pragung besitzen**.2^  
It is not the Opposition which tends to the right, says StrauB, but 
the government to the left. The government has changed from its
254 Verhandlungen, p. 5917. 
$55 Cf* p. 73.
256 Vephandlungen, p. 5925.
one-time position of ’Yerzicht ist Verrat* to one in which it •
labels such opinions ’nationalist1; it has ceased to favour ’Gemein-
samkeit' and now seeks to divide the Germans into the good, who
favour security, detente and peace and are therefore for the treaties
and the bad, who are against detente, against peace, for war and
257
therefore against the treaties. Admittedly, says StrauB, the
government is right to speak of a disaster: "Sin Desaster besteht
darin, daB Sie sich in Ihrer Ostpolitik in eine ausweglo3e Lage ver-
258setzt haben, unter der wir alle leiden".
This last part of the speech by StrauB can be seen as another
259round in the battle for the voters of the centre and also as a 
further indication of the degree of polarisation on the issue of the 
Ostpolitik. The fact that this polarisation and the resulting con­
frontation in the Bundestag is felt to be a bad thing is illustrated 
by statements from the government side. Kirst (FDP) expresses the 
opinion that the Bundestag is now tending much, more towards being 
a *Redeparlament’ than previously, and this causes too much repeti­
tion in debating. He blames the repeated opposition attempts to 
associate the government with ’Ausverkauf’ and ’Inflation* for the 
’barriers of hatred* in the Bundestag. Brandt also regrets the 
confrontation, and claims that it is the opposition intention to 
create mistrust and insecurity by deliberately misinterpreting
257 Yerhandlungen» pp.5926 - 8.
258 Ibid., p. 5929.
259 Cf. p. 114.
260 Verhandlungen, p. 5936.
government foreign policy instead of putting national interests
261 t-first. Talk of ’Ausverkauf deutscher Interessen’, he says, can
be dangerous; he is concerned *daB hier ein Ungeist . . wachge- 
rufen werden konnte, durch den unser Volk schon einmal ins Unheil 
gesturzt worden ist*1. Brandt accuses the CDU/CSU of choosing con­
frontation because it cannot accept the role of opposition, of see­
ing itself as a 'geborene Staatspartei’ and thus slipping into the
role of ’Keinsager* and of seeking ’Kollision urn.jeden Preis’ in-
263stead of being constructive. -
These accusations cause the opposition (von Wrangel) to mention
a ’defamation1 attempt by Giinter GraB, who had alleged^ said that
StrauB, Barzel, Kiesinger and Heck had created an atmosphere “die
den politischen Mord nicht mehr ausschlieBe’. Von Vrangel warns
that this kind of statement, and also the attempt by Jochen Steffen
to associate StrauB and Springer with the SS, will ensure that the
265Federal Republic follows the same course as Weimar. Other oppo­
sition members add that the government side had even stated that
266not to ratify the treaties would be to play with war.- However, 
in spite of the government-opposition polarisation over the treaties, 
von Vrangel shows a reluctance to accept the division of parliament 
into two sides; in the same speech he says to the government side 
that he. has a feeling "daB die Kontrollfunktion nur noch von der
.261 V erhandlungen, pp.5939 - 41* 
262 Ibid. , p.. 5941* 
265 Ibid., p. 5945. 
264 Ibid., p. 5952. 
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Opposition wahrgenommen wird, weil.Sie si chi. als konformistisches 
gouvernementales Anhangsel der Bundesregierung betrachten". He
complains that the other Fraktionen receive more information and de­
mands that all members of the Bundestag should receive the same in­
formation. This view of parliament as a whole as the true counter­
part to government has been noted earlier among*, other members of the
. .. 268opposition.
The various ‘attacks1 on the opposition mentioned by von Vrangel 
here are referred to again-by Barzel at the close of the debate
269
when he repeatedly asks Brandt to dissociate himself from them,
and the same points are raised by opposition questioners at a 
270later date. The government answer does state that politicians
should be careful in their use of vocabulary andthen points out
that certain terms used by the opposition "sehr unangenehm an be-
stimmte Vokabeln antidemokratischer Krafte in der Weimarer Repub- 
271
lik erinnern". This familiar government tactic is a further illu­
stration of the difficulties facing a conservative or right-wing 
opposition in the German context.
26.7 Verhandlungen, p. 5954.
268 Cf. pp. 127/8; .190 j also Barzel, 'Die Rolle der Opposition*, p.34«
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6 The Berlin agreement of 3rd September, 1971» and Brandt *s visit 
to the Crimea
There were no further debates on Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpoli­
tik during the spring and summer of 1971> although the opposition
272 -continued to submit questions. As the four-power talks on Berlin
progressed, the CDTT/CSTI made clear their concern that the ties be­
tween the city and the Federal Republic should remain: "Aus Berlin
275darf kein drittes Deutschland werden". Both Brandt and Scheel
274.
made television appearances to speak on Berlin ,rt! but there was no 
government statement in the first autumn sitting of the Bundestag, 
nor was there any account of Brandt’s visit to the Crimea, from 
which he had returned on 18th September. Rot surprisingly, oppo-
275
sition questioners raised both subjects at the first opportunity. 
There is particular concern with the German text of the Berlin 
agreement and with the subject of the discussions between Brandt 
and Brezhnev in ’Yalta’, as the opposition cannot resist calling
The opposition regard the government answers to their questions 
as inadequate and call for an 'Aktuelle Stunde1 , since 1. the govern­
ment is apparently no longer prepared to answer questions and is
272 E.g., Marx, 7erhandlungen, p. 6505, 6844> Czaja, Verhandlungen, 
p. 6685; Reddemann, 7erhandlungen, p. 7247*
273 Yerhandlungen, pp.7248, 7762; Barzel.
274 Scheel on 23rd August, Brandt on 3rd September, 1971*
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276 7erhandlungen,pp. 7915 - 9«
ignoring its responsibility to parliament, 2. the government is 
not informing parliament, but is informing the public and by­
passing parliament, 3* -the government is degrading parliament to
277
a propaganda platform. However, the ensuing debate did not
deal so much with the information/communications function of par- 
278
liament as with the government's alleged lack of commitment
to Europe as compared with its willingness to help the Soviet
279Union and the DDR achieve their ends. Marx claims that the 
Crimea communique confirmed the opposition's fears of a turning 
point in German policies: there was no positive statement on Ger­
man interests and the. impression abroad would be:"Die Deutschen
20o
sind wieder unberechenbar geworden". Von Weizsacker adds that 
the government, instead of seeking European cooperation on Qst-
O Q  *1
politik, is pursuing 'national' Ostpolitik.
Tlie government side reply as usual by accusing the opposition
of wanting confrontation; their deliberate use of the name Yalta,
says V/ehner, is not a simple mistake, but a ’’nationalistisch-
28 2
chauvinistischer Versuch, aufzuhetzen". Dorn refers to oppo­
sition accusations that the government is not acting sufficiently 
in the German interest and warns: "Eier . . .  beginnt das verteufel- 
te Spiel der Opposition mit der parlamentarischen Demokratie. "28^
277 Verhandlungen. pp. 79‘ 21- 2.
278 Cf. p. 98.
279 Verhandlungen, pp.7922 - 3*
280 Ibid., p. 7925.
281 Ibid., p. 7927.
282 Ibid., p. 7926.
283 Ibid., p. 7929.
Bhmke's meaning is similar when he claims that the opposition tactic
of confrontation, whose real architect is StrauB and not Barzel, is
284
designed to stir up 'politische Ressentiments in diesem Lande* 
and may harm the democracy which all parties have worked hard to 
build.28  ^These speakers from the government side again attempt to 
show that the CDtl/CSU is unacceptable to the voters of the centre 
and that opposition in the present situation lacks legitimacy.
An antagonistic atmosphere prevails in the following debates and 
a further blow is dealt to the opposition by the announcement during 
the 144th Sitting (20th October, 1971) of the award of the Nobel
236
.Peace prize to Brandt. This award naturally tended to add legiti- 
macy to the policies pursued by the government, and the opposition 
continued to claim that it really wished to cooperate with the.
government. On the following day, Barzel made a speech deploring
the 1Unversohnlichkeit und Feindschaft1 between government and oppo­
sition, and denying that the CDU/CSIT wanted total confrontation. Be 
explained that the opposition had been given no real chance to co­
operate on the treaties, in spite of the need, particularly in Ger-
many, for 1 Solidaritat der Demokraten* *28'^ The opposition continue 
to seek information on the treaties by submitting a ’GroBe Anfrage1 
on Deutschlandpolitik and foreign policy on 11th November, 1971, 
which was answered in writing by the government.288 After the rati-
284 Verhandlungen.. p. 7934*
285 Ibid., p. 7955.
286 Ibid., p. 8289.
|87 Ibid., pp.8530 - 1.
288 Brucksache Vi/2828; also Repr. in Texte zur Deutschlanduolitik 
9, p. 190.
fication procedure for the treaties had been started by the govern­
ment (following the conclusion of the inter-German transit agree-
On q
ment on December 11th, 1971; ); the opposition Fraktion issued a
resolution on the treaties declaring that they were incomplete, had
not solved the problems of the 'Germans in Germany1 and that the
290grave doubts of the opposition remained. Thus the Bundestag 
faced the certainty that the opposition would reject the treaties, 
and the antagonistic attitude of the CDU/CSU was retained.
G The ratification of the Ostvertrage
1 The ‘Bericht zur Lage der Nation, 1972* and the first reading 
of the ratification
The 23rd February, 1972, was seen in the Bundestag as "eine
291
groBe Stunde fur unser Parlament und unseren Staat". The‘Bericht 
zur Lage der Ration, 1972* was introduced by Brandt, the ratifi­
cation of the Ostvertrage by Scheel, and these were then discussed 
in conjunction with the opposition* ‘GroBe Anfrage1 of 11th Hovember
1971 > and an opposition motion on relations between the Federal Re-
292
public and Poland. The government emphasis lay on efforts to
289 There was a government statement on the agreement of Dec. 11th 
1971i in the Bundestag on Dec. 13th.
290 Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik 9, p. 447.
291 Verhandlungen, p. 9743; Scheel.
292 Drucksache Vi/1523.
. 293maintain self-determination and the unity of the nation, and on
294.a German contribution to international detente. Scheel stressed
that the Ostvertrage were a necessary complement to the Westver- 
trage, that world interest now centred on the way in which the 
Bundestag would deal with them and that the Federal Republic must
295
ensiire that respect for parliament is maintained, not as in Weimar.
He appealed for a controlled debate and asked for uden Beweis der
296 •Zuverlassigkeit und der demokratischen Reife". Scheel admitted
that the government now had a difficult task, since the opposition
had already decided to refuse to ratify the treaties, but still
spent a considerable time endeavouring to show that the opposition
297
objections were groundless. He also stressed the possible con-
298sequences of a failure to ratify.
For the opposition, Barzel agreed that there was a very serious 
and historic decision to be taken, but stressed that the govern­
ment had not Achieved* peace, since the situation in Berlin and at 
the DDR border remained. He points out that German democrats have 
always been in favour of peace, those in Weimar too, where only
the Rational Socialists and the Communists were not: the communists 
299
are still not. Further on the subject of the communists, Barzel
293 Brandt, Verhandlungen, pp> 9739. 9742.
294 Scheel, Verhandlungen, p. 9743*
295 Verhandlungen. p. 9742.
296' Ibid., p. 9744.
297 Ibid., pp. 9744 - 9750.
298 Ibid., pp.9750 - 51.
299 Ibid., pp.,9752 - 3.
claims that the German division is not a direct result of the war, 
but of Stalin’s policies and that the Federal Republic depends for 
its security and freedom on the Western Alliance, regardless of the 
t r e a t i e s . T h e  main opposition contention is that the treaties 
have not settled the situation in Germany itself. The treaties, 
says Barzel, give the Soviet Union, Poland and 'the DDR nearly every­
thing they want, but mean no progress for the Europeans or the Ger­
mans: "zu diesem unvollstandigen, in Leistung und Gegenleistung 
unausgewogenen, im Inhalt miBdeutbaren Vertragswerk sagen wir, die 
CDU/CSU, in aller Verantwortung: so nicht”. T h i s  rejection was 
supported by Kiesinger, who repeated the opposition’s objections
to the treaties and claimed that they had deepened the division of
302Germany and made the unity of Germany more difficult than before.
The reaction of the government side (Wehner.) is to point out 
that Jaeger, a fairly prominant member of the opposition, has said: 
’’Die Ostvertrage drohen fur das deutsche Volk nicht nur territorial, 
sondern auch- finanziell zu einem Super-Versailles zu werden”^^^ and 
that this is a tactic of the ’national opposition’ in the years 
after the first World War, for which CSU influence is particularly 
to blame.^ ^ However, Barzel defends the opposition’s right to stand 
up for its beliefs and poses the question: how do you hope to im-
300 Verhandlungen, p. 9754*
301 Ibid., pp. 9761 - 2.
302 Ibid,, pp. 9786 - 90.
303 Ibid., p. 9765.
304 Ibid., pp. 9770 - 1;
V
305prove things in Germany "wenn Sie vorher alles weggeben". In a
further remark he insinuates that the government is less than Ger­
man in its actions: "Wenn- Sie hier schon dauernd mit auswartigen 
Quellen arbeiten,. um eine deutsche Politik im deutschen Parlament. 
zu begrunden Barzel then makes a serious and important point
about treaty politics. It is one thing, he says, to see realities
and to procede from them, but quite another to put them down in
307writing in such a way that they cannot be changed. As already
mentioned, treaty politics can be particularly disruptive for in­
ternal politics, and the end of ’Gemeinsamkeit1 during the 6th 
Bundestag is an illustration of this.
An indication of the emotional mood of this debate is that some
309opposition members walk out when Mischnick speaks. Also, as has
already been seen in Barzel*s opening speech, anti-communist senti­
ments tended to come to the surface. Stucklen points out that only
the Soviet interpretation of the treaties will count^**0 and that
311the alms of communism must not be ignored. He claims that the 
opposition would not lead the Federal Republic to socialism or 
bolshevism. Nor would they have signed a treaty so little in the 
German interest: the CSIL had produced its own draft treaty.^12 This
3Q5> Verhandlungen, e. 9796.
$06 Ibid.
307 Ibid., p. 9793.
3-08 Cf. p. 72.
3.09 Verhandlungen, p. 9799*
310 Ibid., p. 9804.
Ibid., p. 9805.
312 Ibid., p. 9807; see also Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik 9, 
pp. 558 - 560.
draft was based on the Adenauer-Bulganin agreement of 1955 and did
not accept the existing situation, unlike the present treaty, which
513 •"sanktioniert die Kriegsbeute Stalins ".  ^ With*, mounting emotion
Stucklen asks:"Kann es Aufgabe der Bundesrepublik sein, den Hitler- 
Stalin Pakt von 1959 zumindest moralisch nachtraglich noch zu sank-
314.
tionieren?". He then claims :"Dieser Yertrag tragt die Handschrift
315
Moskaus."j ' later he again displays the profound mistrust of the
government within the CBXJ/CSIJ by referring to the fact that the
opposition had not been permitted to see the minutes of the Moscow
negotiations as "eine Zumutung fur die parlamentarische Opposition,
316fur die starkste Fraktion di.eses Beutschen Bundestages". This
reminder of the opposition’s view that the ’rule of the majority’ 
principle had been broken by the formation of the SPD/FjDP. govern­
ment reflects the CDU/CSU’s continuing reluctance to accept their
— 317
role, although the fact that the debate was being televised may 
have encouraged a return to this theme*
Stucklen later mentions another popular opposition theme: Brandt’s 
emigration, albeit in an apparently positive connection. He says 
that it is wrong to be resigned to the Jrealities’ in the DDR, that 
Brandt had not been resigned in 1933 hut had emigrated and con­
tinued to oppose the regime. If brutal realities have to be recog-
313 Yerhandlungen. p. 9810.
3--14 Ibid., p. 9811.
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid., p. 9813.
3.17 The government side uses the term ’Fernsehhetze ’ to describe 
Stucklen.1 s speech- (Wehner, Yerhandlungen, p. 9813).
318nized, he continues, "das ist das Ende des Rechts insgesamt".
This emotional tone is not taken up by Schroder,, the next oppo­
sition speaker, but his attitude is equally negative. He deplores
the lack of cooperation and the advent of a 'Glaubenskrieg1 over the
319Ostpolitik, but blames the government. The opposition, he says,
does not agree with the timing of the treaties and fears,that the
320advantages expected from them are no more than hopes. He empha­
sizes the danger that " die formalen Yorbehalte der Regierung als
321
verbale Pflichtiibung entwertet werden" and the likelihood that
falling in with Soviet demands, as the treaties have done, will
make it more difficult to act in the German interest: H . . i n
322unseren Augen ist das keine solide AuBenpolitik". With this
thought in mind, Schroder makes it clear that the government alone
has the responsibility for its policies, that it alone takes the
risks involved and that it alone will face disaster if the treaties
are not ratified. His concluding statement, which is applauded by
his Fraktion, .is a definite rejection of the treaties:"Ich bin der
tiberzeugung, daB die Interessen Dentschlands ohne dieseYertrage
323besser wahrgenommen werden konnen". ■
The debate is continued on 24th February when von Weizsacker ex­
presses some concrete objections of the opposition. He points out 
that the previous all-party goals of unity and self-determination
318 Verhandlungen, p. 9815.
319 Ibid., pp. 9820 - 1.
320 Ibid., pp. 9822 - 3.
321 Ibid., p. 9824.
322 Ibid., p. 9825.
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for the Germans are not compatible with the recognition of the DDR
which has in fact taken place, whatever terms are used to describe
it. Further, once both -Germanies are members of the UN,' the world
■will regard them as separate subjects of international law, says
von Weizsacker, leaving no chance of Germany being anything other
than a ’Kulturnation’ • The government side attempt to defend
their position in various ways. It is pointed out by Mat tick (SEN)
325
that reunification has not been taken seriously for years, while 
later Achenbach (FDP) takes it upon himself as a lawyer to’prove 
to the opposition that nothing is given away by the Moscow treaty.
He explains the treaty point by point and concludes:"daB meine In­
terpretation juristisch einwandfrei ist, wollen Sie doch hbffentlich
326nicht bestreiten". This is dismissed as frivolous by the oppo­
sition foreign policy spokesman, Marx, who then embarks on a lengthy 
speech against the treaties.
Marx claims that the government policy is irresponsible, based
on a "verfehlte Einschatzung des Gegners", badly timed and likely to
327
strengthen Soviet hegemony. He is critical especially of Egon 
Bahr, terming his negotiations 'dieses undurchsichtige Spiel’ and 
’Geheimgesprache1 about which the DKP was better informed than the 
democratically elected Members of the B u n d e s t a g . H e  then goes 
further to say that the treaty is the work of the other side and that
324- Verhandlungen, p. 9840*
325 Ibid.,pp. 9845 - 7-
326 Ibid., p. 9858.
3£7 Ibid., p. 9860.
328 Ibid., p. 9861.
Brandt's visit to the Crimea showed "wie sehr sich dieses Land be-
329reits im Sog sowjetischer Politik befindet". After demanding
more clarity on a number of points, Marx attacks the government on
its alleged change of attitude, maintaining: "Pilr die CDIJ/CStF haben
sich die Kategorien des Rechts und der Freiheit, der Wahrheit und
530
des Friedens nicht verandert".
This last remark by Marx caused noisy scenes as the government
side objected strongly and replied with 'ideological insults' such
as Wehner's comment:“Sportpalastl Hier fehlt nur noch.die Frage:
331wollt ihr den totalen Krieg? \nt/y When the debate resumed Ehmke 
makes similar associations:"Herr Kollege Marx, die Rede, die Sie 
hier gehalten haben, war eine Rede, die in Weimar manche Beutsch-
'Z'ZO
nationale gehalten haben," Later Ehmke also criticizes the oppo­
sition for having "dieses obrigkeitsstaatliche Verhaltnis zur 
Regierung", since the CDU/CSU expect to ask questions and receive 
answers instead of entering into a two-way dialogue. These
provocative remarks about the opposition are rejected by Windelen 
(CDU/CSU), who then attempts to throw doubt upon the legitimacy 
of the government's position. He claims that the Polish treaty means 
that one quarter of Germany is lost, but there is no majority for 
such a decision; one vote could decide the issue and this amounted to
pure chance and lacked credibility. The government, he said had no
334mandate for this.
329 Verhandlungenno.9862 - 3.
330 Ibid., p. 9869.
331 Ibid. .
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A further contribution for the opposition is made by StrauB,
who admits that various arguments for the treaties are acceptable:
the moral argument that war must be paid for, the humanitarian
argument that the people must be helped, the peace argument that
peace must be secured and the reality argument that reality must be
faced. However, he claims that the really relevant and important
questions concern the right of self-determination and the true
cause of peace and reconciliation: the first is omitted from the
treaty, the second is not compatible *ri.th the Soviet ideology and
imperialist policies. StrauB also warns that everyone expected
M35
peace after the Munich agreement. He goes on to list all the
objections to the treaties and then decides that to say ’.no' is the
lesser evil since "Ein Ja zu diesen Yertragen bedeutet einen Bruch-
336punkt auf der StraBe ins Unheil". Schmidt replies for the govern
337ment side with sharp reminders of 'Vilshofen' and again later
has the last word of the day: "Legen Sie endlich ihren deutsch-
338
nationalen GroBenwahn ab".
This antagonistic atmosphere still prevailed on the third day 
339of the debate when Zimmermann for the opposition termed Schmidt’ 
speech a 'Schmutzkubel1 emptied over the house. Zimmermann firmly 
rejected the treaties and emphasized that they were the responsi­
bility of the government.Dissatisfaction with the Polish treaty
335 Verhandlungen, pp.9910 - 9915.
336 Ibid., p. 9918.
337 Cf. p. 108.
|38 Verhandlungen, p. 9934*
339 173rd Sitting, 25th February, 1972.
340 Verhandlungen, pp. 9941 - 9947.
was expressed by Czaja who asked 1. how were the interests of Ost-
preuBen, WestpreuBen, Brandenburg, Pommern, Schlesien and Ober-
schlesien represented in the treaty negotiations? 2. was the treaty
a description of the situation or a final agreement? ' 2U how can
the government say that nothing substantial has happened to our
homeland when these areas have suddenly become parts of a foreign 
341country? The opinion that the government had failed the expellees 
was also expressed by Becher, who claimed that the Chancellor's ab­
sence during Czaja's speech was a 'MiBachtung der Interessen der
34.2deutschen Heimatvertriebenen'. Also for the opposition Katzer
reminds the house that the Germans in 'Mitteldeutschland' have no
343right of self-determination and regrets that those who seek more 
freedom and justice for all should by taunted by the government side 
with the words 'Deutschnational' and 'Sportpalast'.^44
The following speech for the government side by Schmid- was a
lengthy account of German history, which even drew applause from 
345the opposition. However, it is an indication of the atmosphere 
of the debate that a demonstrator had to be removed from the '
346
gallery and viewers were reportedly telephoning to complain about
347the noise in the chamber; There were also further displays of 
emotion when Mende, only recently a member of.the opposition, asked
341 Yerhandlungen, p. 9961.
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if there was still any belief in human rights as laid down in the 
Basic Law; how could the TOT membership of the DDR, which disregards
7y| Q
these rights, otherwise be contemplated? Mende also makes an
emotional address to ’meine Landsleute in Schlesien1, giving the
following promise;"Die grofite Partei der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
. . . wird ihre Fiirsorge- und Obhutspflicht fur die Landsleute in
Schlesien, fur unsere Deutschen in Schlesien, OstpreuSen, Pommern
niemals preisgeben, weil wir den Menschenrechten mehr verpf lic’ntet
349sind als der Macht und dem Opportunismus". Other prominent 
opposition members also stressed human rights, as well as recon­
ciliation, self-determination, unity and freedom of movement in
350their summing up of their position on the treaties. The expec­
tation that the conflict between government and opposition might 
become unbearable during this debate is illustrated by the closing
remark of Bundestag President von Hassel, who congratulated all on
351good parliamentary debating.
2 The constructive vote of no confidence
During the period following the first debate on the ratification 
there were further defections from the government side; Hupka left 
the SPD on 29th February, 1972, and joined the CDU/CSU on 3rd 
March, Seume left the SPD on March 2nd552 and later555 became a :
348 Verhandlungen. p. 9988*
349 Ibid., p. 9989*
35° Ibid., p. 10000.
351 Ibid., p. 10003.
352 Reported to 177th Sitting, 15th March, 1972.
353 Announced on April 12th, 1972; Verhandlungen. p. IO445.
•guest* of the opposition Frak'tion. On 26th April it was announced
5154.
that Helms had left the FDR. The resultant narrowing of the gov­
ernment majority was obviously one factor in deciding the CDU/CSU 
to attempt to gain power by making the first ever use of the con­
structive vote of no confidence in the Bundestag. This intention is 
first mentioned in a plenary session of the Bundestag on 26th 
April^^ by Althammer (CDIJ/CSU) who expresses surprise and shock 
at reports of ’Warnstreiks * in various towns against what is the 
opposition's legitimate use of an instrument of the constitution.
He claims that the Young Socialists have called for extra-parlia- . 
mentary action against what they term a ’Machtiibernahme durch die 
CDU/CSU’, an attempt ^die Macht zu erschleichen' • Althammer 
also deplores alleged attempts to influence parliament from abroad
and asks why this action is thought in Germany to be an abuse, when
  357members of the Bundestag are supposed to be free agents. '
As Althammer describes, sections of public opinion in the
Federal Republic felt that a change of power through a constructive
vote of no confidence would be lacking in legitimacy, despite the
constitutional provision for it. This provision was made expressly
to avoid what was seen as a major weakness of* the Weimar constitu-
358tion, however, as Leicht has pointed out there was some con-
354 182nd Sitting, Verhandlungen, p. 10589.
355 Verhandlungen, on, 10594/5; the motion had been proposed on 
24th April.
356 Yerhandlungen, p. 10594*
357 Ibid., p. 10595*
358 Grundgesetz und politische Praxis, p. 45.
fusion between the stability of government and the stability of the
system. According to Leicht, the constructive vote of no confidence
was criticized at the time the Basic Law was drafted because of
fears nda8 ehrgeizige Politiker versuchen, sich aux diese Weise
hinter den Kulissen in den Vordergrund zu schieben und zum Bundes-
kanzler zu avancieren. Bas wiirde bedeuten, da& die Bundesverfassung
quasi formellrechtlich die Intrigen der Politik zum Gegenstand der
359verfassungsmaBigen Ordnung macht" . In April 1972 there was "un­
doubtedly some public aversion to 'political intrigues' which 
meant that the formation of the government would be totally divorced 
from, elections; a characteristic, incidentally, of the Weimar Re­
public. As seen above, critics of the opposition were tempted to 
use vocabulary firmly associated with Hitler's rise to power 'using 
the provisions of the constitution'.
Following Althammer's speech there was bitter controversy about 
strikes on the left and campaigns on the right which used the terms
 ^ft o
'Untergang Deutschlands', 'Kommunisten', 'Verbrecher' end 'Hurerei'
3 6 *1and even made death threats. For the government, Ertl warns that 
"mit Angeboten versucht wird, Mehrheiten zu b i d d e n T h e  oppo­
sition retaliate with accusations of manipulation of the vote of
no confidence the next day, since the government are apparently
. . 363
planning to abstain. Wohlrahe claims that the government are
359 Grundgesetz und politische Praxis. 0. 44.
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using ’Volkskammer1 methods. The government side again make use 
of the opposition choice of terminology by informing the house that 
StrauB has called the Moscow treaty a ’kalter Staatsstreich1*
Dorn points out the different 1Demokratieverstandnis1 of the oppo­
sition indicated by Althammer!s use of the verb *ertragen* in con­
nection with the role of opposition. He adds: nDie Christlich-Demo- 
kratische und die Christlich-Soziale Union sollten doch gerade auf 
diesen Sektor mal auf ihre eigene Vergangenheit in Deutschland zu-
■zrr
riickblicken. ” Returning to the subject of the vote of no confi­
dence, Sperling (SPD) warns that everyone who votes the following 
day is "unter dem Yerdacht, einen honorierten Gang zur Urne zu 
tun.1,567
During the debate on the Chancellery'budget 1972, on this 
occasion there were further exchanges about the CDU/CSU in the 
role of opposition. Katzer for the opposition accuses the government 
of Mder unentwegte und dauernde Yersuch, die Opposition in die 
Ecke der Uein-Sager, der ewig Gestrigen, der zu neuen Losungen 
schlichtweg Unfahigen zu drangen. This is an accusation often
levelled at the government by members of the C D U / C S U , a n d  the 
reply from the government side (Schafer) is that the opposition has 
a guilty conscience that it is not respecting the decision of the
364 V erhandlungen, p. 10601.
365 Ibid., p. 10600; Wehner.
366 Ibid., p. 10601.
367 Ibid., p. 10603.
368 Ibid., p. 10609*
v o t e r s . L a t e r ,  the character of the Bundestag is discussed by 
Kirst (FDP) when he suggests that the activities of the opposition 
have been more in keeping with a ’Redeparlament1 than an ’Arbeits- 
parlament'. In his opinion the opposition have indulged in too 
much questioning M aus polemisch-demagogischen Grunden" and made 
parliament ineffective. Kirst claims that the CDU/CSU could not get 
used to the change of power and to their role as opposition, and, in 
their desire to remain the *Staatspartei’, they launched a cam­
paign to spread insecurity and cause polarisation, with talk of
’Ausverkauf* in the area of Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik and
371of ’Inflation* in the area of finance and the economy. These 
criticisms of the opposition had often been made before, but were 
now levelled anew as the CDU/CSU was about to attempt to escape 
from its oppositional role. Kirst seeks to underline that the govern­
ment side sees this attempt as illegitimate when he speaks of "Das 
Wahlergebnis durch das konstruktive MiBtrauensvotum zu verfalschen", 
and his comment on Barzel becoming Chancellor is "Nicht soi**.'^
For the opposition, von Wrangel defends the decision to use the 
vote of no confidence and the action of the members of the govern­
ment side who have joined the opposition.^7$ He claims that they
will ensure that the second republic does not go the way of the 
374first. Barzel also stresses that members of the Bundestag should
Verhandlungen «,■ 0.10610.
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370
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3,75follow their consciences and not any 1;Wahlerauftrag’ and re­
minds the house yet again that it was Ollenhauer, Brandt and Wehner 
who first said ’Verzicht ist Verrat1. ' Ee goes on to claim that 
the government did not tell the truth concerning the Bahr paper 
and acted altogether irreponsibly in conducting foreign policy
377and signing treaties without assured majority hacking. StrauB - 
objects to the use by government supporters of the expression 
’CDU/CSU Machtergreifung1 and for the government, Schiller re­
plies that if StrauB talks of ‘Volksfront1, his side will say
379‘Harzburger Front1. This kind of exchange makes further de­
bating impossible and there are repeated cries of ’Nazi1,‘SA-Mann1 
and ‘Hazi-Professor1, as well as ?Sie sind Professor von Hitlers 
Gnaden', before the debate has to be adjourned in disorder.
The vote of no confidence against Brandt was brought in the 
next day, 27th April, 1972, by Kiesinger. In putting the motion^8"* 
he stressed that since the government had failed and ‘den Interessen 
unseres Volkes geschadet’, the opposition had chosen a positive 
method of democratic parliamentarism in order to uphold the inter­
ests of the peoplej their action was not for the sake of power.^82 
Kiesinger contended that the government's foreign policy had not
375 Verhandlungen. p. 10652.
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582 Verhandlungen, pp. 10697 - 8.
been in harmony with international tendencies, that the treaties
had barred the way to national unity for the Germans and that the
SPD/FDP had not adhered to the wishes of the electorate, yet now
383
insulted men of conscience by calling them ’Uberlaufer1• For 
the government side, after the SPD and FDP Fraktionen had pledged 
their support for Brandt, Scheel expressed the opinion that the 
vote would be an important test of democracy. He warned that it 
should not become the rule to replace the government without an 
election and that it was wrong to base a government on men without 
the nerve or character to stand by their party or give up their
7 0y|
mandate! Such a government would be weak."* The final word was 
spoken by Brandt himself, who said of the opposition attempt: “Dies 
ist der Versuch einer Flucht nach vorn, heraus aus der Unverant- 
wortlichkeit eines sterilen Hein zu Schicksalsfragen unseres 
Volkes”.585
The attempt did not succeed, but it became obvious that the 
government had lost its majority. The Chancellery budget debate was 
continued later during the same sitting, with the government attemp­
ting to avoid a vote by filibustering. The opposition became very 
abusive when their demands for a vote were ignored and even accused 
a government minister of being drunk.^8^ This antagonistic atmos-
383 VerhandlungenV -p. 10698.
384 Ibid., pp.IO7O4 - 5.
385 Ibid., p. 10708.
386 Barzel needed 249 votes, but received only 247.
387 Verhandlungen, p. 10750.
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phere returns the following day, but only after Brandt has made a 
government statement about the need to avoid polarisation and the 
desirability of some agreement between government and opposition on 
Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik. He suggests a new joint resolu­
tion on these policies, as well as more cooperation in other areas 
and advocates immediate all-party talks on the possibility of fresh
7QQ
elections. Barzel claims that the opposition has always been
ready to cooperate, but these offers from the Chancellor have only
389been achieved by the action of the previous day. Some discus­
sions on an election follow, with the inadequacy of the arrangements 
becoming apparent. One difficulty is that the government does not
wish "unseren eigenen Mann wegen der komplzierten Vorschriften des
390Grundgesetzes zu desavouieren". An important point about the
attitude of the opposition is also made here. Schmidt sees the fact
that the opposition brought its no confidence motion on a budget
issue and not on the Ostpolitik as an indication that it may be
391changing its thinking on the treaties. After some further time- 
wasting by Schmidt and other ministers, during which Brandt was 
apparently trying to persuade Helms to vote with the government, 
a vote was taken and resulted in a tie; Helms had voted against 
and von Kuhlmann-Stumm (FDP) had abstained.^^ This was the 
final proof that the government was powerless.
3Q8 Verhandlungen,pp. 10757 - 9.
389 Ibid., pp.10759 ~ 63.
3.90 Ibid. , p. 107,69; Schmidt.
391 Verhandlungen, p. 10772; Gf. Leicht, p. 36.
92 See remark by Stiicklen, Verhandlungen. p. 10784.
393 Verhandlungen, pp. 10787 - 9.
3 The .joint resolution and, the final vote on the treaties
By 10th May, 1972, an all-party resolution on the treaties had 
39 Abeen prepared and it seemed that rGemeinsamkeit• might after 
all have been achieved. However, in the 186th Sitting of the Bundes­
tag on that date the opposition state their concern that there
are apparently Soviet objections and ask for a postponement of the
395further reading and vote on the treaties. The vote on this is
396a tie so that the opposition request is refused. Very long,
detailed and thorough reports from the Bundestag foreign policy
committee are given by Achenbach (FD?) and Heck (CDU/CSU), Haack
(SPD) and Bach (CDU/CSU)597 and both treaties are explained and
interpreted fully. The debate is opened in conciliatory mood by
Brandt, who expresses his thanks to all sides for their efforts
398and declares that everyone in the Bundestag favours peace. This 
even receives some applause from the opposition. However, after a 
break for Fraktion meetings the opposition seems less inclined to 
cooperate. Barzel declares that it is irresponsible to call for a 
vote in such an unclear parliamentary situation and claims that the 
•so nicht’ of the opposition was a real a l t e r n a t i v e . H e  objects 
to the pressure for haste and states he has advised his Fraktion to 
vote •no* if there is to be a vote that day, since they have hot 
been allowed enough time for discussion and consideration.^^ He
394 Texte zur Deutschlandnolitik 10, pp. 427 - 9.
395 Verhandlungen, p. 10872; Wagner.
396 V erhandlungen, pp. 10872 - 3.
397 Ibid., pp. 10873 - 10888.
398 Ibid., pp. 10888 - 10891.
399 Ibid., p. 10901.
400 Ibid., p. 10903.
goes on to explain that the opposition is not satisfied that Sovi'et 
objections to. parts of the joint resolution have been cleared up 
and it is revealed that a frantic series of meetings and exchange 
of letters between the Soviet representative Falin and the govern­
ment has been taking place, in order to satisfy the doubts of the 
401
opposition. In spite of this the opposition ask for an adjourn­
ment, with Barzel explaining that they only agreed to the joint re­
solution ’wenn sonst alles stimmt’, and this did not seem to be the 
402case.
The debate on the treaties was resumed on 1?th May, 1972, with 
a statement by Schmid for the SPD, emphasizing that the treaties 
are part of the process of overcoming the divisions in Europe, the
only way in which self-determination may one day be possible for
403 ~ •
Germany. ' Mischnick also saw them as favourable for peace and for
the end of German-German confrontation.^^ It was then announced by 
the opposition spokeman, Kiesinger, that after very long delibera­
tions, the CDU/CSU had decided to abstain. He admitted that they 
had rejected the treaties, but now the government had lost its 
majority it had been forced to seek cooperation and a joint reso­
lution had been produced. Therefore the opposition would not be the 
cause of a failure to ratify. In spite of this decision Schiitz, 
the mayor of Berlin, and Scheel both make last appeals for a ryes’
401 Verhandlungen. pp. 10904 - 8.
402 Ibid., p. 10913.
403 Ibid., pp.10931 - 2.
|04 Ibid., pp. 10932 - 3.
405 Ibid., pp. 10933 - 4.
vote, but unsuccessfully. Most of the opposition abstained, but 
there were 10 votes against the Moscow treaty, including Becher,
Czaja, von Guttenberg, Hupka, Jaeger, Zoglmann and von Kuhlmann- 
Stumm, and 17 against the Warsaw treaty, the above members being 
joined by notably von Fircks and Mende. There were even 5 abstentions 
on the joint resolution: Becher, Czaja, Hupka, Riedel and ZoglmannJ^
Broadly speaking, those who voted against had been consistent 
in their sincere and outright rejection of government Ostpolitik 
and Deutschlandpolitik throughout the 6th Bundestag and, unlike the 
rest of the opposition, seem not to have been swayed by any tacti­
cal considerations. Many issued written statements giving their 
reasons and the opposition published a resolution which was some­
thing of a concession to them. It stated that the treaties did not 
change the right to freedom of movement'and did not legalize the 
expulsion of Germans from their homeland. After the vote on the 
treaties further members left the Bundestag or joined the oppositio^^ 
and there were protracted deliberations on how to overcome the 
paralysis of government and parliament. The treaties with the Soviet 
Union and Poland, and the Berlin agreement, went into effect on 
3rd June, 1972, amid demands for Brandt to resign.
406; Verhandlungen, pp.10939 - IO945.
407 E.g., von Kuhlmann-Stumm, von Guttenberg, Muller.
4 The vote of confidence
It was not until the 197th Sitting on 20th September that Brandt
made the dissolution of the Bundestag possible by asking for a vote
of confidence which he intended to lose.^^ Barzel claims that
Brandt should have resigned on 28th April when his budget had been
rejected, instead of seeking "am Grundgesetz vorbei . . . eine-
409
Parteiverabredung uber Heuwahlen". He then lists the members of
the SPD and FDP who changed Fraktionen or resigned and describes 
410 '
their reasons. These people are discussed again in the 199th 
411Sitting when the confidence motion is continued; Scheel condemns
the change of party without the agreement of the electorate as the
412end of parliamentary democracy. However, Schulz (Berlin) claims
that the 'tiberlauf er-Legende' is a new 'DolchstoBlegende' and rejects
the government 'defamation1 as a deplorable return to the Freund-
415Feind relations of Weimar. . He says that if the government had 
paid more attention to dissenters, the treaties would have been 
different and Brandt would not have lost his majority: the dissenters 
"wuBten, daB man AuBenpolitik nicht ohne eine so groBe und macht- 
volle Opposition machen kann."^^ Muller, who, like Schulz, left 
the SPD to join the opposition, later claims that people with the
4.08 First ever use of 'Antrag gemaB Art. 68 des Grundgesetzes'.
409 Verhandlungen, pp. 11575 - 6.
4,10 Ibid., pp.11576 - 7.
411 22nd September, 1972.
4.12 Verhandlungen, p. 11740.
^15 Ibid., p. 11745.
414 Ibid., p. 11746.
courage to follow their consciences are ’Trager wahrhaft huma- 
nistischer Gesinnung', as the SPD had once said in a similar situ­
ation. He claims that he and others changed parties just in time
415
to prevent a "neue totalitare Schlagseite der deutschen Geschichte"
A further defector, Mende, blames the whole situation on the
A -1 /T
•‘falsification of the 19&9 election result", . and is called a
417liar by FDP members. Kleinert recognizes the situation for
what it is when he calls it the ’peinlichste Wahlkampferoffnung’
418ever.
The government side take the opportunity here to remind the
house and the TY audience of the record of the opposition. Wehner
accuses them of holding up even very necessary reforms, just because
these were initiated by the government, of not accepting their role
and of ’Propaganda mit der Angst1. Most deplorable, says Wehner,
was von Hassel’s statement that the opposition only allowed the
treaties to be accepted by abstaining because 'burgerkriegsahnliche
419
Zustande’ existed, outside the parliament buildings. ■ Brandt also 
emphasizes the negative attitude of the opposition: "Die Opposition 
hat sich in die Rolle des ewigen Heinsagers hineinmanovriert", ..and 
criticizes their indecision on the treaties :"Wer in einer Schick- 
salsfrage der Nation in die Enthaltsamkeit fliichtet/ insoweit in 
einer Schicksalsfrage der Nation vor dem Gewissen flieht, der sollte 
nicht vom Gewissen reden,wenn von Mandat sub ertragern die Rede ist"^
415 Verhandlungen. p. 11752.
416 Ibid.
417 Ibid., pp. 11754 - 5; Ertl.
418 Ibid., p. 11755.
419 Ibid., p. 11760.
420 Ibid., p. 11771.
Many further antagonistic remarks are contained in a lengthy re­
ply by StrauB, who claimed that the government did not ban the HPD
421because they would then have had to ban the DKP too, that they 
had misled the public on the vote of confidence procedure for dis­
solving the Bundestag and that they might be ruling unconstitutionally,
422since the budget had not been passed. He again declared that the.
CDU/GSU was a party of the centre and that democrats should distance
423themselves from revolutionaries. A reply by Kirst becomes very 
provocative when he says that the ’Uberlauf e r w o u l d  provide mate­
rial for a chapter in 'Verrat im 20, J a h r h u n d e r t ' E q u a l l y  pro­
vocative is Schmidt’s defence of ministers who have resigned: at
least they were not tainted by a ’brauner Fleck* like some people
425who had had to resign. After this the atmosphere became extremely 
hostile until the vote was taken, which Brandt lost, allowing the 
dissolution of the 6th Bundestag.
421 V erhandlungren .p. 117,74*
422 Ibid. , pp. 11776 - 7.
423 Ibid., pp. 11777 - 8*
424 Ibid., p. 11785; some members walked out even as Kirst began
to speak.
425 Presumably a reference to StrauB and the ’Spiegel Affair'; 
Verhandlungen . p. 11803.
Ill SUMMARY. AMD CONCLUSIONS
A The development of the CDU/CSU Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik
1 The position of the opposition towards the policies of the 
government
The period preceding the signing of the treaty between the Fede­
ral Republic and the Soviet Union was that during which the CDU/
CSU parliamentary opposition was most active in plenary sessions 
concerning Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik. This period, the first 
year of the 6th Bundestag, was also the time of adjustment.by the 
opposition to its new role and has therefore been dealt with at 
greatest length. From the outset, in opposing the Ostpolitik and . 
Deutschlandpolitik of the Brandt/Scheel government, the CDU/CSU 
took up a conservative attitude, more conservative, it might be 
argued, than when it had been in power itself. Of Kiesinger it
has been remarked that in 19^9 "he and his party had retreated far
2 '
: from their position at the outset of the grand coalition". However, 
the stance of the opposition at this time has also been described 
as consistent with its relatively negative attitude throughout the 
60 s when, in contrast, the SPD began to look for more progressive
1 Cf. Peter Merkl, German 'Foreign Policies, West and East (Oxford, 
1974), pp. 118/9. :
2 Merkl, p. 131.
- . I y
policies which were more in tune with the. changing international 
si tuation.^
Important debates such as those on the government declaration, 
the ’state of the n a t i o n t h e  Chancellery and other budgets 
CDU/CSU ’GroBe Anfrage' on Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik were 
the occasions of very detailed and sometimes very differing 
accounts of the opposition position. The overall impression of 
the opposition approach is of caution and conservatism, since 
heavy emphasis is placed on the retention of the previous goals of 
reunification and self-determination for Germany. While support for 
the aims of the government’s Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik is 
affirmed, there is general disapproval of its methods, ranging 
from outright rejection to the voicing of ’doubts’. The CDtl/CSU’s 
main objection at the outset was to. the two state theory adopted 
in the government declaration of 1969. This was seen by the oppo­
sition as incompatible with the continuing aims of self-determina­
tion, reunification and the restoration of human rights. The signing 
of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was also condemned by the 
opposition since, they claimed, it would mean a change in the re­
lationship between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic. This 
negative reaction to the beginning of a period of ’treaty politics’ 
seemed to be conditioned by the parties’ basic conservatism and 
anti-communism.
3 Hacke, p. 85.
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By early 197^ the opposition obviously wished to appear less . 
negative and clearly expressed its support for the aims of the 
government's Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik, for talks with the 
DDR and for efforts towards a non-agression agreement with the 
Soviet Union.^ At the same time, CSU and expellee elements in the 
Bundestag reacted against the government by condemning any efforts 
to negotiate with communist regimes, but the official opposition 
position remained one of qualified support, or at least of non- 
obstruction, while the Erfurt and Kassel meetings were going on 
and while talks went ahead in Moscow. However, by April, 1970> de­
mands were being voiced by the opposition for progress on a Berlin 
settlement before other talks went any further. There were also re­
peated requests for more information and more clarity, and the 
CDU/CSU began to stress an ’ideal* foreign policy of 'Ausgleich1 
and 'Losung', while denying the usefulness of the 'formulae1 being 
sought by the government. Nevertheless, the Bundestag opposition made 
it clear that it would do nothing to prejudice the final negotia­
tions.
The Moscow treaty of August, 1970, was the first and most im­
portant stage in the Ostpolitik of the new government and was not 
officially rejected by the opposition in the Bundestag. They pre­
ferred to keep their options open by deferring a final decision 
until further stages of the policy had been successfully completed. 
Reactions from individual CDU/CSU members were decidedly negative,
4 . Cf. p. 110.
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however. Essentially the same reception was given to the Warsaw
treaty, although the reaction of the CSU and expellee members was
one of immediate rejection. In early 1971> Barzel stated that the
opposition were still intending to judge the government’s Ostpolitik
as a whole, but were so far disappointed with the treaties, since
their greatest concern was German self-determination. He further
claimed that the opposition was ready to share responsibility for
the treaties, but that the government was not interested in co- 
5
operation. CSU opinion was obviously not in agreement with this, 
since their statements suggest that they reject the Ostpolitik, 
which they regard as the cause of the atmosphere of hatred in the 
Bundestag.
One point about which there did seem to be agreement in 1971 was 
that the conclusion of a satisfactory Berlin agreement should be 
a condition for ratification of the treaties with the Soviet Union 
and Poland. However, once the four-power agreement was concluded, 
the attitude of the opposition was ambivalent, although it had to 
admit that some progress had been accomplished. It expressed a de­
sire to reserve judgement until the inter-German arrangements had 
been completed, but even then the CDU/CSU claimed that the treaties 
were incomplete and seemed intent on rejecting them.
5 Cf. p. 143.
6 Cf. p. 154.
In early 1972, the ratification of the treaties received its first 
reading in the Bundestag and the opposition attitude appeared un­
changed. They contended that the treaties had not settled the 
German problem, had given away more than they had achieved and there 
fore still caused opposition doubts to remain. The decision of the 
CDU/CSU was formulated as ’so nicht1, although the CSU used much 
more negative terms and pointed to their own counter proposal for 
a treaty with the Soviet Union. There were again claims that the 
goals of self determination and unity for the Germans had been 
neglected and that expellee and refugee interests had been ignored. 
Particularly the controversy over the ’letter on German unity’ was 
an illustration of the confusion within the opposition Fraktion as 
to the exact reason for its objections. To an outside observer, how­
ever, the basically conservative reaction of the CDU/CSU was only 
to be expected: "The motives of their opposition were obvious: the 
ustpolitik was a radical challenge to the cold war shibboleths of
Q
twenty years of CDU/CSU government." merkl clearly does not con­
sider any of the concrete objections raised at this stage by the
9 ■
opposition to be valid.
By the time the second reading of the ratification laws took 
place, the government majority had narrowed, the opposition had
7 Cf. Hacke, p. 48/49*
8 Merkl, p. 165*
9 In his opinion "The treaty drafters made sure to cover also the 
points raised by the opposition spokesmen of the CDU/CSU and the 
refugee and expellee organisations. They left undiminished the 
German right of self-determination and reserved the final dis­
position of the frontier questions to a peace conference"^ (Ger- 
man foreign Policies, ,p.. 13.5 )•
failed to replace Brandt "by Barzel using the constructive vote of 
no confidence, but had succeeded in defeating the government on a 
tied budget vote. The ensuing new efforts for cooperation between 
government and opposition had produced a joint resolution, which 
was expected to make the treaties acceptable to the opposition, but 
the CDU/CSU were still not ready to make a decision. After a post­
ponement they decided that they could not vote in favour of the 
treaties but, as they did not wish to be the cause of a failure to 
ratify, they would abstain from voting. The vast majority of oppo­
sition members followed this tactic but ‘no* votes were recorded by 
a handful of outright opponents, which gave some indication of the 
strength of truly fundamental opposition to the treaties from within 
the CDU/CSU Fraktion.
2 Division of opinion within the opposition on the question of
Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik
The detailed examination of the behaviour of the opposition in 
the 6th Bundestag given in Section II showed clearly that with re- 
gard to the Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik of the government, 
there were many shades of opinion and fluctuations of attitude with 
in the CDU/CSU. These can usefully be divided simply into three 
overlapping groups: CDU, conservative but later tacticalj CSU, re­
maining conservative; upholders of the refugee and expellee cause 
from all parties, fundamental.^ This division serves to show the
10 Cf. M. Haag, The opposition to the Ostpolitik, unpbl. case study. 
University of Surrey, 1972.
broad, differences, but the party labels cannot be clear cut, since
individuals appeared to be in different groups on different occa-
11 12
sions. Even less distinct are the divisions into four or five 
groups which have been suggested. These show agreement at the ex­
tremes of opposition opinion, but confusion about more moderate 
groups. The CSU is taken to be the broad label for the most nega­
tive goup of absolute opponents of Ostpolitik, and refugee and
expellee elements, both from the CSU. arid from other parties, can be
15
included under this heading. This group splits only for the final 
voting on the ratification, when the ’absolute opponents1 who vote
I no1 are clearly those espoused to the refugee/expellee cause. The 
four-way and five-way divisions also agree on the ’positive’ group 
exemplified by ICiep. This is omitted from the simple three-way di­
vision suggested above, since it did not emerge until after the
1972 elections.
The central groups within the CDU/CSU opposition to the Ost­
politik are exemplified mainly by prominent members of the CDU: a 
’conservative* group represented by Kiesinger and Marx*^ and a 
group of ’conditional critics’ (Pridham), who were ’undecided’ 
(Hacke),represented by von Weizsacker and Birrenbach. The examina­
tion of the Bundestag debates in Section II confirms that there 
were consistent differences between these two suggested groups, in
II Pridham, ’The Ostpolitik and the Opposition’, PP* 49 - 51.
12 Hacke, pp. 75/76.
13 Hacke omits the refugee/expellee group but points out that it
has been suggested by othersj p. 59 & n.261.
14 Cf. pridham, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, p. 202.
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that the first tended very much towards the antagonistic approach, 
while the second was more restricted to concrete criticism. The 
suggestion made by Hacke that Gerhard Schroder should represent a 
separate group of opinion is borne out by the indication that he 
did not share the governmental approach to foreign policy of Kie­
singer and other ’conservatives' since he stressed that the govern-
1 s
ment alone should assume the responsibility for its policies. In
his view the opposition should accept that foreign policy initiative
17 ■ ■
was the responsibility of the government, and as liacke points
out, the final action of the opposition on the ratification of the
0
treaties was very much in line with this viewpoint.
B The CDU/CSU as the parliamentary opposition
1 The CDU/CSU*s ’governmental1., approach to opposition
The CDU/CSU opposition in the sixth Bundestag was operating
somewhat self-consciously in a new parliamentary role: as shown in
■ 19 :
Section II the early part, particularly, of the sixth legislative
15 Die Qst- und Deutschlandpolitik der CDU/CSU, p. 7o.
16 . cf. p. 159.
17 Cf. Hacke, p. 61.
18 Ibid., p. 71.
19 p. 82 ff.
period was a time of adjustment to what must be regarded as the 
beginning of a system of alternation between government and oppo­
sition for the two major political parties (or two groups) in the 
federal Republic, The change of power was not immediately accepted 
by the opposition, however, since the important democratic principle 
of the rule of the majority seemed to have been broken. The result 
of the 1969 election had not clearly assigned the roles of govern­
ment and opposition. The CDU/CSU had retained its position as the
largest Fraktion, but the 3PD and FDP together could now form a
: 20
majority. This is an example of the case pointed out by Gehrig,
in which the 'rule of the majority' principle may be ignored in a
two group system such as the Federal Republic. The CDU/CSU were
21
quick to point this out, just as oppositions in similar circum-
22stances at Land level had in the past. However, as several authors
23 ■ ~ '
indicate, the representative aspect of the system allows the
parties to decide upon government formation if no absolute majority
is reached. Nevertheless the CDU/CSU felt the 19&9 situation to be
illegitimate and claimed the election result gave them a mandate to
lead the government, either by continuing the Grand Coalition or by
joining with the FDP. They pointed to past precedents: the largest
party had always led the coalition government, and the FDP had pre-
20 Parlament - Regierung - Opposition, p. 196 — 197.
21 Cf. p. 95.
22 E.g., Seidel, Die Funktion der Opposition.
23 E.g., Gehrig, p. 197; Grube, p. 7» DoIf Sternberger, Lebende 
Verfassung: Studien iiber Koalition und Opposition (Meisenheim, 
1956), p. 114*
viously always adhered to the principle of coalescing with the . 
strongest .party. On the other hand,- the SPD claimed the. 19&9 < 
election result gave it a mandate to join with the FDP. Just before 
polling day the FDP had made it known that it would coalesce with 
the SPD if possible. The situation was certainly not clear and the 
government formation was divorced from the election to some extent, 
since there were theoretically three possibilities on the basis of 
the same results.
24According to Kaltefleiter, the structural weakness of the West
German party system which allowed this unclear situation to arise 
was one of the main causes of the constitutional crises which de­
veloped between 1969 and 1972. It was well known that some FDP mem­
bers had only accepted the new coalition out of party loyalty. The 
CDU/CSU? could therefore count on some internal opposition in the 
coalition* which might provide a chance for it to regain power be­
fore its term was completed. "Diese Chance, verbunden mitdem Selbst- 
verstandnis, die Wahl von 196-9 nicht verloren zm haben und 1 zui Un-
recht1 in die Opposition verwiesen worden zu sein, verstarkte die
25BereitschafU zum ■Umkoalieren1 u* In this situation the opposition 
chose to attempt to regain power without waiting for the next 
election and therefore not to use the time out of office to re­
generate. This leads critics to the conclusion that it did not
24 Zwischen Konsens und Krise, p. 6*
25 Ibid., p. 9*
•understand1 the role of opposition, The attempt to take over 
government failed and the 1972 elections were to show that the 
opposition's 1 governmentalV approach was not honoured by the electo­
rate. Surveys have shown that all legislation tends to be credited
26to the government, and that the public expected that the oppo­
sition would concentrate more on offering alternatives.
This •governmental1 approach was recognised as inevitable by
CDUI authors such as Dietrich Rollmann: "Bei einer Partei, die so
lange in der Regierung und noch nie in der Opposition war, ist das
■ 27
Oppositionsverstandnis notgedrungen gouvernemental". It has also
28been pointed out by Pridham that the main concern is apparently
with the organisational structure and governmental expectations of
the CDU, with the CSU somewhat more prepared for opposition in the
form of confrontation. The role of opposition is described by the
opposition Fraktion leader, Rainer Barzel, as that of an ever-
present alternative government, not polemical but constructive in 
. . : 29
criticism. Barzel warns that the government side, and Herbert
V/ehner in particular, must not be allowed to brand the CDU/CSU a
30 ' '•Nein-Sager-Partei' composed of nationalists incapable of offering
alternatives. This image of the CDU/CSU would mean the "Yerbannung
26 Kaltefleiter, Zwischen Konsens und Krise, p. 50.
27 Die CDU in der Opposition, p. 149.
28 *The CDU/CSU opposition in West Germany1, p. 212.
29 'Die Rolle der Opposition' in Rollmann, p. 30.
30 Ibid. p. 315 see also Blum, p. 8.
auf die harten Banke der Opposition1' for several further legislative
periods.^ In fact the experience of other two party or two group
systems has shown that a party’s regeneration and the return of
its electoral attractiveness through opposition, as suggested for
- 52the CDU/CSU by Rollmann, usually take more than one period out of 
office. It is characteristic of the predominant CDIJ attitude during 
this period that Barzel refers to the role of opposition in this 
way and emphasizes a speedy return to office rather than a period
of regeneration. This emphasis meant that many of the demands for
■ 3 3  ■; ' i .
party reforms went at least temporarily unheeded- and the parlia-
"■34 '
mentary party and its leader became all-important.
It is further made clear in the same article by Barzel that the
CDU/CSU intended to oppose and yet to bring positive influence to
bear by continuing their legislatory work as before. According to
Rollmann, the aim of this work was to return the CDU/CSU to its:
government position:"Die CDU hat eine Opposition immer fur not-
wendig gehalten, aber sie hat sie fur sich selbst niemals erstrebt,
ihr Ziel war die Regierung . . . Dem gilt ihre Arbeit, dem gilt 
. - 35 ■
ihr Kampf. This statement again reflects the CDU*s image of 
itself as the ’natural’ governing party.^ In fact the 1969 - 1972
31 Barzel, 'Die Rolle der Opposition’ in Rollmann, p. 31.
32 Die CPU in der Opposition, p. 149.
33 E.g., those of Blum,. BeckerWiesendahl.
34 Of. Pridham, Christian Democracy in Western Germany, p. 193*
35 Die CPU in der Opposition, p. 153.
36 Cf. p. 53.
opposition did turn out to be the most hard-working opposition
37 ■ .ever, although the SPD opposition had also been very active in
initiating legislation, amending government legislation and coopera-
38ting in joint legislation, even in the first Bundestag. The con­
cept of parliament as a legislative body is still very strong in
. 39the Federal Republic and the Bundestag must be regarded as tending
more towards an 1 Arbeitsparlament1 than towards a 'Redeparlament'.
This contrast between its legislative function and its representative.
function has been pointed out by Loewenberg^ and is considered
likely to make the opposition's important tasks of criticising
government and offering alternatives very difficult, since these
may often be incompatible with strong emphasis on the legislative 
. 41
function. According to Hereth, some reforms and new rulings have
improved the situation of the opposition in plenary sessions, but
politicians and constitutional lawyers continue~to regard parliament
as a whole as the counter-weight to government. One example of this
is Barzel's reference to the opposition's intended efforts to
strengthen the position of parliament, and he adds: "Wenn sich die
Koalitionsfraktionen als reine Hilfstruppe der Regierung betrachten
und ihre Kontrollfunktion nicht wahrnehmen, dann kommt der Oppo-
42
sition ein besonderes Wachteramt zu." . . As noted in the previous 
section, almost identical statements were made on a number of
37 H.-J. Veen, Die CDU/CSU Opposition im parlamentarischen Ent-
scheidungsprozefi, (Munich, 1973)» P* 103* ' . ■
38 Gf. Kralewski & Neunreither.
39 Loewenberg, p. 264; Veen, Die CDU/CSU Opposition, p. 9-
40 Parliament in the German political system, p. 3^3•
41 Hereth, Die parlamentarische Opposition, p. 141*
42 'Die Rolle der Opposition', p. 34*
occasions in plenary sessions of the sixth Bundestag.
As regards legislation, then, the overall, impression of the
opposition's activity was one of broad cooperation with government.
The CDU/CSU introduced 122 draft laws during its first period in
opposition; the largest number of opposition initiatives ever in
the history of the Bundestag, amounting to 7Cffo of all the initiatives
originating there in the sixth legislative period. Further, the
opposition agreed to 9$fo of all legislation passed.^ However, the
sixth Bundestag still tended more towards a mixture of 'Arbeits-
parlament* and 'Redeparlament1 than its predecessors. As shown, in
the plenary sessions the opposition dominated the question periods,
brought a large number of ‘GroBe Anfragen’, forced debates on
several issues in ’Aktuelle Stunden* and finally was the first to
use the constructive vote of no confidence, thus making very full
use of the parliamentary methods available to it. The use of these
methods predominated above all in the foreign policy area and, as
AA '
Veen has pointed out, this is traditionally an area of executive 
initiative. Treaties with foreign countries need the agreement of 
the legislature in the form of a law, but members of the Bundestag, 
and this also applies to the opposition as a body, have no right 
of legislative initiative in foreign policy matters. Also the scope
43, H.-J. Veen, VZum Qppositionsverhalten im 6..Beutschen Bundes-. 
tag', Zeitschrift fur Par lament sfragen, Heft 5 (1973)* PP» 319* 
321.
44 Pie CDU/CSU Opposition, p. 45*
for influencing government legislation is limited in this area,
since, according to § 81 of the Bundestag rules of procedure, no
amendments are permitted in the second or third readings of foreign
treaty laws. The vote is taken on the whole treaty only, leaving
the opposition only a straight choice of acceptance or rejection,
and therefore with no opportunity for legislative influence. The
intensive work on legislation in all other areas, however, was the
main aspect of the CDU/CSU approach to opposition which Kaltefleiter
45
terms 'quasi governmental'. This approach was not only based on
long-standing habit, but was the logical continuation of the con­
viction held by many CDU/CSU politicians that they had not lost the
A6 ~election but had been cheated of office by the FDP. It was con­
sistent with repeated assertions from all the parliamentary parties
47that opposition should be ’cooperative1 and ’constructive‘.
2 The antagonistic approach in opposing the Ostpolitik
Two areas of confrontation were chosen by the opposition in 
the sixth Bundestag. One was the economy and inflation, an area 
very sensitive in Germany and generally one in which opposition
45 Kaltefleiter, Zwischen Konsens und Krise; p. 29.
46 Pridham,'The GDU/GSU Opposition1, p. 205.
47 Cf. Hrbek,. ' AuQenpolitische Gemeinsamkeit *,* p. 467; Richard von 
Weizsacker, 'Deutsche Ost- und Westpolitik’, in Rollmann, p*.35; 
Anton Bohm, 'Opposition - so oder anders? Das Yerlangen nach 
der einen Stimme' , Die Politische Meinung 138 0971)» p. 89; 
Franz Ruscheler & Winfried Steffani, ‘Die Opposition als Alter- 
nativregierung' t Die Politische Meinung 133 O970)> P* 63*
can.successfully gain support. In this case however, economic issues 
were overshadowed by the second area chosen by .the opposition, the 
SPD/FDP Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik, which was the main area 
of government activity. As already indicated, the foreign policy 
area is a particularly difficult one for opposition. Government can 
usually count on public sympathy, due to a feeling of national 
solidarity, and since foreign policy is seen less as a party issue 
than other areas. Therefore, an opposition which makes foreign 
policy the main target of its attack is less likely to enjoy public 
support. It was largely the choice of the CDTj/CSU opposition that 
the Beutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik of the government became the 
central theme of public controversy during the sixth Bundestag. A's 
during the first Bundestag, the, opposition tended to become un­
realistic in its hostility to these parts of government foreign
v ■ ■ a s
policy, while neglecting the opportunity to oppose internal policies.
On many occasions in the sixth Bundestag a debate on some other
topic was turned into a foreign policy debate by the opposition.
This is another aspect of the self perception of the GBTJ/CSIT as the
■'natural* government party. It had always been in government, had
a great deal of foreign policy experience as a result, and a number
of its leading members were especially interested in foreign policy**
Thus its at times almost obsessional hostility to government
foreign policy became the main characteristic of the CBU/CSU-'s
48 Cf. A. Ashkenasi, Reformpartei und AuBenpolitik (Opladen, 1968),
p. ,182. , ■
oppositional behaviour*
In this policy area there was a lack of basic agreement between
■ 49government and opposition as to the permissable rate of change
and there was an absence of trust between the two sides. The 1rule
of the majority1 principle, which the opposition had claimed was
unjustly broken by the government formation after the 19&9 elections,
was now seen as inappropriate for decision making on Os tpolitik.
Members of the opposition suggested that a narrow majority was not
sufficient in the case of the treaties with the Soviet Union and
Poland, especially since there was particularly intense minority
■ 5o:
feeling against them. As suggested by Dahl, such a situation can 
be avoided by appropriate responsiveness of the system to all
Cj . .
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claims, and the constant demands for cooperation between govern­
ment and opposition, from both sides, but particularly from the 
opposition, reflect the desire to overcome these minority objections 
by a return to the power-sharing and ‘unanimity1 of the past.^2 How­
ever , by the spring of 1972, as•the final approach of the CDU/CSU 
to the ratification of the treaties would suggest, the opposition 
had begun to realise that the only realistic course was to accept 
and adapt to government foreign policy.^ This, according to
49 Cf. p. 10 above on Kirchheimer1 s conditions for the functioning
of loyal opposition.
50 E.g., Becher, p. 141; Windelen, p. 161. . -
51 Cf. p. 6.
52 The joint resolution of May 1972 was a last attempt to do so.
53 See Hacke, p. 84 - 85 on ’Adaption* or * Negation*.
54
Pridham, is "one primary characteristic of * loyal opposition* 11, 
and in .choosing Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik as areas of con­
frontation the CDU/CSU had found particular difficulty in reconciling
5 5
'responsibleness’ with criticism^ in order to appear 'loyal*. It 
had reacted ..in a negative fashion sufficiently often for the 'Nein- 
Sager’ label given it by the government to appear credible. Also, 
the continuing sentiment that opposition may be harmful to the 
system allowed the government plausibly to suggest that CDU/CSU an-
56
tagonism towards the Ostpolitik was irresponsible and illegitimate.
This antagonistic side of the CBU/cSU's approach to opposition
has tended to overshadow the 'governmental-cooperative' attitude
displayed in matters of legislation. Obviously, most publicity was
attracted by those plenary sessions in which most controversy was
apparent. The public image of the opposition, and even that portrayed
by some observers such as Manfred Friedrich, was more one of 'total 
. 57'confrontation' • Friedrich refers to "der damalige oppositionelle 
Kampfstil" as "ein buchstablich lehrbuchhaftes Beispiel fur das 
Verhaltensmuster der ..kompetitiven" Opposition"^8 and finds the most 
remarkable characteristic of the CDU/CSU opposition in the sixth
54 ’The Ostpolitik and the Opposition1, p. 47.
5-5 Cf. Butt, p. 296.
56 E.g., p. 124? Dorn suggests it is wrong to oppose a democratic 
government; p..140, Apel; p. 170, Brandt.
57 'Opposition im Beutschen Bundestag: Phasen oppositionellen Ver- 
haltens 1949 bis 1972', Zeitschrift fur Par lament sfragen 1975, 
vol. 5, p. 405.
58 Ibid.; Friedrich, Veen and others use 'competitive' in an appa­
rently positive sense to denote an 'opposing' opposition, offering 
alternatives, while Kirchheimer speaks of opposition being 'reduced* 
to competitive elements only (p. 52).
Bundestag to have been its all-out effort to regain power: "Nur eine 
Partei, die sich keine andere Losung ihrer Probleme als ihre baldige 
Riickkehr in den Regierungsbesitz vorstellen kann, konnte sich so be- 
denkenlos auf diesen Stil einlassen. This assessment of the CDTJ/ 
GSU opposition’s approach has caused Veen to comment that the sta­
tistically demonstrable cooperative stance of the CDU/CSTl in matters 
of legislation in the sixth Bundestag has either not been noticed or
60ignored ,fweil das Image einerflKanzlersturz-Partei11 evident zu sein
61 ”  ■ ■■■
schien". Veen claims that the CDU/CSU attempted to put equal empha-
62sis on cooperation and on confrontation, and that the result was 
that its public image was determined, and in fact distorted, to a 
large extent by its behaviour in the important foreign policy debates 
and finally by its decision to use the constructive vote of no-confi­
dence.
The evidence given in the previous section of this study of the 
antagonistic approach of the CDU/CSU opposition to the Ostpolitik 
in particular confirms this image, and it is not necessarily an in­
correct one; the assessment is based on a 'classical1 concept of 
'British-type' parliamentary opposition, whose activities begin and
59 Friedrich, 'Opposition im Deutschen Bundestag*, p. 405*
60 Opposition im Bundestag (Bonn, 1976), p. 193, an extended version 
of Friedrich's article does now refer to opposition cooperation 
in legislation in the sixth Bundesjtag - 'Parlamentarische Oppo­
sition in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Wandel und Konstanz* in 
Oberreuter, p. 257*
6-1 Opposition im Bundestag, p. 193; Veen's example here is the work 
by Becker & Wiesendahl.
62 . Ibid,
end in the plenary sessions of parliament and, as already noted, 
this is the conscious or unconscious model for the majority of 
authors on opposition. In any case, it is interesting to note 
that the antagonistic approach of the CDTJ/CSU opposition in the 
sixth Bundestag can also be 1 statistically demonstrated1. The 'most 
hardworking opposition ever’ was also the 'most antagonistic oppo­
sition ever* (with the exception of the SPD opposition in the first 
Bundestag): the number of times members were called to order or 
reprimanded was well over double the average for the previous 
eight years and there was a more than fourfold increase in the
number of times a member was called upon to return to the subject
■ 63 ■ '
under discussion or was not allowed to continue speaking. ■The 
most notable of these occasions have been described in the previous 
section of this study, showing, of course, that the at-times almost 
obsessional hostility of the CDU/CSU opposition towards the govern­
ment and its foreign policy was repaid in kind by the SPD/FDP. As 
already suggested, some members of the government side may have 
sought to encourage the more extremely negative style of opposition, 
or at least to keep it in the public memmory, in the knowledge that 
the antagonistic and ideological approach had been sufficiently 
discredited and could only harm electoral chances.
63 Peter Schindler,'Daten zur Tatigkeit und Zusammensetzung des 
1. bis 6. Deutschen Bundestages *, Zeitschrift fur Parlflments- 
fragen 1/1973> p. 6.
-  i yo -
3 Loyalty to the system as a primary function of opposition
The CDU/CSU opposition in the sixth Bundestag attempted not only
to combine cooperation with confrontation, but also) to continue in
its role as a'pillar of the state1, although no longer the governing
1Staatspartei'. In line with accepted definitions, it saw preservation
of the system as a primary aim of 'loyal* opposition, which, as
mentioned earlier, may be seen as 'part of government* or 'part of
the s t a t e S i n c e  past experiences of political successes or fail-
65ures obviously act to condition the pattern of opposition, * this 
was not unexpected* In the sixth Bundestag, great emphasis was placed 
on German political history by both sides, with the most obviously 
relevant period being the Weimar Republic. The experience of the 
disintegration of the Weimar system meant that-political parties 
in the Federal Republic felt obliged, and to a large extent still, 
feel obliged, to preface important policy statements, especially 
when changes are involved, by affirming their allegiance to the 
system. Although there were occasions in the sixth Bundestag when 
it was expressly stated that no one doubted the democratic and peace- 
loving nature of all the parliamentary parties, both sides mani­
festly felt that there was still enough doubt in the public mind 
to provide useful election material based on fears of a return of
64 Cf. p. 25 above; this appears to be. another way of saying that
opposition does, should or must at times behave 1governmenially'•
65 Cf. p. 19/20 above.
the ideological cleavages of the past.
The fact that the Federal Republic wa3 set up with the conscious
aim of avoiding a repetition of the collapse of the Weimar Republic
and that the new political system was based on an anti-communist
(and to a lesser extent anti-Razi) ‘negative consensus1 has been
demonstrated in the previous section of this study to have still
affected the behaviour and self-perception of the government and
opposition in the sixth Bundestag. Firstly, the ’continuous election
campaign’ in the Bundestag centres on the question of preserving
the system, when each side attempts to discredit the other by
suggesting that it is endangering the system. The stability of
voting and the usually high turn-out at elections in the Federal
Republic mean that this election campaign is largely a battle for
the few floating voters of the centre, although there must also be
attempts to retain the more extreme votes. In the sixth Bundestag
the CDU/CSU tended to appeal to continuing anti-communist sentiment
and to denounce the SPB for its past activities as ’opposition of
principle* towards the end of the Empire, as the government that
signed the treaty of Versailles and as a socialist, 'natural' oppo-
67sition party perhaps still suspected of communist sympathies. '
66 E.g., p. 88, Brandt; p. 125/126, von Guttenberg; p. 120, CDU/CSU.
67 It has been suggested that the SPB/FBP Ostpolitik and Deutsch- 
landpolitik were 'ideologically determined', and even that 
Marxism had penetrated the FDP by Anton Bohm, 'Opposition .-
so oder andersr', p. 93*
-  £ U U  -
Secondly, the anti-communist sentiment necessarily affected the 
reaction of the CDU/CSU to the Ostpolitik and its ability to 
suggest alternatives. Towards the end of the sixth legislative period 
when most of the concrete opposition objections to the treaties 
had been removed, the opposition case appeared to rest on two pillars 
the 'conservative* argument that the major objectives of self- 
determination and reunification had been endangered, and the anti­
communist argument that the SPD/FDP Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik 
were playing into the hands of the communists, and that the treaties 
were the 'work of the other side *.
These two arguments may perhaps be regarded as two sides of the
same coin since, as already stated, the whole system of the Federal
Republic was based on anti-communism, especially its foreign policy.
It could be argued that the CDU/CSR, as the former government
party closely identified with the state and the political system,
regarded the foreign policy tenets of twenty years as essential to
the system itself. It saw the preservation of that system as a
68primary function of loyal opposition and was therefore obliged 
to oppose any changes in foreign policy that might affect the 
status of the Federal Republic, which it still regarded as 'Provi- 
sorium Bundesrepublik’. In fact, it could be said that the ‘real’ 
status of the Federal Republic had long been that of a permanent
68 Cf. Hacke, p. 17/18j he refers to the competition between
government and opposition Mjeweils besser bzw. effektiver das 
Primat der Systemerhaltung zugewahrleisten".
state and not of a provisional creation of the international situ­
ation, and that the system had long ago survived the break with any 
chances of reunification or self-determination which resulted from
69Adenauer's Westpolitik. Nevertheless, it was almost a reflex 
action on the part of the CDU/CSU opposition to defend the tradi­
tional stance towards Eastern Europe, and.it apparently failed to 
appreciate that both the international situation and public opinion
at home had changed. The hope of detente brought about a reduction
70
in the need for security and reassurance, and therefore a lack of
•7*1
understanding of the CDU/CSm position. It was clear that pre­
servation of the system was no longer enough, and in any case some­
thing not compatible with the role of opposition, since it amounted 
to stagnation. Popular demand favoured progress and alternatives to 
previous policies, and now looked to the government for these.
The CDU/CSU was therefore unable to offer itself as a credible al­
ternative government because it chose to concentrate on Ostpolitik 
and Deutschlandpolitik. Its attitude in the plenary sessions of the 
sixth Bundestag dealing with these areas was generally antagonistic, 
and the resultant clashes were the occasion of renewed exaggeration
of old ideological differences, a type of conflict often felt to 
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be undesirable. These may be seen as useful and informative for
69 cf. p. 71.
70 cf. p. 79.
71 Cf. Kaltefleiter, Zwischen Konsens und Krise, p. 53*
72 E.g. by Achenbach, p. 111, by Kirst, p. 168.
the electorate, however, if the statements made by each side about 
the other are regarded as presenting "an extreme case from which it 
is perhaps easier to make a choice • . . than it would be from more 
circumspect and 'accurate' utterances. Each side's caricature of the
other represents a kind of truth which it is useful for voters to
73apprehend." Prom the result of the 1972 election it may be suggested 
that the government's efforts to 'caricature* the opposition were 
the more successful, since the parallels which could be drawn between 
the Federal Republic's first 'right-wing' opposition and the oppo­
sition of the right to the previous republic were all too obvious.^ 
The threat that the activity of the CDU/CSU opposition would en­
danger the system appeared greater than the likelihood that the 
Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik of the SPD/PDP government would 
do so. .
73 Butt, p. 300.
74 Merkl, an outside observer, states quite categorically:"StrauB 
and his adherents conducted themselves as the 'national Oppo­
sition' against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 
Ostpolitik" (p. 131)*
C The concept of opposition in the Federal Republic
1 The West German assessment of the importance of opposition
It was made clear in the sixth Bundestag that both sides were
conscious of the great importance of the 'proper* functioning
of parliamentary opposition for the stability and proven 'maturity
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of West German democracy. There was nevertheless an ambivalence 
of attitude, since the continuing presence of anti-oppositional 
sentiments was also apparent. The stress that many members of the 
Bundestag felt obliged to put on the significance even of details 
of the opposition's behaviour might perhaps be regarded as over­
compensation for the remains of an underlying 'German aversion 
to opposition'.There were suggestions on the onee hand that to
undervalue and even insult the opposition was to 'fail as a demo- 
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crat', but on the other, and much more frequently, that to
oppose the government in other than the 'prescribed w a y s w a s
78
to endanger democracy. It is interesting to note that in spite 
of the absence of a 'constitutional-legal warrant' for the parli­
amentary opposition, its functioning in the sense of ' control,
75 E.g., p. 82.
76 E.g., p. 134/5, p. 137.
77 Reference to an opposition 'ideology' will be made below.
78 E.g., p. 124, p. 152.
criticism, alternative' appears to be considered by some as almost
79a 'Verfassungsgebot' , while others deplore the fact that the 
opposition is obliged to take on the functions of control and criti­
cism alone, only because parliament as a whole is no longer con-
‘ ' 80 
forming to the separation of powers laid down in the Basic Law.
The difficulty in coming to terms with the fusion of government
and parliamentary majority is not confined to the politicians; it
is recognised by German political observers and constitutional
81lawyers as a 'neue Phase der Gewaltenteilung* , an expression 
used in an attempt to make the parliamentary situation in the 
'party state' conform to the traditional idea of the separation 
of powers, which the Basic Law is interpreted as perpetuating.
The legacies of German political and constitutional history are
apparent here as they have been throughout the development of the
West German idea of opposition. Confusion has been caused by the
suggested incompatibility of plebiscitary and representative de-
82mocratic concepts. It has been claimed that the ideas of 
Rousseau still predominate over the Anglo-Saxon conception in that 
" Identitat und Homogenitat des Volkes Ansatzpunkte aller staats-
79 Cf. p. 46/47 above; see also Walter Scheel, 'Opposition als 
Auftrag', Liberal 9 (19^7)» P* 577.
80 E.g., p. 104, 150/151, 149.
81 Cf. Norbert Gehrig, 'Gewaltenteilung zwischen Regierung und 
parlamentarischer Opposition', Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1971, 
p. 655 - 6-38; also Sternberger, 'Uber parlamentarische Opposition 
in G. Eisermann (ed.), Wirtschaft und Kultursystem (Stuttgart,
1955), p * 501.  ^ ; -
82 Ernst Praenkel, Die representative und die plebiszitare Kom- 
ponente im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat (Tubingen, 1958)*
theoretischen ijberlegungen ^sind|" . Hennis maintains that the
term ’pluralism1 is still used in West Germany today as a "Hilfs-
begriff, urn die im Hintergrund nicht kleinzukriegende Idee der 'Ein-
heit' des Volkswillens mit der Realitat der von Parteien und Ver-
banden bestiickten Konkurenzdemokratie in Einklang zu bringen".^ The
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term vas most notably used by Ernst Fraenkel in an attempt to re­
concile the West German and Anglo-Saxon concepts of democracy. He 
found that the idea that parliament is a place where pluralistic 
forces of society seek a balance of : interests never took root in 
Germany; the German idea of the general good was fixed, so that all 
opposition must be 'opposition of principle1. The ideas of 
Rousseau and the English parliamentary model had earlier been found
incompatible by Siegfried Landshut, since, as he comments, opposition
ft 7
to the volontfe generale would be treason. The fact that German
tradition automatically regards opposition as being anti-system is
88also dealt with at length by Waldemar Besson , whose article seeks
to explain why "Die deutsche Einschatzung der Opposition ist durch
89die Srfahrungen der Vergangenheit schwer belastet." The same
83 Hennis, 'Parlamentarische Opposition und Industriegesellschaft',
p. 206.
84 'Die Rolle des Parlaments', p. 207«
85 Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien (Stuttgart, 1973)•
86 Fraenkel, 'Historische Vorbelastungen des deutschen Parlamen- 
tarismus' Yiertel.jahreshef te fur Zeitgeschichte 8 (1960) , p.330*
87 'Form und Funktion der parlamentarischen Opposition', Eisermann,
p. 221.
88 ‘Regierung und Opposition in der deutschen Politik't
89 Ibid., p. 226. --
theme was later dealt with by Michael Hereth90, and most recently
91by Dieter Grosser , whose later version of his article still, claims
that because "Verstandnis fur die Aufgaben der Opposition ist in
up '
Deutschland aus historischen Griinden erschwert", and because of 
the pressure put on the opposition by the traditional German 'common 
interest' ethic, the impression is created that "die Allparteien.- 
regierung der geheime Wunseh nicht nur vieler Politiker, sondern 
auch einer durch den Parteienstreit verunsicherten Offentlichkeit 
ist".95 ..
It is seen as part of this traditional German dislike of opposition
that "Parlamentarische Opposition wird in der Bundesrepublik von
‘ 94. 'Wahlern, Journalisten und Wissenschaftlern unterbewertet". It is 
perhaps surprising to see this statement in an article of such recent 
date, since there is now a considerable amount of West German liter­
ature on the subject. However, it is a claim that has been made re­
peatedly in various forms since Dolf Sternberger first pointed out 
the somewhat paradoxical situation in the Federal Republic, where
opposition was a new and important phenomenon, yet not recognised
95in law and hardly noticed by political scientists. In 1966, Gerd
90 Die Parlamentarische Opposition in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
91 'Die Opposition in Deutschland* in Doeker & Steffani (1973)> later
extended as 'Die Sehnsucht nach Harmonie1 in Oberreuter (1975)
92 'Die Sehnsucht nach Harmonie', p. 208.
93 Ibid. p. 227.
94 Ibid. p. 206.
95 'tiber parlamentarische Opposition*, Eisermann, p. 303*
Schumann could still justify terming- opposition the ’Stiefkind der
96
deutschen Forschung’ and could comment on the continuing absence
of reference to the term in standard works and specialist handbooks 
. 97
on German politics. Three years later, Paul Kevenhorster again re-
' # Qg
marked on the lack of interest in opposition in Germany, and as re­
cently as 1972 Franz Nuscheler claimed ffWenn das Vorhandensein einer 
institutionalisierten Opposition das entscheidende Kriterium der 
Unterscheidung liberal-demokratisch-pluralistischer von diktatorisch- 
autoritar-monolithischen politischen Systemen bilden soil, . . dann
muB die politikwissenschaftliche Vernachlassigung dieser Institution
99
in der Tat verwundern.” Admittedly, an increased interest in 
opposition during and following the sixth legislative period could 
not be fully taken into account by Nuscheler. Nevertheless, it must 
at least be suggested that in view of the apparently unchanged feeling 
in Germany that opposition research is being neglected, there must 
be a continuing failure, or perceived failure, to come to terms with 
the presence and functioning of opposition in the political system. 
The impression given is that the fIdentifizierung der Demokratie 
durch Opposi tion' has been driven home hard in West Germany, and 
the result now seems to the outside observer more like over-preoccu-
96 Schumann, ’Die Opposition - Stiefkind der deutschen Forschung?*, 
Per Staat 1966, Heft 1, p. 81 - 95*
97 Ibid. p. 81/82.
98 ’Opposition in der Bundesrepublik*, Die neue Ordnung 19^9> Heft 
3, p. 204.
99 1 Oppositionsforschung’ , Zeitschrift fur Parlamentsfragen 1972, 
vol. 3, p. 253/254- —
100 Oberreuter, p. 8.
pation with opposition than neglect: perhaps the ’Stiefkind* is 
being over-indulged. The facts of the matter would not seem to 
justify the concern expressed by the authors mentioned above: in 
1974» Hans-Peter Schneider was able to produce a bibliography of 
almost 200 German titles, mostly directly concerned with parliamentary
'jQ't
opposition and nearly all dated between 1950 and 1972.
The point of concern is perhaps rather that the contents of most 
opposition research has remained unchanged, and this was mentioned 
by Nuscheler. Control., criticism, debate, alternative continue to 
be prescribed and continue to be at odds to some extent with both 
the ’Verfassung’ and the ’Verfassungswirklichkeit ’. The problem of 
parliamentary opposition in West Germany, in as far as one can still 
be said to exist, is partly the specifically German one of reconciling 
the concepts of opposition and democracy as discussed above, and 
partly the general one of reconciling the prescribed functions of 
the opposition with the realities of the ’modern, executive-oriented, 
welfare state’. The considerable attention paid in the sixth Bundes­
tag to the effect of the history of opposition in Germany on present 
conceptions and to the relationship between the functioning of 
opposition and the stability of the system may thus be seen as an 
expression of the coincidence of these two problems in West Germany*
101 Die parlamentarische Opposition im Verfassungsrecht der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 415 ff. Schneider states cate­
gorically: ”Seit dem Zusammenbruch des Nationalsozialismus hat 
die staats- und politikwissenschaftliche Beschaftigung mit Fragen 
der parlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesrepublik bis zur 
Gegenwart eine Breite und Intensitat erreicht wie nie zuvor in 
der neueren deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte1 (p. 123).
2 The West German 1ideology1 of opposition
The reference made several times above to 'proper1 or 'prescribed1
functioning of parliamentary opposition was intended to refer to
the universally accepted 'classical' opposition functions of control,
102criticism, alternative. A3 already noted two of these functions 
are mentioned explicitly in the 1971 Hamburg Constitution, 'control1 
presumably having been omitted in deference to a continuing commit­
ment to the separation of executive and legislative powers. State­
ments in the sixth Bundestag have shown that the West German concept
of parliamentary opposition was for the majority of politicians, as
it is. for most of the political observers referred to in this 
study, not unexpectedly still modelled on the 'classical' British 
type of opposition. There was a conscious effort by.both sides in .
the sixth Bundestag to express their espousal to this model and by 
the CDU/CSU opposition to conform to it. At the same time, the self­
perception of the opposition seems to have changed little with the 
change of roles: the fifth Bundestag members' conception of the role
of opposition was found by a survey to be either of a powerless per-
. 103
manent minority or of a parliamentary 'Hitarbeiter'. These con­
ceptions are reflected in the CDU/CSh distaste for the role of
102 Cf. p. 45. . . . .
103 Hans llaier et al. (eds.), Zuin Pari amen tsverstandnis des fiinften 
Deutschen Bundestages (Munich, 1969)> P*43»
opposition and reluctance to accept it, and in the emphasis placed
on working on legislation. It was made clear that members of the
opposition also felt themselves to be members of parliament as a
whole and their attitudes fluctuated according to which group they
were identifying with. Because of the continuing uncertainty as to
the 'division of powers' and the character of the Bundestag as on
balance an 1 Arbeitsparlament1, the functions of cooperation and
'behaving constructively* must be added to. those prescribed by the
'classical' model of opposition. The numerous allusions to the
desirability of cooperation and 'constructive1 behaviour in the
sixth Bundestag have already been noted, especially in relation to
the Ostpolitik.However, the addition of cooperation to the
list of opposition functions may be seen as a contradictionj in as
far as 'Mitarbeiten1, in parliamentary committees for example, is
'Mitregieren', there is no clear group out of government and ready
105'co provide an alternative government. _ This is in fact a return 
to the problem of considering opposition as 'part of government' or 
of terming its activities 'governmental *. It is perhaps a re­
flection of the impi’ecise Anglo-Saxon conception of government, as 
against pai'liarnent, as the legislator that cooperation in legisla-
104 Oee aiso Anton Bohm, 'Opposition - so oder anders?', p. 89*
105 Of. p. 2 above, Lipset; also Schneider, p. 119/120
106 Seep. 185 - 192; cf. p. 198, n.64.
tion is seen as a governmental activity: it is seen by German ob­
servers and by the members of the Bundestag as a parliamentary 
activity, in which the parliamentary groups of 'ins' and ‘outs' are 
not necessarily decisive.
Both sides in the sixth Bundestag stated that they expected control,
criticism, alternatives and cooperation from the opposition. In spite
of the many outbursts to the contrary it was taken for granted that
the opposition should be and v/ished to be 'responsible' , 'loyal'
107and 'constitutional' ; it was obviously also the desire of tne
CDU/CSU to be seen as 'competitive1, 'systematic', 'cohesive* and
108'distinct', and above all 'temporary'. It is clear that these 
terms of opposition classification can be used in a confusing array 
of combinations, but they are merely the attributes thought to be 
most conducive to the 'proper' functioning of opposition. In total 
they describe the West German public 'ideal* of opposition, which . 
seems, predictably, to be a mixture of the British-type opposition 
model and the *continental-European-German' parliamentary model. The
British model, with modifications, vas a natural choice in post-war .
109 110West Germany and was advocated notably by Sternberger and Seidel
German studies of parliamentary, opposition tended to concentrate on 
the ideas of Bolingbroke and the development of the British parlia-
107 See p. 17 above.
108 Cf. Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, p. 332; 
also p. 18 above ; and Goiter Pieroth, p. $$0.
109 'Uber parlamentarische Opposition', p. $1$«
110 'Die punktion der Opposition', p. 24*
1 1 1mentary ‘alternation* system. Kurt Kluxen at one time even des­
cribed the confrontation between government and opposition in 18th
century England as corresponding to the “sittlichen Kampf im Einzel- 
112menschen", While this is an exceptional example, it indicates the 
direction of some German thinking on the ^classical* model of 
opposition. The fact that neither the present-day British opposition 
nor other oppositions such as the West German opposition* which 
attempts to combine an imitation of the British model with ’conti- 
nental-Suropean* parliamentary legislative duties, can continue to 
operate along ‘classical* lines in modern industrialised states is
one major reason for the pessimistic thinking on opposition referred
. , ' 113-to aoove.
In particular, some problems concerned, with the function of
parliamentary opposition stem from a gap between the ‘ideology’
and the perceived real possibilities regarding control of the govern- 
114
rnent. The liberal democratic notion that the power of the majority
11Smust be controlled and the rights of minorities protected has led 
to the assumption that dualism is basic to democracy. The function
111 E.g. , Kurt Kluxen, Das Problem der politlschen Opposition 
(Freiburg, 1956); Ingeborg Bode, .Pr sprung und Be griff der 
pariamentarischen Opposition (Stuttgart, 1962).
^ 2  Parlamentarismus, p. 395»
113 This adherence to the British model has prompted Schneider to 
claim: "V/er . . glaubt, den englischen Parlamentarismus einer be- 
stimmten geschichtlichen Epoche verabsolutieren und als 'Ideal- 
modell . . empfehlen zu konnen, muS sich den Vorwurf der Ideoli- 
•sierung gefallen lassen" (p. 128)4 see also p. 52 above.
114 Of. p, 21 - 23.
115 Of. p. 22.
116 Most recently in west Germany Gehrig, Parlament - Regierung - 
Opposition, p. 18; see also p. 10 - 12 & 14 above.
of controlling government has been seen to have passed from parli­
ament as a whole to the parliamentary opposition according to the 
’classical* model* This 'new division of powers' has then led to 
opposition being seen as the guarantee of freedom and therefore of
-j -J 7
democracy. The continuing adherence to the executive/legislative 
conception of the division of powers in the sixth Bundestag is there­
fore perhaps not only an indication of the belief of some members
in the unity of parliament; acceptance of the ’new division of 
118powers’ theory is also hindered by the realisation that ultimate
control of the government by the opposition appears impossible in
119the party state. Too much is expected of the parliamentary oppo­
sition if its very existence is identified with the control of
120 121government power and even with democracy itself. While it
may be an exaggeration to speak of an 'ideology* of opposition, the 
fact that West German politicians and political observers seem to 
have accepted, what may now be seen as a somewhat dogmatic or at least 
narrow definition of the functions of parliamentary opposition,, in 
the face of conditions and practices in parliamentary/party states 
such as the Federal Republic, is arguably a major cause for dis­
satisfaction with or distaste for the role of opposition.
117 Siegfried Landshut has used the term 'Wachter der Freihe.it V  
Eisermann p. 228; similarly Gunther Olsog, ’GroBe Koalition oder 
Opposition?' Politische Studien 17 (19^6), p. 284; with reference 
to the sixth Bundestag, Barzei, 'Die Rolle der Opposition’ p.yO.
118 Cf. p. 204*
119 B.g* p* 104, 131/2, 149.
120 As by Gehrig, p. 83; see also Theodor Eschenburg, Staat und Ge- 
sellschaft in Deutschland 4th ed. (Stu11gart, 1965), p. 291*
121 Cf. p*1] - 3 above; also introductory speech to 6th Bundestag by
—  I * -f
5 Pessimistic views of opposition in West Germany
The difficulty of combining the 'classical1 functions of parlia­
mentary opposition with legislative cooperation, and of carrying 
out the control function in particular, has been shown above to 
contribute to pessimistic views of opposition in Y/est Germany. The 
additional problem of the 'alternative' function is, however, per­
haps the most responsible for the ideas already described above
"122 123under 'the decline of opposition' and 'Oppositionspessimismus ' .
As already discussed, the rise of catch-all parties and the decrease 
in class differences in modern societies such as the Federal Republic 
has been considered likely to minimise differences of interest, 
making alternatives often superfluous. Alternatives are in any case 
claimed to be a practical impossibility in complex, industrialised, 
executive-oriented, welfare states, -where government information, 
planning and provision can meet every need. Yet in the sixth Bundes­
tag the CDU/CSU opposition often claimed to be offering alternatives
1 2 /iand saw this as an important part of its role. + The government, 
too, constantly replied to opposition objections to the Ostpolitik 
by demanding, albeit somewhat cynically, to know the alternatives. . 
Tnere was certainly no sign in the plenary sessions of a general 
resignation to the 'Opposition ohne Alternative* theory. ,
122 p. 27 - 29.
123 p. 52 ff.
124 B.g. , farzel's statement on the CDIT/CSU concept of the role
of opposition, p. 86 a'bove.
As suggested above, the views of Kirchheimer, Friedrich, Hennis,
Forsthoff, Krippendorff and others may perhaps be 'seen as part of
125
the traditional criticism of parliament and parties in Germany.
It must also be remembered that they originated during the period 
of 'permanent' CDU/CSU supremacy in the Federal Republic. It has 
been suggested that the claims of the constraints of modern industri­
alised society on the functioning of opposition may be exaggerated
126
and anyway are based on an out-dated conception of alternatives.
Otto Kirchheimer, especially, was firstly concerned to explain the 
disappearance of ‘opposition of p r i n c i p l e w h i c h  is based on funda­
mental differences between government and opposition, on ideological 
antagonisms of the past. He saw the limitation and eventual decline 
of ‘loyal’ opposition as a logical consequence of the removal of 
these fundamental differences and the resultant end 01 'opposition 
of principle’. However, some west German observers have now rejected 
this theory and the related ones of the above-mentioned authors.
They argue, for example, that "die Entvicklung zur ,fmodernen Industrie 
gesellschaft" auch die Oppositionsfunktionen verandert hat, daS also 
insbesondere die Alternativfunktiori zugunsten anderer, wesentlich 
wirksamerer Oppositionsstrategien (innovation, Aggregation, Publi- '
kation, Partizipation) vollig in den Hintergrund tritt, ja sogar
125 Cf. p. 55*
12o Gchneider, p.154; see also Kevenhorster (p.207), who claims the
loss 01 function of the opposition cannot be explained by the 
welfare state.
bewuBt vernachlassigt werden kann, ohne die Effektivitat der Oppo-
127sition ernstlich zu beeintrachtigen"$ or similarly that -the 
'pessimists’ were mistaken:"Ihren Irrtum hatten sie einer rigiden 
Interpretation der Alternativfunktion und der unzutreffenden An- 
nahme automatischer Machtalternation im parlamentarischen Regierungs-
-j 2 q
systemen zu verdanken."
As shown, however, the CDU/CSTJ opposition in the sixth Bundestag
expected, and was expected, to offer altex’natives. Anton Bdhm has
claimed that the government constantly demanded ’constructive
alternatives' in order to be able to chose the best ideas for its 
129own use. He further maintained that the opposition had offered
its ’better ideas' in order to avoid the negative results of govern- 
1
ment policies: " this would seem to be a version of 'mitregieren'. 
Other authors state similarly that it has become the custom in 
the Federal Republic for. criticism by the parliamentary opposition 
to evoke demands for 'constructive alternatives’ so that criticism 
without alternatives is seen as irresponsible or even unpatriotic.^^ 
A credible critical opposition must have an alternative programme as 
well as alternative personnel, it is claimed.1^2 Confusingly, a 
membei* of the CDU/CSU opposition, Manfred Hattich, appears to regard
127 Schneider, p. 154*
128 Oberreuter, p. 21.
129 'Opposition - so oder anders?', p. 89-, see also Veen, p. 21.
130 Ibid., p. 91.
131 Huscheler & Steffani, p. 63.
132 Ibid.
the offering of alternatives as possibly irresponsible and seems to
be resigned to the constraints of modern, complex society: "Es kann
nicht Aufgabe der Opposition sein, in einem System mit hochgradigem
Konsens durch angestrengte Suche nach Alternativprogrammen konsens-
133sprengend zu wirken". The opposition in the sixth Bundestag did, 
however, offer alternatives, even on the Ostpolitik, where consensus 
was apparently regarded by both sides as most desirable.
The theory of the decline of opposition due to the loss, particularly, 
of its function as an alternative government was regarded by some 
non-German observers as having been disproved even before the change
of power in West Germany and the ••'revival of not only a strong but
”134 135an articulate opposition in the sixth Bundestag. It was
suggested that the welfare state might increase expectations so that
. —  136
more disappointed voters would wish to effect a change of power.
Folloving the election results in a number of countries, as well as
in West Germany in 1969, there was wider acceptance tha.t parliamentary
opposition could still hope to function as an. alternative govern- 
137ment. The previous acceptance of the concept of overwhelming 
consensus in the 'classless, welfare state' had perhaps been a re­
flection, in Germany at least, of a continuing traditional desire
133 ’Die Opposition in der pariamentarischen Demokratie* in G. Goiter
• & S. Pieroth (2nd ed.) p. 111.
134 Gerhard Loewenberg, ''The patterns of political opposition in 
Germany' in K. Commager et. al. (eds.), Festschrift fur Karl 
hoewnstein (Tubingen, 1971), P* 340.
135 Seymour Martin Upset & Stein Hokkan, Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments: cross-national perspectives (New York, 19&7) P»53*
136 Ibid. ' y
137 Cf. Roland Schneider, Die CDU/CSU Opposition, p.5*
1 5 8for harmony. It has been pointed out by Adolf Arndt that oppo­
sition would only die out in the welfare state if such a state could
159really create a conflict-free society. According to Dahl, conflict
potentials are not necessarily reduced by economic satisfaction,
since ‘classless’ societies still contain enough political and.other
inequalities.^^ Hennis, too, admits that his previously stated
views do not justify “daran zu zweifeln, daB fur die Bundesrepublik
das parlamentarische System alternierender Regierungen noch immer
von hinreichenden gesellschaftlichen Spannungen und "Polarisierungen”
gespeist und motiviert wird. Ss zum alten Eisen zu werfen, besteht 
141
kein AnlaS". It is agreed that differences must remain, and the
fact that they are not fundamental in terms of traditional ideologies
does not mean that the opposition’s function is no longer to offer
alternatives; rather, Mder Begriff der Alternative jjrerliert)'..*•'
seine terminologische Starrheit.. Nicht das zwanghafte Beziehen kon-
■sequenter Gegenpositionen, auch nicht die Ritualisierung eines
„advocatus diaboli", sondern nicht mehr und nicht veniger als die
Brmoglichung einer anderen Option ist die reale AXternativfunktion
der Opposition. Das setzt keine sachliche Gegensatzlichkeit, aher
142graduelle Verschiedenheiten voraus." +
158 Cf. Dahrendorf's ’Sehnsucht nach Synthese’, B. Grosser’s ’Sehn- 
sucht nach Karmonie', etc.
139 ‘Opposition’, p. 15.
140 Robert Dahl (ed»), Regimes and Oppositions, (New Haven, 1973)»
p. 18.
141 fi)ie Rolls des Parlaments1 , p. 227*
142 Veen, Opposition im Bundestag, p. 20.
This last argument by Veen appears realistic and persuasive in re­
lation to the actual differences between government and opposition 
by the end of the sixth Bundestag. Nevertheless, the markedly 
ideologically ’loaded’ controversies over the SPD/FDP Ostpolitik 
and Deutschlanapolitik would seem, at least superficially, to
confirm the view of Gunther Gaus, who claimed in 19&5 that ideology
143was only ’scheintot’. Differences between the government and 
opposition were exaggerated by the use of ideological rhetoric and 
what seem to the outside observer as transparently groundless 
insinuations of extreme ideological affiliations. The apparently 
devastating effect of a single word or name has already been noted. 
Both government and opposition seemed to believe that controversies 
must appear fundamental in order to be credible, in spite of re­
peated concern that such open conflict could be damaging to viest 
German democracy. Although these controversies did not reflect deep 
existing differences in West German society, they stirred memories 
of the past and, latent fears effectively.. Increased polarisation of 
opinion on the Ostpolitik was the result and the impression was' 
created that the CDU/CSU opposition had revived 'classical’ oppo­
si tion.
143 Bonn ohne Kegierung? Kanz1erregiment und Opposition. Bericht, 
Analyse, liri tik (Munich, 19&5), p* 19*
<44 A.g. , p® 88 ’uugenberg’ , p. 141 ’Mosicau' , p. 156 'Versailles’, 
p. 161 !Sportpalast'.
D Political conflict and political stability in the Federal 
Republic
The conflict between the revived parliamentary opposition and the 
government in the sixth Bundestag was regarded with distaste and 
even apprehension by many of the participants and observers, demon­
strating the continuation of the German tradition of the avoidance 
of conflict. Individual members of all the parliamentary parties 
expressed their disapproval of conflict, especially on issues of 
such national importance as the Ostpolitik. However, as fears proved 
groundless, the open controversy ina.j perhaps in retrospect be seen 
as advantageous, rather than damaging, to the stability of the 
political system. The completion of the Ostpolitik had the end effect
of legitimising the separate and permanent existence of the West 
145 ,
German sxate. The fact that the system withstood the conflict 
and crises of the sixth Bundestag further lent legitimacy to the 
party system and to government by either party. The outcome of the 
1972 election following the premature dissolution of the sixth Bundes 
tag showed that a two group system of alternation between government 
and opposition had been accepted by the electorate of the Federal 
liepublic. The fact that there had been-demonstrations against the 
use of the constructive vote of no confidence illustrated the 
feeling of the electorate that it should assign the roles of govern-
145 Gf. Gmith, ’West Germany and the Politics of Centrality’, p.399*
merit and opposition. In the opinion of some commentators, the fact 
that in 1972 the FDP firmly declared its intention of coalescing 
with the SPD before the election set a precedent, so that the 
electorate will in future always be able to vote directly for a
4 A f.
potential government. The elections will therefore take on more 
of the character of a plebiscite on the government.
The polarisation of opinion over the Ostpolitik divided the Bundes­
tag clearly into government and opposition sides, and although the
concept of parliament as a body was still upheld to varying degrees,
147and even very consistently by some members of the opposition, the
factual situation was unmistakable in the plenary sessions. The
separation of the two sides of pai’liament was effectively demonstrated
in the controversy over the Ostpolitik, as was the dependence of the
government on parliament when the opposition used the constructive
vote of no confidence. As Hennis has pointed out, this may have led
to a change in the concept of parliamentary democracy in the Federal 
1A R
Republic. He suggests that the Stabilisation of a two group system 
is now seen to be not so much the result of constitutional provisions 
or even of changes in society as of the functioning and development 
of the Bundestag and of the fact that it appears to have passed on 
its elective function to the electorate. A weakening of the German 
tradition of legalism might possibly result from this experience
146 E.g*, Hennis, ’Die Rolle des Parlaments’, p. 234.
147 E.g. , von Vrangel..
149 'Die Rolle- des Parlaraents1, p. 235-
and particularly from the management of the parliamentary crisis
of 1972. Hennis expresses the hope that the common sense 'manipulation*
of the Basic Law in order to effect the dissolution of the sixth
Bundestag "dem Syndrom Verfassung/Verfassungswirklichkeit einiges
,149an Brisanz genommen hat."
It would seem that the experience beginning in 1969 of the
successful functioning of the parliamentary system is most important
in helping to solve Germany’s ’historic problem of reconciling
150political conflict with political stability*. The traditions of
151German political culture referred to above continue to be present 
and to influence the development and perception of the political 
system, but they may now in some instances be regarded as less 
disadvantageous than was previously supposed. The change in the 
pattern of opposition in 1969 from the ’invisibility* and 'decline* 
seen as part of the 1 confliet-avoidance ’ tradition to an apparent^ 
almost 1 classicalpattern demonstrated the stability and maturity 
of the West German political system and the viability of parliamentary 
opposition and of a system of al tei’nation: the experience was par~ 
ticularly effective since it coincided with what must be regarded 
as the settlement of the international status of the Federal Republic.
)
149 'Die Rolle des Parlaments*. p. 254.
150 Gerhard Loewenberg, 'The patterns of political opposition in 
Germany*, p. 33Q*
151 See p. 30/31. ■
The endorsement of the Ostpolitik by the electorate in the 1972 
elections may be regarded as evidence of acceptance on the one hand 
of a realistic rather than legalistic stance in foreign policy, and 
on the other of the ability of either major party to govern, conduct 
foreign policy and be identified with the state. The change of power 
in 1969 had spelt the end of the permanent identification of one 
party with the state and the beginning of the concept of both govern­
ment and opposition as part of the state and responsible for it. In-
152deed the parties are claimed to have assimilated the state tradition 
and thus brought about the acceptance of the party state.
Opinion varies as to whether the 19&9 ~ 72 pattern of opposition
was closer to the norm for the Federal Republic than the pattern of
invisible* opposition under the Grand Coalition. The circumstances.
and issues were obviously exceptional, but it is impossible to say
whether, without the Ostpolitik, the pattern would have been different.
As Loewenberg' has claimed, the pattern changed independently of the
socio-economic conditions and political-cultural traditions- thought
153to be decisive in determining it. He explains the change of power
in terms of coalition theory: simply that "coalitions tend toward
154the minimum size which permits them to govern11 , since this size 
rs most advantageous for the participants. It may also be argued
152 E.g., by Hyson, Party, State and Bureaucracy, p. 11.
153 'The patterns of political opposition in Germany', p. 338. 
134 Ibid.-, p. 339-
that the centripetal W o  group system which resulted meant that there 
was increased incentive for lively controversy and more competition
■j r c
for the votes of the centre than previously. In contrast, there­
fore, to the often pessimistic views of the past, the conclusion may 
be drawn here that the evolution of a system of government and 
opposition alternation, which began with the sixth Bundestag, and the 
resulting increased political stability of the Federal Republic, 
were demonstrated to have been determined as much by the practicali­
ties of politics as by their specifically German environment.
155 Statements in the sixth Bundestag such as that of JtrauB, p.147, 
confirm this, although the predominance of 'ideological* 
controversies does not. .
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